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1Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: 
A Critical Analysis of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service 
I. Introduction. 
 
A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently dropped 
a bombshell on Federal income tax jurisprudence by holding in Murphy v. Internal 
Revenue Service1 that Congress violated the United States Constitution by attempting to 
tax a personal injury award that compensated the taxpayer for emotional and reputational 
injuries.  The decision has caused an uproar in the tax community, and many expect the 
decision to encourage an already booming tax protestor industry.2
The tax community’s primary criticism has focused on the harm done by the 
decision to income tax theory and jurisprudence.3 These criticisms miss the mark, 
however, because the decision was not moored on tax theory or jurisprudence.  Rather, 
the court of appeals concluded that Ms. Murphy’s damages award would not have been 
considered “income” in 1913, when the 16th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was adopted,4 and therefore could not constitutionally be subject to tax.5
This paper disputes virtually every aspect of the court of appeals’ decision in 
Murphy.  The first question considered by the court of appeals in Murphy was whether 
Ms. Murphy’s damages award was statutorily excluded from income under IRC6 section 
104(a)(2).  The version of IRC section 104(a)(2) applicable to Ms. Murphy’s damages 
award excluded from income all recoveries “on account of a personal physical injury or 
physical sickness.”7 The statute also provided that “emotional distress shall not 
constitute a physical injury or physical sickness.”8 The court of appeals wrongly 
concluded that the award could not be excluded from income under IRC section 
104(a)(2) because the Department of Labor hearing panel that issued the award referred 
only to “emotional distress” and “professional reputation” in the heading of the award.  
The court of appeals’ focus on the language used in the heading of the award was 
 
1460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
2 See e.g. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Tax Law Ruling by Court May Encourage New Challenges (August 23, 
2006), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=azSsFNBVDjJ8&refer=us
(quoting criticism from Yale Law School tax professor Michael Graetz, Former IRS Commissioner Donald 
C. Alexander, and University of Cincinnati Law School tax professor Paul Caron); Tax Prof Commentary 
after Murphy (2006), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/08/tax_prof_commen.html
(quoting ten tax law professors criticizing various aspects of the decision primarily on the basis of tax 
theory). 
3 Id. Eight of the ten professors argued either that the decision did not comport with modern tax theory, 
that the decision failed to consider tax policy, or that the precise holding – that IRC § 104(a) is 
unconstitutional – wrongly focused on an exception to an exclusion rather than the operative provision 
(IRC § 61).  Only two of the ten professors discussed the definitional issue, and only one professor, 
Stephen Bank, questioned the fundamental basis for the Court’s ruling – the reliance on later 
pronouncements to define the 1913 meaning of “income.”   
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (1913). 
5 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92 (holding IRC section 104(a)(2) unconstitutional to the extent it permits Congress 
to tax Ms. Murphy’s emotional and reputational damage award).   
6 All citations to the IRC are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, Title 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.  
(2006). 
7 IRC § 104(a)(2). 
8 IRC § 104 (flush language). 
2misplaced.9 The court of appeals should have focused on whether Department of Labor’s 
award, in fact, included compensation for physical injuries or physical sickness.  Even the 
court of appeals recognized that the Department of Labor intended the award to 
compensate Ms. Murphy for the physical manifestations of emotional distress that she 
suffered.10 
Instead of asking whether the language in the heading of the award was 
sufficiently particular, the court of appeals should have asked whether Ms. Murphy’s 
physical manifestations of emotional distress constituted a “personal physical injury” 
within the meaning of the statutory language.  Had the court of appeals reviewed the 
legislative history of the statute, as had the scores of other courts to consider the 
question,11 the court of appeals would have discovered that Congress did not intend 
physical manifestations of emotional distress to constitute a “personal physical injury or 
physical sickness” within the meaning of the statute.12 The court of appeals thus 
correctly determined that Ms. Murphy’s award was not statutorily excluded from income 
by IRC section 104(a)(2), but for the wrong reason.13 
Second, after determining that the award was not specifically excluded from 
income, the court of appeals in Murphy should have considered whether the income tax 
law required Ms. Murphy to include her award in income, so that it would be subject to 
taxation.14 Instead, the court of appeals wrongly concluded that the exclusion in IRC 
section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional for exceeding the grant of power contained in the 
16th Amendment of the United States Constitution.15 Even if the court of appeals’ 
constitutional analysis were correct, it held the wrong provision unconstitutional.  Section 
104(a)(2) is not the provision of the IRC requiring Ms. Murphy’s damage award to be 
included in income.  Section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion provision.  Before considering the 
constitutional validity of the statute, the court of appeals should have determined 
whether, notwithstanding the lack of an exclusion in section 104(a)(2), some other 
provision of the IRC required Ms. Murphy to include her award in income.   
It is IRC section 61 that requires “all income from whatever source derived” to be 
included in gross income and thus be subject to tax.  It is the application of IRC section 
61 to Ms. Murphy’s damages award that would be unconstitutional, if the court of 
appeals correctly concluded that Ms. Murphy’s damage award could not constitutionally 
be taxed.16 To reach the constitutional question, the court of appeals should first have 
considered whether Ms. Murphy’s damage award constituted “income” within the 
meaning of IRC section 61 – for if the statute did not reach Ms. Murphy’s damage award, 
the court of appeals could not consider whether or not the statute was constitutional.17 
In reaching the constitutional question, the court of appeals must implicitly have 
concluded that Ms. Murphy’s damage award was “income” within the meaning of IRC 
section 61.  Ironically, the court of appeals’ unexpressed but necessary holding that Ms. 
 
9 See discussion infra Part III beginning on page 5. 
10 See discussion infra at note 51. 
11 See infra note 73. 
12 See discussion infra Part III.C beginning at page 10. 
13 See discussion infra Part III.C beginning at page 10. 
14 See discussion infra Part III.D beginning at page 14 
15 See discussion infra Part III.D beginning at page 14. 
16 Id.
17 See infra note 35.  
3Murphy’s award constituted income within the meaning of section 61, but not within the 
meaning of the 16th Amendment, would have been contrary to its suggestion that the 
word “income” in the IRC was synonymous with the word “income” in the 16th 
Amendment.18 
Many tax experts believe that the court of appeals should not have reached the 
constitutional question.19 They believe that the Ms. Murphy’s award either was income 
under both IRC section 61 and the 16th Amendment (in which case it could 
constitutionally be taxed), or under neither provision (in which case the statute simply 
would not reach the award).  This analysis ignores the evolution of the statute.  Congress 
clearly intended for non-physical-injury awards to be included in gross income under IRC 
section 61 when it added the “physical injury or physical sickness” requirement to IRC 
section 104(a)(2) in 1996.20 Congress’s intended meaning for IRC section 61 at the time 
it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) in 1996 should prospectively govern the interpretation 
of the statutory scheme.21 Thus, the court of appeals in Murphy was correct in reaching 
the constitutional question, although it failed to meet its obligation to first explicitly hold 
that IRC section 61 required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income.  By failing to 
properly address the statutory issue, the court of appeals in Murphy failed to address the 
apparent conundrum of the word “income” having a different meaning under the 16th 
Amendment than under IRC section 61.22 
The final question is whether Congress had the constitutional power to tax Ms. 
Murphy’s damages award.  The court of appeals concluded that Congress lacked the 
constitutional power to tax Ms. Murphy’s compensatory personal injury award because 
the award did not constitute “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.23 
Unlike the court of appeals’ two prior mistakes, in which it reached the correct 
conclusion for the wrong reason, this time the court of appeals’ flawed constitutional 
analysis led to the wrong result.   
 
18 See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85 (“The Supreme Court has held the word "incomes" in the Amendment and 
the phrase "gross income" in § 61(a) of the IRC are coextensive.”).  In fact, the Supreme Court did not say 
in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940), that the word “income” in the Act and in the 16th 
Amendment was coextensive.  The Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680, had defined gross income to include 
all "gains, profits, and income derived . . . from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or 
sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in 
such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on 
for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." The Court in Clifford 
merely stated that “The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full 
measure of its taxing power within those definable categories.”  Id. Using the full measure of Congress’s 
taxing power in a defined manner is different than the word income having the same meaning.  Congress 
may have had multiple means of implimenting an income system.  For example, Congress could have taxed 
income accruing annually rather than taxing income upon the occurrence of an event of realization.  By 
intending the chosen system to have a broad reach does not negate the possibility that other systems could 
have been constitutionally chosen.   
19 The author engaged in a lengthy debate on the TaxProf discussion board with, among others, Professor 
Joseph Dodge of Florida State University College of Law over this point.  Professor Dodge contended that 
Congress’s amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) in 1996 could not change the meaning of section 61, 
which should be governed by the text of the statute.   
20 See discussion infra beginning at note 84 
21 Id.
22 See discussion infra beginning at note 86. 
23 See discussion infra Part IV beginning at page 20. 
4First, the court of appeals erred in stating, without the citation of any authority, 
that Congress’s power to tax emanates from the 16th Amendment.24 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly and long held that the 16th Amendment granted no new power of 
taxation.  The taxing power has always emanated from Article I of the Constitution, and 
has long been recognized to encompass far more than income.25 Because of the court of 
appeals’ initial error in failing to recognize the Constitution’s original grant to Congress 
of taxing power in Article I, the court of appeals failed to analyze the alternative 
constitutional bases for Congress to tax Ms. Murphy’s personal injury award without 
apportionment – as a “duty or excise.”  A careful review of tax history shows that the 
Supreme Court repeatedly recognized Congress’s ability to tax transactions, whether 
involving the sale or exchange of property or the sale of human capital, as duties or 
excises, long before the 16th Amendment was adopted.26 Ms. Murphy engaged in just 
such a transaction when she received cash in exchange for her emotional distress 
damages.  Therefore, Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to tax 
Ms. Murphy’s damages award even if it was not “income” under the 16th Amendment, 
because Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she exchanged her emotional distress 
damages for cash. 
In addition, the court of appeals erred in failing to consider whether a tax on 
human capital would ever be direct tax requiring apportionment under Article I of the 
Constitution.  A careful reading of precedent suggests that the taxation of human capital, 
unlike financial capital, has never been treated as property or wealth, and has always been 
treated as a legitimate subject for indirect taxation.27 
Second, the court of appeals erred in holding that Ms. Murphy’s award was not 
income under the 16th Amendment.  The court of appeals cited no credible authority for 
its conclusion that the adoptors of the 16th Amendment intended for compensatory 
recoveries not to be included in income.  The court of appeals relied on two 
administrative rulings issued years after the adoption of the 16th Amendment and made 
in the light of later-rejected Supreme Court statutory interpretations.28 The court of 
appeals in Murphy ignored the fact that Congress has always treated wage payments as 
income, and wage payments are, like personal injury damage awards, payments in 
exchange for human capital.29 The court of appeals failed to cite any proper authority 
arising before or contemporaneously with the adoption of the 16th Amendment to suggest 
that receipts from human capital would not be considered income.  Ms. Murphy received 
“income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment when she received the award 
because her financial wealth was increased as a result of the award.  The 16th 
Amendment gave Congress, not the courts, the power to decide whether or not the 
increase in financial wealth should be subject to taxation.   
In sum, the court of appeals’ statutory and constitutional analysis was flawed, and 
its conclusions were erroneous.  The Constitution and the 16th Amendment gave 
Congress the power to decide questions of tax policy within its broad limits.  The court of 
 
24 See infra note 102 
25 See discussion infra Part IV.A beginning at page 20. 
26 See discussion infra Part IV.A beginning at page 20 
27 See discussion infra Part IV.A(6)(b) beginning at page 45. 
28 See discussion infra Part IV.A(5) beginning at page 39. 
29 See discussion infra Part IV.A(2) beginning at page 24. 
5appeals has usurped Congress’s power over tax policy questions, and its decision 
threatens the smooth operation of the tax system – which is the lifeblood of government.  
The decision should promptly be overturned. 
 
II. Procedural History of the Murphy Decision 
 
Marrita Murphy, a former employee of the New York Air National Guard, 
brought a claim before the Department of Labor under various whistle blower statutes, 
alleging that she was blacklisted by her employer for complaining to state authorities 
about environmental hazards at an airbase.30 At her hearing before the Department of 
Labor, Ms. Murphy introduced evidence showing that she suffered physical 
manifestations from her emotional distress.  According to the court of appeals, “Upon 
finding Murphy had also suffered from other ‘physical manifestations of stress’ including 
‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness,’ the ALJ recommended 
compensatory damages totaling $ 70,000, of which $45,000 was for ‘emotional distress 
or mental anguish,’ and $25,000 was for ‘injury to professional reputation’ from having 
been blacklisted.”31 
Ms. Murphy paid income taxes on her personal injury award, but then brought an 
action in the United States District Court against both the IRS and the United States for a 
tax refund and for declarative and injunctive relief.32 The government then moved to 
dismiss the IRS as an improper party, and sought summary judgment on the merits.   
The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the 
injunction claims were properly brought against the IRS, but granted the government’s 
motion for summary judgment on the merits.  The district court also denied Ms. 
Murphy’s cross motion for summary judgment.33 Ms. Murphy appealed the grant of 
summary judgment to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  The government did not 
appeal from the denial of its motion to dismiss the IRS. 
The court of appeals began by holding that the IRS was not a proper party, and 
should have been dismissed.34 However, because the refund action against the United 
States was properly brought, the court of appeals then proceeded to consider the merits of 
the refund action.   
 
III. The Statutory Questions. 
 
30 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 81. 
31 Id. at 82. 
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. The court of appeals in Murphy considered this question, even though the government had not 
appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss, because the issue concerned the court of appeals’ jurisdiction 
over the IRS.  Id. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the IRS, holding that 
the government did not waive its sovereign immunity for declaratory and injunctive relief suits in tax 
controversies, citing 28 U.S.C. section 2201(a) (no waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to 
declaratory relief actions “with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”), and IRC section 7421(a) (prohibiting injunctions restraining 
assessment or collection of taxes).  Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the IRS was an improper 
party on all counts, and should have been dismissed. 
6Before considering constitutional questions, a court must first consider whether 
the issue can be resolved on the basis of the statute enacted by Congress.  A court must 
always consider the statutory question before considering the constitutional validity of 
the statute, because constitutional issues are to be avoided whenever possible.35 
Therefore, the first real issue that the court of appeals in Murphy should have addressed 
was whether Ms. Murphy’s award was subject to tax under the applicable statutory rules 
adopted by Congress in the IRC.  Only after determining that Congress had in fact 
statutorily required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income should the court of 
appeals have proceeded to determine whether the statute was constitutional.   
The statutory question requires a two-step analysis:  (1) was there a specific 
provision in the IRC allowing Ms. Murphy to exclude her award from income, and, if 
not, (2) was there a specific provision in the IRC requiring Ms. Murphy to include her 
award in income.   Only if the first question is answered in the negative and the second 
question answered in the affirmative is it proper for the court to consider the 
constitutionality of the statutory scheme. 
As is discussed below, the court of appeals properly considered whether Ms. 
Murphy could exclude her award under IRC section 104(a)(2), but its analysis was 
flawed.  The court of appeals wrongly focused on the language used in the heading of the 
award to conclude that Ms. Murphy’s award did not compensate her for “physical injuries 
or physical sickness.”  The court of appeals’ focus on the heading used in the award was 
misplaced, however, because the award in fact was intended to and did compensate Ms. 
Murphy for the physical manifestations of emotional distress that she suffered.  The real 
question should have been whether Ms. Murphy’s physical manifestations of emotional 
distress constituted a “personal physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning 
of IRC section 104(a)(2).  The court of appeals reached the right result – that Ms. Murphy 
could not exclude her award from income – but for the wrong reason.  The award was not 
excludible because physical manifestations of emotional distress do not constitute 
“personal physical injuries or physical sickness” within the meaning of IRC section 
104(a)(2), not because the language used in the heading of the award was too general.   
After concluding that Ms. Murphy could not exclude her award from income 
under IRC section 104(a)(2), the court should have determined whether any provision of 
the IRC required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income.  The proper question 
should have been whether IRC section 61 – the provision subjecting income to taxation – 
was unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Murphy’s damages award.  The court of appeals 
failure to engage in the second step of the analysis ultimately caused it to hold the wrong 
provision unconstitutional, and enabled it to avoid addressing a difficult question of 
statutory interpretation:  whether Ms. Murphy’s award could be “income” under IRC 
section 61, but not “income” under the 16th Amendment.  The following analysis shows 
that the court of appeals correctly proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the 
statute, although it again did so for the wrong reasons. 
 
35 See e.g. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003) (“‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is 
drawn in question, and . . . a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this 
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may 
be avoided,’”quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
7A. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis. 
 
The first substantive issue considered by the court of appeals in Murphy was 
whether Ms. Murphy’s damages award should be statutorily excluded from income under 
IRC section 104(a)(2).  IRC section 104(a)(2) excluded from gross income damage 
awards “received . . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”  The 
flush language to section 104(a) provides “[f]or purposes of paragraph (2), emotional 
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness,” except to the extent 
of amounts paid for medical care.36 
Ms. Murphy first argued that her damages award should have been excluded from 
income under IRC section 104(a)(2) because she suffered a “personal physical injury”  as 
a result of the stress of being blacklisted.37 The court of appeals did not address whether 
physical manifestations of emotional distress constitute “personal physical injuries” 
within the meaning of the statute, an issue discussed below.38 Instead, the court of 
appeals focused on the words used by Labor Board in the heading of its damages award.  
The Labor Board hearing panel titled the awards “Compensatory damage for emotional 
distress or mental anguish” and “Compensatory damage award for injury to professional 
reputation.”39 The court of appeals adopted the Government’s argument that “the Board 
awarded her damages, not to compensate [her for that] particular injur[y] [physical 
manifestations], but explicitly with respect to nonphysical injuries.”40 Because the 
heading used by the Board in rendering its award only referred to emotional distress and 
reputation, the court of appeals did not consider it relevant that the Board had, in fact, 
found that Ms. Murphy suffered serious physical manifestations from that distress, and 
had considered these manifestations in setting the amount of her award.41 As a general 
matter, tort awards for emotional distress include all consequences of that distress, 
including physical manifestations.42 The court of appeals erred in focusing exclusively on 
the language used by the Board in the heading of the award, rather than its clear intent, 
which was reflected in the award, to compensate Ms. Murphy for her physical 
manifestations. 
 
B. The Court of Appeals’ Improper Focus on the Language Used in the 
Heading of the Award. 
 
The court of appeals’ focus on the heading rather than substance of the award was 
based on its reading of two Supreme Court cases interpreting the “on account of” 
 
36 IRC § 104(a) (flush language).   
37 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 9-10. 
38 See infra Part III.C beginning at page 10.   
39 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84 (“Murphy no doubt suffered from certain physical manifestations of emotional 
distress, but the record clearly indicates the Board awarded her compensation only "for mental pain and 
anguish" and "for injury to professional reputation." The Board thus having left no room for doubt about 
the grounds for her award, we conclude Murphy's damages were not "awarded by reason of, or because of 
. . . [physical] personal injuries.”) (citations omitted).  
40 Id.
41 See infra beginning at note 50.   
42 See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again:  The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory 
Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 748 (December 1997) (purpose of tort law to make 
plaintiff whole). 
8language contained in IRC section 104(a)(2).  The court of appeals interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s decision in O’Gilvie v. United States43 to require “a strong causal 
connection” between the physical injury and the language of the award.  The court of 
appeals’ reading of O’Gilvie is, however, quite strained.   
In 1988, the plaintiffs in O’Gilvie recovered $10 million in punitive damages in a 
wrongful death action against the manufacturer of a product that caused the death of their 
wife and mother.44 The issue in O’Gilvie was whether the punitive damage award could 
be excluded from income under the 1983 version of IRC § 104(a)(2), which excluded 
from income all awards of damages “on account of personal injuries or sickness.”45 The 
taxpayers in O’Gilvie argued that the punitive damage award should have been excludible 
from income because it would not have been recovered “but for” the personal injury to 
their wife and mother.46 
The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie rejected the taxpayers’ approach.  Instead, the 
Court held that the statute’s “on account of” language required a direct connection 
between the personal injury and the purpose of the remedy.  The Court held that punitive 
damages are not awarded as compensation for personal injury, but rather to punish the 
wrongdoer’s conduct and deter others.47 The Court therefore ruled that the punitive 
damages award was not “on account of” the personal injury because the remedy – 
punitive damages – was not, as a matter of law, given “on account of” the personal 
injury.   
The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie also relied on its prior decision in Commissioner 
v. Schleier,48 in which it had held that liquidated damages awarded under the 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ( the “ADEA”) were not excludible under 
IRC § 104(a).  In explaining its holding in Schleier, the Court in O’Gilvie stated: 
 
[P]ain and suffering damages, medical expenses, and lost 
wages in an ordinary tort case are covered by the statute 
and hence excluded from income "not simply because the 
taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each 
element . . . satisfies the requirement . . . that the damages 
were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness.'"   
In holding that ADEA liquidated damages are not covered, 
we said that they are not "designed to compensate ADEA 
 
43 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
44 Id. at 81. 
45IRC Section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1989 to provide that punitive damages awards “for physical injury 
or physical sickness” were not excluded from income.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. 
L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, §7641(a).  The statutory amendment did not apply to written binding 
settlements or decrees in effect on or before July 10, 1989, and was therefore not effective on the settlement 
in O’Gilvie. See Id. at § 7641(b)(2); O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 89-90.  The statute was again amended in 1996 
to make personal injury awards taxable in all cases, but again the statutory amendment was not retroactive 
and therefore did not apply to the settlement in O’Gilvie. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, §
1605, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1838; O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 90. 
46 Id. at 82. 
47 Id. at 83 (“The Government says that such damages were not ‘received . . . on account of’ the personal 
injuries, but rather were awarded ‘on account of’ a defendant's reprehensible conduct and the jury's need to 
punish and to deter it.”). 
48 515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
9victims," instead, they are "'punitive in nature.'"  Applying 
the same reasoning here would lead to the conclusion that 
the punitive damages are not covered because they are an 
element of damages not "designed to compensate . . . 
victims.49 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in O’Gilvie and Schleier did not 
focus on what the award said the damages were for – the label used – but on the 
underlying legal purpose of the remedy.  This is very different from the court of appeals 
interpretation of these cases in Murphy. Ms. Murphy’s claims were brought under 
federal statutes that authorized awards of “compensatory damages.”50 According to the 
lower court, “the Administrative Law Judge noted and the Administrative Review Board 
confirmed that Murphy suffered from [Bruxism and] other ‘physical manifestations of 
stress’ including ‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness.’51 Unlike the claims 
in O’Gilvie and Schleier which were legally limited in a way having tax significance 
(punitive damages in O’Gilvie and liquidated damages for age discrimination in Schleier,
both of which were, statutorily, not intended as compensation for personal injury), the 
claim in Murphy did not have a remedy legally limited in a way that would have tax 
significance.  Ms. Murphy was entitled to and did recover for all of the consequences of 
her emotional distress, including her physical manifestations.  There was nothing in the 
quoted language of the award to suggest that the Labor Board did not accept as true and 
take into account in setting the amount of the award the physical manifestations of 
emotional distress suffered by Ms. Murphy.   Indeed, the court of appeals recognized that 
the Board had in fact intended, by its award, to compensate Ms. Murphy for her physical 
manifestations.52 
The court of appeals’ error in focusing on the language used in the heading of the 
award rather than on what the award in fact was intended to compensate was 
demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Dotson v. U.S.,53 where the court held that 
a taxpayer who recovered damages under the Employment Retirement and Income 
Security Act (ERISA)54 could exclude the portion of the award that was given to 
compensate for personal injuries, even though the courts later determined that ERISA 
precluded compensatory damages awards.  The Dotson court held that the taxpayer could 
exclude the award, which had been wrongly given to compensate for damages, because 
the award, in fact, had been given on account of personal injuries, even though the 
remedy for ERISA violations was later held to be more limited.  Similarly, in cases 
involving settlement allocations, the courts have required a factual inquiry into the true 
 
49 519 U.S. at 83-84. 
50 Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (D.C. 2005), rev’d 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 
2006).   
51 Id. citing Leveille v. New York Air National Guard, 1999 WL 966951, Recommended Decision and 
Order at 6 (ALJ Feb. 9, 1998.).  The court of appeals also recognized this in its opinion.  See infra note 52. 
52 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 81 (“Upon finding Murphy had also suffered from other ‘physical manifestations of 
stress’ including ‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness,’ the ALJ recommended compensatory 
damages totaling $70,000, of which $45,000 was for ‘emotional distress or mental anguish,’ and $25,000 
was for ‘injury to professional reputation’ from having been blacklisted.”).   
53 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996). 
54 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and 1140. 
10
nature of the award, rather than a strict focus on the labels used by the parties.55 The 
theory used by the Supreme Court in O’Gilvie and Schleier simply does not support the 
court of appeals’ blunt focus on the language of the heading in the Labor Board’s award, 
rather than the true purpose and intent of the award.   
If physical manifestations of emotional injuries were excludible as “physical 
injuries,” the courts in Murphy should have made an allocation between the physical 
aspects of the emotional award and the purely mental aspects of the emotional award.56 
However, Congress did not intend physical manifestations of emotional distress to 
constitute a “personal physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning of IRC 
section 104(a)(2).   
 
C. Ms. Murphy Could Not Exclude Her Award Because Physical 
Manifestations of Emotional Distress Do Not Constitute “Personal 
Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness” Under IRC Section 104(a)(2). 
 
The question that the court of appeals in Murphy should have addressed is 
whether an award on account of emotional injuries causing physical manifestations 
constitutes an award on account of “personal physical injuries or physical sickness” 
within the meaning of IRC section 104(a)(2).  The meaning of the statutory language is 
greatly aided by a review of the statute’s judicial and legislative history.   
In 1918, Congress added language to the income tax statute to exempt damages 
received “on account of [personal] injuries and sickness.”57 This basic exclusion has 
remained in the statute ever since.  However, beginning in 1989, important judicial and 
statutory limitations were recognized.   
In 1989, the House of Representatives proposed, and ultimately passed, a bill 
limiting the personal injury exclusion to “cases involving physical injury or sickness.”58 
The Senate passed a bill that did not accept the House’s proposed language.  The 
Conference Committee reached a compromise providing that the exclusion for personal 
injury or sickness “shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not 
involving physical injury or physical sickness.”59 This compromise was accepted by both 
houses and became law.60 
55 See e.g. Tamberella v. Commissioner, 139 Fed. Appx. 319, (2d Cir. 2005)(focus on intent of payor);
Chamberlain v. United States, 401 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. La. 2005) (prejudgment interest taxable regardless of 
characterization of parties or state law); Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2000) (focus on 
motivation behind settlement); Forest v. Commissioner, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3312 (1st Cir. 1996) (focus 
on facts and circumstances); Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (ignoring party 
allocation and focusing on facts); Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. Colo. 1996) 
(prejudgment interest taxable regardless of characterization); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 
(1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting party’s allocation of 95% of 
settlement proceeds to excludible claims when earlier jury verdict awarded mostly punitive damages); 
Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995) (same). 
56 See e.g. Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995) (Ignoring parties’ allocation between excludible 
personal injuries and non-excludible emotional distress); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994) 
(ignoring allocation made in stipulated court-approved settlement). 
57 Revenue Act of 1918, Child Labor Tax Acts, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b), 40 Stat 1057, 1065 (1919). 
58 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 104, 140, 451 (1989) (emphasis added). 
59 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 99 (1989).   
60 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 7641, PUB. LAW NO. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989). 
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In 1992, the Court in Burke v. U.S.61 held that an award of damages under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for illegal discrimination on the basis of gender did 
not constitute a “personal injury” award, and thus could not be excluded from income, 
because the statutory remedy was limited to back pay and injunctive relief rather than 
compensating for a tort-type personal injury.   
Three years later, in Commissioner v. Schleier,62 the Court held that an award of 
back pay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) was not “on account of” a personal injury, and was thus not excluded from 
income, because neither remedy was given in lieu of – to compensate for – a personal 
injury.  The award was given either to compensate for taxable income (lost wages) or as a 
statutory remedy without regard to whether or not the plaintiff suffered a personal injury.   
In 1996, following these two highly-complex interpretations of the statutory 
language, the House of Representatives again proposed to limit the exclusion in IRC 
section 104(a)(2) to “physical injuries or physical sickness.”  According to the House 
Committee Report proposing to add the new “physical injury or physical sickness” 
language, the Committee believed that the change was needed because non-physical 
injury awards generally compensate for lost profits and wages that would otherwise have 
been taxable.  The Committee felt that attempting to attribute the reason for the award 
(lost wages or lost personal enjoyment) has resulted in “substantial litigation, including 
two Supreme Court cases within the last four years.”63 The Committee concluded that 
“The taxation of damages received in cases not involving physical injury or physical 
sickness should not depend on the type of claim made.”64 The “physical” requirement, 
and the language saying that emotional injuries would not meet the “physical” 
requirement, were thus added to simplify the application of the rule. 
In explaining the new physical injury requirement, the Committee focused on the 
origin of the claim and the proximity of the physical injury to the wrongful act:   
 
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, 
then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom 
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or 
physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the 
injured party. . . .  The bill also specifically provides that 
emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or 
physical sickness. [footnote 24 deleted]  Thus, the exclusion from 
gross income does not apply to any damages received (other than 
for medical expenses as discussed below) based on a claim of 
employment discrimination or injury to reputation accompanied 
 
61 504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
62 515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
63 House Committee Report on Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104- 586, at 143 
(1996), 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481 (“Damages received on a claim not involving a physical injury or physical 
sickness are generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits or lost wages that would otherwise be 
included in taxable income.  The confusion as to the tax treatment of damages received in cases not 
involving physical injury or physical sickness has led to substantial litigation, including two Supreme Court 
cases within the last four years.  The taxation of damages received in cases not involving a physical injury 
or physical sickness should not depend on the type of claim made.”). 
64 Id.
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by a claim of emotional distress.  Because all damages received on 
account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from 
gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any 
damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is 
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.65 
In Footnote 24 of its report, the House Committee said “the Committee intends that the 
term emotional distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, 
stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional distress.”66 The House 
Committee that proposed adding the “physical” requirement thus specifically intended 
that physical manifestations of emotional distress not be treated as a “physical injury or 
physical sickness.”  There must be a proximate physical impact causing an immediate 
physical injury or sickness (although not necessarily to the plaintiff) in order to have a 
“physical injury or physical sickness” from which excludible damages could flow.  
The Senate version of the bill eliminated the exclusion for all punitive damages, 
rather than just punitive damages arising out of non-physical injuries.  However, the 
Senate’s version did not accept the language proposed by the House of Representatives to 
eliminate the exclusion for all damages recovered for non-physical injuries, whether 
punitive, compensatory, or otherwise (other than the recovery of medical expenses).67 
It is interesting to note that the change proposed by the Senate would have been 
rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s later decision in O’Gilvie v. United States.68 The 
Court in O’Gilvie interpreted the pre-1996 statute to provide no exclusion for punitive 
damages, notwithstanding the specific language at the time limiting the exclusion only to 
punitive damages arising from non-physical injuries. 
While, as in 1989, the Senate did not initially accept the House version of the bill, 
this time the Conference Committee agreed to the House version.69 The Conference 
Committee report quoted much of the language from the House Report concerning the 
reason for eliminating the exclusion for damages arising from emotional distress.70 The 
language limiting the exclusion to amounts received on account of “physical injuries or 
physical sickness,” and providing that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a 
physical injury or physical sickness,” became law.71 In his signing statement, President 
Clinton stated that he did not think damages for non-physical injury or sickness should be 
 
65 Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added) 
66 Id. (emphasis added). 
67 See S. REP. NO. 104-281 at 97 (1996). 
68 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
69 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737 at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677.
70 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3448, H.R. CONF.
REP. 104-737, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1996 W.L. 443734 at 265 (1996) (“The House bill 
also specifically provides that emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness.  
Thus, the exclusion from gross income does not apply to any damages received (other than for medical 
expenses as discussed below) based on a claim of employment discrimination, or injury to reputation 
accompanied by a claim of emotional distress.  Because all damages received on account of physical injury 
or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any 
damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to physical injury or physical 
sickness.”). 
71 IRC §104(a) flush language, added by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
188, 110 Stat. 1838 (1996). 
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taxable, although he nevertheless signed the bill into law.72 Thus, the clear purpose of the 
new “physical injury or physical sickness” requirement was to make all amounts received 
for emotional distress damages, including amounts received on account of physical 
manifestations arising out of that emotional distress, includible in income. 
The numerous other Courts that have addressed the physical injury limitations 
added by the 1996 amendments have recognized and applied the interpretation given by 
the legislative history, focusing on whether the settling party made the payment on 
account of a direct proximate physical injury or physical sickness (in which case there 
would be exclusion) or as a result of physical manifestations from emotional distress (in 
which case there would not be exclusion).73 The government has also issued an 
 
72 Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3448, P. 3, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1862, 1996 
W.L. 648447 (1996) (“Finally, I have reservations about a provision in the Act which makes civil damages 
based on nonphysical injury or illness taxable.  Such damages are paid to compensate for injury, whether 
physical or not, and are designed to make victims whole, not to enrich them.  These damages should not be 
considered a source of taxable income.”). 
73Lindsey v. Commissioner, 422 F.3d 684, 688-89 (8th Cir. 2005) (Business tort claim recoveries not 
excludible because taxpayer’s “hypertension and stress-related symptoms, including periodic impotency, 
insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary incontinence. . . . relate to emotional distress, and not 
to physical sickness.”); Johnson v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 n. 4 (D. Col. 2002) (“As 
discrimination is not a physical injury. Plaintiff's claim would also fail on this basis.”); Goode v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2006-48 (T.C. 2006) (rejecting “physical injury” characterization in settlement 
agreement, and holding that employee’s claimed “repeated, vehement verbal assaults . . . which caused him 
physical pain and suffering” did not constitute physical injury); Vincent v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
2005-95 (rejecting physical injury characterization in settlement agreement); Ndirika v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2004-250 (No credible evidence employment settlement to compensate for previous 
miscarriage or pregnancy-related pain and suffering); Lindsey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-113 
(Hypertension leaving to “fatigability, occasional indigestion, and difficulty sleeping -- are the types of 
injuries or sicknesses that Congress intended to be encompassed within the definition of emotional 
distress.”); Amos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-329 ($200,000 settlement payment to cameraman 
allegedly injured by Dennis Rodman at basketball gain was for “physical injury or sickness,”  because “Mr. 
Rodman's dominant reason in paying the settlement amount at issue was to compensate petitioner for his 
claimed physical injuries relating to the incident.”); Venable v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-240, 24 
(Malicious prosecution claim does not give rise to physical injury or sickness); Shaltz v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2003-173 (Sexual harassment settlement not excludible because no evidence of physical injury, 
only “depression, anxiety, stress, and recurrent past stressors” caused by “depression and trauma at 
work.”); Henderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-168 ($5,000 settlement of credit reporting claim 
not excludible even if "life-threatening, pre-existing physical illness" exacerbated by the harm to his 
personal reputation.”); Prasil v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-100 (Allegations of severe physical 
manifestations from sex discrimination and harassment not sufficient to establish physical injury or 
physical sickness); Witcher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-292 (Physical manifestations caused by 
defamation and business torts not personal physical injury or physical sickness); Medina v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-148 (Settlement for wrongful termination due to pregnancy and resulting 
disability not excludible because wrongful termination did not cause physical sickness); Dorroh v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-93 (Petitioner’s employment discrimination settlement not on 
account of personal physical injury suffered at work, which was covered by separate workers’ 
compensation claim);  Emanoil & Magdalena Gantea v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-55 
(settlement of injured employee’s claim for invasion of privacy not “on account of” the physical injury); 
Nield v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2002-110 (No credible evidence that sex harassment 
recovery on account of physical injury or sickness.  Court rejected petitioner’s self-serving testimony that 
unwelcome touching (elbow to breast) led to physical injury (bruising), and also rejected new allegation 
that employer tackled petitioner in parking lot.); Reid v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2002-55 
(Wrongful discharge recovery not on account of separate work-related injury covered by separate workers’ 
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administrative ruling concluding that there must be a contact resulting in “observable 
bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding” to constitute a physical injury 
or physical sickness within the meaning of the statute.74 The court of appeals in Murphy 
did not cite to any of these many authorities.    
It is a straightforward matter to apply Congress’s intent in enacting the physical 
injury requirement, as explained in the legislative history, to Ms. Murphy’s claim and 
award.  Ms. Murphy had physical manifestations from her emotional distress, but did not 
suffer a physical injury – an impact – from which excludible damages could flow.  The 
court of appeals thus reached the correct decision – that Ms. Murphy could not exclude 
her damages award under the statute, but it did so for the wrong reason.  Ms. Murphy was 
not entitled to exclude the award because she did not suffer a “physical injury,” since 
physical manifestations of emotional distress do not meet the statutory requirement.   The 
court of appeals’ use of the “in lieu of what” tracing requirement from O’Gilvie v. United 
States75 to attempt to determine what the award was compensating for,76 and its improper 
focus on the language used in the heading of the award rather than the award’s intent, 
ignored the intent of the 1996 amendment – as expressed in both the House and 
Conference Committee Reports – to avoid the kinds of difficult tracing distinctions 
suggested by the Court in Burke and Schleier for emotional injuries.  Thus, whether or 
not the award was, in fact, made to compensate Ms. Murphy for her physical 
manifestations, and whether or not the Department of Labor hearing board adequately 
described the basis for the award, is now irrelevant under the statute.  It is curious that the 
court of appeals in Murphy made no mention of the legislative history, because that 
history had been correctly analyzed in the district court’s opinion in Murphy.77 Since Ms. 
Murphy’s physical manifestations from her emotional injury did not constitute a 
“personal physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning of the statute, she was 
not entitled to exclude the award. 
 
D. Without an Exclusion, Was Ms. Murphy Required to Include Her Award in 
Gross Income? 
 
Having properly determined, albeit for the wrong reasons,78 that Congress had not 
allowed Ms. Murphy to exclude her emotional distress award under IRC section 
 
compensation case).  See also Febray v. Commissioner, 223 F.3d 1261, 1262 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that physical injury requirement after 1996 amendments would have eliminated issue of excludability in 
case involving recovery on account of injury to business reputation.). 
74 Private Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000) (unwelcome sexual harassment which included physical 
touching that did not result in observable bodily harm would not constitute an excludible “personal physical 
injury or sickness” within the meaning of IRC section 104(a)(2)).  
75 519 U.S. 79 (1996), discussed supra beginning at note 43. 
76 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84. 
77 Murphy v Internal Revenue Service, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 215 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (“Here, Murphy's mental anguish manifested into a physical problem, bruxism, but this was only 
a symptom of her emotional distress, not the source of her claim. Plaintiff's emotional distress is not 
"attributable to her physical injury; in fact, it is the other way around. Because the statute clearly provides 
damages must be received "on account of personal physical injury or physical sickness," and because 
mental pain and anguish and damage to reputation are not physical injuries, plaintiff's emotional distress 
damages are not included within the statutory exemption under § 104(a)(2).”). 
78 See supra Part III.C beginning at page 10. 
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104(a)(2), the court of appeals proceeded to consider whether Congress had the 
constitutional power to tax the award.  Reaching back to what it determined to be the 
meaning of “income” in 1913, when the 16th Amendment was enacted, the court of 
appeals held that Congress lacked the constitutional power to tax Ms. Murphy’s award 
because it was not “income.”  The court of appeals then held that since Congress lacked 
the power to tax Ms. Murphy’s award, IRC section 104(a)(2) must be unconstitutional.   
The court of appeals missed an important step in its analysis – whether any 
provision of the IRC required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income.  Only 
amounts which must be included in income are statutorily subject to tax.  IRC section 61 
requires all “income” to be included in gross income and thereby made subject to 
taxation.  Before considering whether the statute was constitutional, the court of appeals 
should have determined whether Congress required the award to be included in income 
under IRC section 61.  If Congress lacked the power to tax Ms. Murphy’s award, it would 
be the provision requiring the award to be included in income – IRC section 61 – that 
would be unconstitutional, not the exclusion provision. 
By failing to address the inclusion question, the court of appeals missed an 
important and difficult legal question – whether an award could constitute “income” 
under IRC section 61 (a necessary predicate to considering the constitutional question), 
but not constitute income under the 16th Amendment, as the court of appeals ultimately 
held.  The court of appeals failed to address this apparent conundrum. 
As discussed below, using the modern theories of statutory interpretation adopted 
by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals could have properly reached the constitutional 
question by holding that Ms. Murphy’s award was not “income” within the meaning of 
IRC section 61, notwithstanding any original meaning attached to section 61 or its 
predecessors by the original adopting Congresses.  The court of appeals may have 
properly reached the constitutional question, but its flawed analysis led to holding the 
wrong statute unconstitutional for the wrong reason. 
The court of appeals’ specific holding in Murphy, that IRC section 104(a)(2) is 
unconstitutional,79 does not make logical sense.  IRC Section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion 
provision, not an inclusion provision.80 The change made by Congress in 1996, to 
eliminate the exclusion for non-physical emotional distress damages recoveries, would 
only cause such damages to be taxable if, without regard to IRC Section 104(a)(2), such 
recoveries had to be included in income by some other provision.  As currently written, 
IRC section 104(a)(2) excludes from income damages on account of physical injury or 
physical sickness, other than punitive damages.  The court of appeals in Murphy was not 
questioning the constitutionality of the existing exclusion contained in IRC section 
104(a)(2).  Rather, it was questioning the constitutionality of Congress’s attempt to 
affirmatively tax Ms. Murphy’s compensatory non-physical injury recoveries.  Therefore, 
it was not the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2) that would be unconstitutional, but 
 
79 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92 (“insofar as § 104(a)(2) permits the taxation of compensation for personal injury, 
which compensation is unrelated to lost wages or earnings, that provision is unconstitutional.”). 
80 IRC § 104(a)(2) (“gross income does not include . . . (2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive 
damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on 
account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”).  The section says nothing about whether other 
awards, such as Ms. Murphy’s award for non personal physical injury, are to be included in income. 
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rather the provision requiring compensatory non-physical injury recoveries to be included 
in income that would be subject to constitutional attack. 
The court of appeals in Murphy was wrong to hold IRC section 104(a)(2) 
unconstitutional.  The Constitution does not require Congress to enact a specific 
exclusion for all of the things that do not constitute “income” or that cannot otherwise 
constitutionally be taxed.  Rather, Congress has the affirmative duty to provide by statute 
what items are subject to its taxing laws.   
Instead of focusing on the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2), the court of appeals 
in Murphy should have focused its attention on the inclusion provision in IRC section 61 
– for taxpayers are only required to pay income taxes on amounts included in “gross 
income” under IRC section 61.81 IRC section 61 provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means 
all income from whatever source derived, including (but not 
limited to) the following [15] items:82 
Thus, as a technical matter, Ms. Murphy’s emotional distress and reputational damage 
award would only be included in gross income if the award constituted “income” within 
the meaning of IRC section 61.   
The court of appeals in Murphy should have considered whether Ms. Murphy’s 
award had to be included in income under the statute before considering whether the 
statute was constitutional.  Under the established maxim that constitutional questions are 
to be avoided,83 a court can only reach a constitutional issue after first resolving the 
statutory issue.  The court of appeals in Murphy failed to specifically address whether 
Congress had in fact statutorily required Ms. Murphy’s damages award to be included in 
gross income, and thus subject to the income tax, before proceeding to the constitutional 
issue.   
When it eliminated the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2), Congress clearly 
thought and intended that non-physical injury damages awards would be included in 
income under IRC section 61.  Congress’s intent to include in income emotional and 
other non-physical injury awards was made clear in the legislative history of the 
amendment.84 More importantly, Congress’s intent was also manifested by the 
enactment of the statute itself.  There would be no logical reason for Congress to limit the 
exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2) to “physical injuries and physical sickness,” or to 
provide that emotional injuries would not constitute “physical injuries or physical 
sickness,” if emotional and other non-physical injury recoveries were already excluded 
from taxation because they were not “income.”  If emotional injury recoveries were not 
included in “income” under IRC section 61, the amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) 
 
81 IRC §1 imposes a tax on “taxable income.”  See IRC §§ 1(a) (married individuals filing jointly and 
surviving spouses); 1(b) (heads of households); 1(c) (unmarried individuals); 1(d) (married individuals 
filing separately); 1(e) (estates and trusts).  “’[T]axable income’ means gross income minus the deductions 
allowed by this chapter.”  IRC § 63.  Gross income is defined in IRC section 61 as “all income from 
whatever source derived.”  IRC § 61(a).  Thus, unless an item is included in “gross income,” it is not 
subject to tax under the IRC, and only items that constitute “income” are included in gross income.   
82 IRC §61(a) (2006). 
83 See supra note 35..  
84 See discussion supra beginning at note 63. 
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would be a useless act.  The doctrine of statutory interpretation known as the “rule 
against surplusage” requires Congressional acts to be interpreted to have meaning.85 
Therefore, both the amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) itself and the legislative history 
of the amendment show Congress’s intent that emotional and other non-physical injury 
recoveries be included in income under IRC section 61. 
On its face, the requirement to address the statutory issue before considering the 
constitutional issue would put the court of appeals in a conundrum.  On the one hand, the 
court of appeals asserted that the word “income” has the same meaning in both the IRC 
and the 16th Amendment.86 The court of appeals appears to have made this assertion to 
support its argument that the government’s early administrative rulings on the scope of 
the taxing statute should be read to limit Congress’s power under the 16th Amendment.87 
However, if the word “income” means the same thing under both the IRC and the 16th 
Amendment, then the Court could not find both that Ms. Murphy’s damages award 
constituted “income” under the IRC (as it must to reach the constitutional question) while 
not constituting “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment (as it must to be 
unconstitutional).  Rather than address the conundrum of Ms. Murphy’s award 
constituting “income” under the IRC but not under the Constitution, the court of appeals 
focused on the elimination of the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2) as the 
unconstitutional act.   
The solution to the conundrum is to recognize that that the word “income” in IRC 
section 61 has evolved from the time that the predecessors of section 61 were enacted in 
1913.  Regardless of the original meaning of the word income when IRC section 61 and 
its predecessors were enacted, Congress’s intent at the time it amended IRC section 
104(a)(2) in 1996 should prospectively88 control the interpretation of the ambiguous word 
“income” in IRC section 61.   
 
85 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory 
Interpretation, p. 266 (Foundation Press 2000) (referring to the doctrine as “The Rule Against Surplusage”) 
(hereafter “Legislation and Statutory Interpretation”). 
86 See supra note 18. 
87 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88-90 (“Fortunately, we need not rely solely upon the wisdom and beneficence of 
the Congress, for, when the Sixteenth Amendment was drafted, the word “incomes” had well understood 
limits. . . .  We concur . . . that the Attorney General’s 1918 opinion and the Treasury Department’s ruling 
of the same year strongly suggest that the term “incomes” as used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not 
extend to monies received solely in compensation for personal injury and unrelated to lost wages or 
earnings”). 
88 The dynamic interpretation of statutory meaning discussed infra at note 91, applies only prospectively, 
because Congress generally legislates prospectively.  See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 (1928) 
(retroactive application of gift tax to gifts made before its enactment violates due process of law); Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (recognizing unjustness of retrospective laws); but see Petitioner v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26 (1994) (validating explicit retroactivity provision in statute where government has a 
“legitimate purpose” for imposing a “modest period of retroactivity.”).  The corollary rule against 
retroactive legislative interpretations of earlier statutes has also been recognized by the Supreme Court. 
For example, in O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), the taxpayer argued that Congress’s 1989 
amendment to section 104(a)(2), which eliminated an exclusion for “punitive damages not arising out of 
physical injury or physical sickness,” implicitly recognized that the taxpayer’s 1988 award of punitive 
damages arising out of a physical injury should be excluded from income.  The Court rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument because the taxpayer’s settlement occurred and was governed by the statute in effect 
in 1988, before the 1989 amendment was made.  The Court held that Congress’s 1989 interpretation of a 
1988 statute was irrelevant, because the meaning of the 1988 statute was governed by the interpretation of 
the earlier enacting Congress.  The Court said “the view of a later Congress cannot control the 
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Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett, in their hornbook on statutory 
interpretation, have recognized that “[s]tatutory amendments can create new textual 
meaning as an indirect as well as a direct result of the new text that they add to the 
statutory scheme.”89 This understanding of the dynamic nature of statutory construction 
– that the meaning of an earlier statute can be prospectively governed not by the intent of 
the original enacting Congress, but by the intent of a later Congress as expressed in an 
enactment or amendment to the statutory scheme, was recognized by the Court, including 
its three strictest constructionists, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.90 The 
facts of Franklin are somewhat complicated.  In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX, which 
prohibited sex discrimination in many schools.91 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,92 
the Supreme Court determined that private parties had an implied right of action under 
Title IX.  In 1986, Congress amended Title IX to abrogate the sovereign immunity of 
state governments for private suits “to the same extent . . . [as] any public or private 
entity other than a State.”93 In the 1986 amendments, Congress implicitly recognized the 
existence of a private right of action under Title IX, as had been determined by the 1979 
Supreme Court decision in Cannon.
The issue in Franklin was whether a plaintiff, who had an implied private right of 
action under Cannon, could sue for damages or only back pay and prospective relief.  
The defendants argued that the original statute and legislative history did not specifically 
authorize damages recoveries, which is not surprising since the original statute did not 
expressly provide for a private right of action in the first place.  The Supreme Court in 
Franklin first applied a general presumption that the courts would infer all available 
remedies when Congress establishes a private right of action.94 More importantly, the 
Supreme Court in Franklin then noted that subsequent statutory amendments in 1986 
broadened the waiver of sovereign immunity, and did not restrict the remedy.  The Court 
viewed these subsequent amendments as validating the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cannon that Congress intended a private right of action under Title IX, and also to show 
an intent not to limit the available remedy.95 The majority opinion thus recognized that 
the 1986 Congress’s intent regarding the meaning of an earlier 1972 statute, as evidenced 
by statutory amendments made in 1986 to other related provisions, is effective to define 
the meaning of the 1972 statute.   
Even more interesting is the concurrence in Franklin written by Justice Scalia for 
the three strictest constructionists then on the court – Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and 
 
interpretation of an earlier enacted statute.”  In support of this rule, the Court cited two other cases holding 
that a Congressional interpretation of an earlier statute was not effective retroactively.  United States v. 
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 331-32 (1960) (“the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for 
inferring the intent of an earlier one.”); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473. 479-80 (1940) (Statute forbidding a 
certain deduction does not necessarily show that previous law would have authorized deduction.).  These 
authorities do not address the prospective effect of a Congressional amendment that interprets a prior 
statute. 
89 Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 85 at 268.   
90 503 U.S. 60 (1992) 
91 Educational Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified, as amended, at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681).   
92 441 U.S. 677 (1979), 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. 
94 Franklin, at 66.   
95 Franklin at 72-73. 
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Thomas.  The trio strongly disagreed both with the Court’s prior decision in Cannon 
implying a private right of action under Title IX, and with the presumption in the 
majority opinion in Franklin that the broadest possible remedies should accompany an 
implied private right of action.96 Nevertheless, the strict constructionists concurred in the 
result because Congress, in the subsequent amendments to Title IX, had shown its intent 
to acquiesce in Cannon and to permit a damages remedy.  As Justice Scalia stated: 
 
The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2), must 
be read, in my view, not only "as a validation of Cannon's holding," but also as 
an implicit acknowledgment that damages are available.  I therefore concur in 
the judgment.97 
The entire Court thus recognized that later Congressional amendments to one statute can 
be effective in prospectively defining the meaning of another earlier provision of the 
same statutory scheme.   
This dynamic approach to statutory construction makes good sense, because 
Congress had the power to amend the original statute.  It did not amend the original 
statute because it did not know that an amendment would be necessary.  Because it had 
the power to amend the original statute, Congress’s interpretation of the meaning of the 
original statute in an enacted amendment should be effective as a legislative act that 
prospectively defines the earlier statute’s meaning.  In a sense, by amending one part of a 
legislative scheme, the later Congress is reenacting the remaining parts of the scheme, 
and these remaining parts should therefore be governed by the new Congress’s intent as 
expressed in the statutory amendment.98 
Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett have recognized that the rule of implied 
statutory amendments can conflict with the rule against implied repeals of un-amended 
earlier statutes if the earlier statute had a clear meaning, and was not itself amended.  The 
rule against implied repeals protects against inferring an intent to Congress’s inaction that 
is counter-intuitive – for if Congress intended to change the meaning of a clear statute, it 
could easily amend the statute.  Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garret conclude that 
“The rule against implied repeals should be limited to cases where the earlier statute had 
a relatively clear and longstanding meaning and the later statute is ambiguous enough to 
have a neutral interpreter pause.”99 The rule against implied repeals should not apply to 
ambiguous statutes, because Congress would not know of the need to make the 
amendment.  Instead of protecting congressional intent from wrongful judicial inferences, 
 
96 Franklin, at 77-78 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
97 Id. at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
98 This doctrine is similar to the so-called “reenactment rule,” under which the Courts presume that 
Congress intended to adopt an extant judicial interpretation of a statute when it reenacts the statute without 
changing it to negate the judicial interpretation.  See e.g. United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 
Ala., 435 U.S. 110 (1978); United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908).  In 
effect, Congress re-enacted the earlier statute at the time it enacted the later statutory or amendment that 
interpreted the earlier statute.  Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett have recognized that, “[s]o long as 
it follows the Article I, Section 7 procedures, each Congress can not only enact statutes, but can amend or 
repeal statutes adopted by earlier Congresses.  This idea could also justify the Court’s dynamic 
interpretation of statutes in both Sweet Home and Franklin, where subsequent amendments arguably 
changed the proper interpretation of provisions that were not formally amended.”  Legislation and Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 85 at 274.   
99 Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 85, at 274 n. 61.   
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applying the rule against implied repeals to ambiguous statutes would ignore clear 
congressional intent.  Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, Congress’s intent 
regarding the meaning of ambiguous corollary statutes is governed prospectively by 
Congress’s intent at the time the statutory scheme is changed.   
The same analysis that was recognized by the Court in Franklin should apply in 
Murphy. Congress intended emotional and other non-physical damages recoveries to be 
included in “income” under IRC section 61 when it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) to 
eliminate the exclusion.  This was clear both from the legislative history, which 
specifically discussed the reason for requiring emotional injury recoveries to be included 
in income,100 and from the intent manifest in the statutory amendment itself.101 
Therefore, both the amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) itself and the legislative history 
of the amendment show Congress’s intent that emotional and other non-physical injury 
recoveries be included in income under IRC section 61.   
Because Congress clearly intended in its amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) in 
1996 for non-physical injury recoveries be included in income, that intent should govern 
the meaning of the ambiguous term in section 61 prospectively.  The courts would be 
ignoring the will of a Congress that had the power and intent to require Ms. Murphy’s to 
include her emotional distress damages recovery in income if they held that the her award 
was not “income” within the historic meaning of IRC § 61.  The courts should therefore 
accept the meaning of IRC section 61 that Congress intended when it amended the 
statutory scheme in 1996 – to require Ms. Murphy to include her emotional and 
reputational damages award in income.   
Therefore, the court of appeals in Murphy should have held that Ms. Murphy’s 
award constituted “income” under IRC section 61 because of Congress’s manifested 
intent when it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) in 1996.  The court of appeals should also 
have recognized that the word “income” in IRC section 61, as interpreted by Congress in 
the 1996 amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2), may not mean the same thing as “income” 
under the 16th Amendment.  Only by recognizing a distinction between the meaning of 
the word “income” under the statute and the constitutional amendment could the court 
properly consider the constitutional issue.  The court of appeals erred in holding the 
exclusion contained in IRC section 104(a)(2) unconstitutional rather than focusing on the 
inclusion required by IRC section 61.  However, the court of appeals correctly concluded 
that Ms. Murphy’s award was statutorily taxable, and therefore it was proper for the court 
of appeals to consider whether the statute was constitutional. 
 
IV. The Constitutional Questions. 
 
A. Congress Had the Power to Tax Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Without 
the 16th Amendment. 
 
The court of appeals in Murphy began its constitutional analysis by stating that 
“[t]he constitutional power of the Congress to tax income is provided in the Sixteenth 
 
100 See discussion supra beginning at note 84 
101 See discussion supra in the paragraph following note 84. 
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Amendment, ratified in 1913.”102 This is an erroneous statement of law, and 
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of income tax history.   
It is true that Congress has those powers, and only those powers, authorized by 
the Constitution.  In recognizing the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court in the 
famous case of Marbury v. Madison said “The powers of the legislature are defined and 
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is 
written."103 Therefore, every act of Congress must be permitted explicitly or implicitly 
by the Constitution.  There is a strong presumption that congressional statutes are 
constitutional, and that presumption is only to be overcome “upon a plain showing that 
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”104 
However, a court cannot declare a law unconstitutional merely because one 
provision of the Constitution does not authorize the law if there is another provision in 
the Constitution that does authorize it.  The proper constitutional question is whether 
Congress had the power under any provision of the constitution to tax Ms. Murphy’s 
emotional and reputational damage award.  In order to determine whether the 
Constitution gives to Congress the power to enact a law, “[i]t is, therefore, necessary to 
search the Constitution to ascertain whether or not the power is conferred.”105 “The 
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it."106 
Even if the court of appeals was correct when it held that Ms. Murphy’s 
emotional and reputational damages award was not “income” within the meaning of the 
16th Amendment, a holding that is questioned below,107 the court of appeals in Murphy 
should have considered whether other provisions of the Constitution would permit 
Congress to tax the award.   
A proper historical review of Congress’s taxing power reveals that Congress had 
the constitutional power to tax Ms. Murphy’s damages award even if it was not “income” 
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.  Congress’s constitutional power to both tax 
property transactions and human capital had long been recognized before the 16th 
Amendment was adopted and has never seriously been questioned.  The court of appeals’ 
statement, that Congress’s power to tax income derives from the 16th Amendment, shows 
a great misunderstanding of both the Constitution and the judicial history of income 
taxation.  What follows is a thorough-going review of tax history which will demonstrate 
the error made by the court of appeals in Murphy in focusing solely on the 16th 
Amendment.   
 
102 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84-85. 
103 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803), quoted in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). 
104 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate 
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing 
that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds. . . .   With this presumption of constitutionality in 
mind. . . .”) (citations omitted).  Morrison was cited with approval in Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84. 
105 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1883), overruled on other grounds, Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1969).  This discussion in Harris was cited with approval in United States v. Morrison, 329 
U.S. at 607. 
106 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (footnotes omitted), quoted with approval in Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). 
107 See discussion infra in Part IV.B beginning at page 46. 
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(1) The Source of Congress’s Constitutional Power to Tax. 
 
Although the court of appeals in Murphy contended otherwise,108 Congress’s 
power to impose income taxes does not derive from the 16th Amendment.  Rather, it 
derives from the plenary power given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution to 
impose all forms of taxation, other than taxes on exports.109 The Constitution contains 
two provisions restricting the manner in which Congress can exercise its plenary power 
of taxation.  The first provision requires that “duties, imposts and excises” be uniform: 
 
“Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”110 
The uniformity requirement has long been interpreted to require only that the tax law not 
discriminate geographically.111 
The second restriction, and the more important one for this paper, requires that 
capitation and direct taxes be apportioned.  The apportionment requirement was 
contained in two clauses: “No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken”112 and 
“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states."113 
It is difficult to administer an apportioned tax other than capitation taxes.114 
Apportionment requires that the share of the total federal tax liability paid by the citizens 
of each state be proportional to the relative population of each state.115 Apportionment 
generally requires a two-step approach, in which each state’s share of the total revenue 
 
108 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84 (“The constitutional power of the Congress to tax income is provided by the 
Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913.”).  No citation followed this statement. 
109 See e.g. Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103 
(1916).   
110 U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 1. 
111 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance tax - geographical uniformity); United States v. 
Singer, 15 Wall. 111, 121 (1872) (distillary tax - geographical uniformity and no discrimination between 
distillers).   
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, §.2, cl. 3. 
114 See Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 
CONST. COMMENTARY 355, 356 (2004) (“Everyone agrees that apportionment makes direct taxes very 
difficult to implement”).  Apportionment is difficult to implement because, except for head taxes, a flat tax 
imposed on an item of property that is held in each state in proportionate numbers to population, or a tax 
imposed on the value of property in which the value of such property in each state is proportionate to 
population, the rates of taxes imposed on the same property held in different states will differ.  Congress 
did impose apportioned property taxes in the 19th Century, but the last such apportioned tax was imposed 
during the Civil War in 1861.  Id. at 356, citing Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292. 
115 For example, if New York has 10% of the population, then the share of the total tax paid by New York’s 
citizens can be no more than 10% of the total  tax.  Jensen, supra note 114, at 358.  It is very difficult to 
impose an apportioned tax other than a head tax.  A flat and uniform head tax would be automatically 
apportioned because, since the base is population, the tax imposed in each state would automatically be 
proportionate to population.   Except in very unlikely scenarios (see supra note 114), any other tax requires 
a two step process of determining the amount to be borne by the citizens of each state according to 
population, and then assessing the citizens of each state at different rates to collect the appropriate tax 
shares of the tax.   
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desired is first allocated according to state population, and then the tax rates for the 
citizens of each state are set.  The result will almost always be different rates of tax in 
each state, because the tax base in each state will not be proportional to population. 
The apportionment requirement for direct taxes arose out of the debate over 
whether slaves would be counted in the state’s population for determining the number of 
representatives each state would have in the House of Representatives.  Gouverneur 
Morris said that Pennsylvania “will never agree to a representation of Negroes,"116and 
Mr. Davie, in turn, said that North Carolina would never confederate on any terms that 
did not rate them [slaves] at least as 3/5.”117 Professor Bruce Ackerman explained how 
the great compromise over taxation, representation and slavery was reached:118 
As the Convention struggled to avoid dissolution, 
Gouverneur Morris took the first constructive step: If the 
South insisted upon extra representation for its slaves, why 
not require it to pay a price at tax time? On Thursday, July 
12, he moved that "taxation shall be in proportion to 
Representation."119 However, after a discussion recognizing 
the administrative difficulty of apportioning all taxes, 
Gouverneur Morris amended his proposal to limit the 
apportionment requirement to direct taxes.120 
There was, however, no discussion at the convention as to the precise meaning of 
the term “direct taxes.”121 Professor Bruce Ackerman believes that any attempt to define 
the term would have been “picking at a sore wound” and that the delegates thought it 
better to leave the definition to the future.122 
Except for taxes on exports which was strictly forbidden, these two limitations – 
uniformity for duties, imposts and excises, and apportionment for direct taxes – are the 
only specific restrictions contained in the Constitution on Congress’s power to tax.  Both 
are procedural restrictions on the method used to impose taxes, not substantive 
limitations on Congress’s power to impose taxes.123 However, because in practice it 
would be so difficult to administer and politically justify an apportioned tax, the 
procedural restriction of apportionment would likely prevent Congress from imposing 
 
116 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 523 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press, 1966) 
(July 12, 1787) [hereinafter “Records”], quoted in Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (hereafter, “Ackerman”). 
117Records, supra note 116, at 593 (July 12, 1787), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 116, at n. 27. 
118 Ackerman, supra note 116, at 9. 
119 Records, supra note 116, at 592 (July 12, 1787), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 116, at n. 28. 
120 Records, supra note 116, at 593 (July 12, 1787), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 116, at n.34. 
121 "Mr King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one answered." 2 Records, supra 
note 116, at 350 (Aug. 20, 1787), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 116, at n. 39. 
122 Ackerman, supra note 116, at 11. 
123 This has long and repeatedly been held by the Courts.  See e.g. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 
(1869); Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103 (1916).  
These are not strictly limitations of power. They are rules prescribing the permissible ways in which the 
power can be exercised. 
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direct taxes in many circumstances.124 Thus, it is important to determine the meaning of 
“direct taxes” in order to determine the constitutionality of an unapportioned tax. 
 
(2) Early Judicial Interpretations of the Direct Taxing Clause.   
 
The meaning of “direct tax” has been the subject of debate in the Courts for more 
than 200 years,125 and remains a source of debate within the academy today.126 While 
there are many conflicting theories about the word’s original meaning to the drafters, 
adopters and ratifiers of the constitution,127 the following discussion focuses on judicial 
interpretations rather than on historical speculations.  A careful review of the historical 
development will demonstrate the Murphy court’s error in assuming that Congress’s 
power to tax an emotional injury award derives solely from the 16th Amendment of the 
Constitution, and in holding that the tax is unconstitutional because it is not within the 
Amendment’s embrace.  Indeed, the following discussion will show that even without the 
16th Amendment, Congress would have the constitutional power to impose a uniform tax 
on personal injury awards and settlements such as the one obtained by Ms. Murphy.  The 
Murphy court’s speculation that a compensatory award is not within the 16th Amendment 
– a very questionable conclusion based on dubious evidence128 – is irrelevant if Congress 
had the Constitutional power to tax the award outside of the 16th Amendment. 
The first great tax case to consider the direct taxing clause was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1796.  In 1794, Congress passed a tax on “carriages for 
the conveyance of persons, varying from $1 to $10.”129 Daniel Hylton, who claimed to 
own 125 carriages for his own personal use, was fined when he failed to pay the tax,130 
Although the procedural history is dim, Mr. Hylton’s challenge to the tax was heard by 
the United States Supreme Court.  Mr. Hylton claimed that the carriage tax was an 
unconstitutional unapportioned direct tax.131 
124 See Calvin Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST.
COMMENTARY 295 (2004); Calvin Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of 
The Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998). 
125 Compare Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 172  (1796) (direct taxes are taxes that can be easily 
apportioned); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 US 429 (1895) (tax on income from 
real property is direct tax that must be apportioned); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 
158 US 601 (1895) (tax on income from personal property is direct tax that must be apportioned); .  
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103 (1916) (calling Pollock’s theory, that taxes on income from 
property must be apportioned, “erroneous”).    
126 Compare articles by Calvin Johnson, supra note 124 (arguing for the adoption of the theory utilized in 
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796)), with Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By 
Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENTARY 355 (2004) (Arguing that “the universe of taxes 
potentially subject to apportionment isn't trivial. These taxes probably include, for example, a wealth tax 
and a direct-consumption tax.”). 
127 See e.g. Ackerman, supra note 116, at 16-20 (discussing the Physiocratic theory, then prevalent, that all 
wealth derives from land), the articles by Professor Calvin Johnson, supra, note 124 (apportionment 
derived from requisitions, and covered only taxes that were intended to be imposed like requisitions in an 
apportioned way); and Professor Erik M. Jensen, infra note 132 (direct taxes had broader meaning).   
128 See discussion infra at Part IV.B beginning at page 36. 
129 Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, 1, 1 Stat. 373, 374 (repealed 1802); See also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 




Professor Erik M. Jenson has argued that the case was set-up by anti-federalists 
seeking to challenge the government’s taxing authority.132 In order to meet the 
jurisdictional requirements, Mr. Hylton claimed to own 175 chariots “for his own 
separate use, and not to let out to hire, or for the conveyance of persons for hire”133 – 
more than existed at the time, according to one early commentator, in the entire State of 
Virginia.134 Professor Jensen claims that the jurisdictional defects were overlooked by a 
federalist bench seeking to establish Congress’s broad taxing power.135 Alexander 
Hamilton, then the former Secretary of the Treasury and the spiritual leader of the 
federalists, personally argued before the Supreme Court that the tax should be upheld.136 
The case was heard before the principal of judicial review had been established137 by four 
Supreme Court justices, three of whom issued substantive separate opinions.   
All of the justices agreed that the carriage tax was not a direct tax requiring 
apportionment.  They differed in dicta about the meaning of direct taxes.  Justice Chase 
accepted Alexander Hamilton’s argument that direct taxes are only those that can be 
reasonably apportioned, and also stated that the tax could be justified as an indirect tax on 
an expense.  This expense theory was better developed by Justice Patterson.  In dicta, 
Justice Chase also stated his opinion, emphasizing that it was not a judicial opinion, that 
there are only two kinds of direct taxes “to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without 
regard to property, profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on LAND. -- I doubt 
whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is 
included within the term direct tax.”138 
Justice Patterson held “I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not 
say, the only, objects, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within 
the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land.”139 Justice Patterson 
explained that the purpose of the direct taxing clause was to protect the southern states 
whose citizens owned large tracts of low-value undeveloped land from being taxed on 
their land at the same per acre rates as the citizens of northern states who had smaller 
tracts of high-value developed lands.140 Justice Patterson also suggested a theoretical 
 
132 See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2352 (1997). 
133 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 176 (Patterson, J.). 
134 See Id., quoting Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280, 283 
n.1 (1907). 
135 Id.
136 Id. at 171. 
137The Supreme Court established the principal of judicial review – that the Supreme Court had the 
constitutional authority to declare acts of the legislative and executive branches, and acts by state 
legislatures, to be unconstitutional – seven years later in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  Justice 
Chase stated in Hylton: “As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is unnecessary, at this time, 
for me to determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Congress 
void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation of, the Constitution; but if the court have 
such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case.”  Hylton, 5 U.S. at 
175.  Professor Jensen argues that the case would have been moot if the Supreme Court did not have the 
power of judicial review, and thus the power must have been assumed to exist for jurisdiction to exist.  See 
Jenson, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes,” supra note 132, at 2352 n. 95. 
138 Id. at 558. 
139 Id. at 177 (Patterson, J.) 
140 Id. (“The provision was made in favor of the southern States. They possessed a large number of slaves; 
they had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive. A majority of the states had 
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distinction between direct and indirect taxes.  Quoting from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations, Justice Patterson argued that taxes imposed on expenses or consumption, such as 
the portion of the carriage that is used up during the year, are indirect because they are a 
circuitous method of taxing income.141 Presumably, this is also what Justice Chase was 
referring to when he justified the Carriage Tax as a tax on an expense.142 
Justice Iredell thought that only those taxes that could be apportioned without 
creating unfair results within different states should be considered direct.143 He noted 
that an apportioned tax on carriages would require owners in one state to pay a higher tax 
than owners in another state because carriage ownership was not proportional to state 
population.144 Thus, an apportioned carriage tax, he believed, would generate the absurd 
result of differing taxation depending on the taxpayer’s state of residence.  In addition, 
Congress could not impose an apportioned carriage tax if there existed any state without 
carriages, because there would be no way for that state’s residents to pay their share of 
the total tax in proportion to population.  Justice Iredell thought it better not to attempt to 
define direct taxes since only a carriage tax was before the Court.145 Nevertheless, he 
suggested that direct taxes might refer only to taxes on land or a product of land – 
something that is fixed and present in every state.146 
Justice Wilson wrote a two sentence opinion agreeing that the tax on carriages 
was constitutional.147 Justice Cushing dissented because he had not participated in the 
hearing of the case, and therefore could not render an opinion on it.148 
It is difficult to glean a clear rule from Hylton, other than the precise holding that 
a flat tax on carriages was held to be an indirect tax that did not need to be apportioned.  
 
but few slaves, and several of them a limited territory, well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The 
southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the Constitution, would have been wholly at the 
mercy of the other states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land in 
every part of the Union after the same rate or measure: so much a head in the first instance, and so much an 
acre in the second. To guard them against imposition in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the 
clause to the Constitution, which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the states, according to their respective numbers.”). 
141 Id. at 180 (“All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind, 
and of course is not a direct tax. Indirect taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of individuals, 
who generally live according to their income.”) 
142 See quotation from Justice Chase, supra, at note 138. 
143 Id. at 561 (Iredell, J.) (“As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution 
contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned.  If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, 
not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution.”). 
144 Justice Iredell gave a hypothetical under which the residents of Virginia would pay $3.80 per carriage 
while the residents of Connecticut would pay $35 per carriage; a result that Justice Iredell thought would be 
absurd.  Id. at 182. 
145 Id. at 183 (“There is no necessity, or propriety, in determining what is or is not, a direct, or indirect, tax 
in all cases.  Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee.”). 
146 Id. (“Perhaps a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something 
inseparably annexed to the soil: Something capable of apportionment under all such circumstances.  A land 
or a poll tax may be considered of this description. . . .  In regard to other articles, there may possibly be 
considerable doubt.  It is sufficient, on the present occasion, for the court to be satisfied, that this is not a 
direct tax contemplated by the Constitution, in order to affirm the present judgment; since, if it cannot be 
apportioned, it must necessarily be uniform.”). 
147 Id. at 183 (Wilson, J.). 
148 Id. at 184 (Cushing, J., dissenting). 
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However, the majority of the judges suggested that only land or capitation taxes, or 
something very similar, would be considered direct.   
Modern commentators strongly disagree about the precedental effect that Hylton 
should have.  One camp, exemplified by Professor Calvin Johnson, gives great weight to 
the interpretation made by justices who were members of the founding generation, some 
of whom even participated in the negotiations that led to the direct taxing clause.149 The 
other camp, exemplified by Professor Erik Jensen, view Hylton as a phony political 
opinion lacking a balanced analytical framework.150 
The next case to be heard by the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of the first federal income tax, which was imposed during the civil war.151 In Pacific 
Insurance Company v. Soule,152 the Court considered two issues.  The first issue was 
whether the tax on an insurance company’s income that had been received in coined 
money could be computed and paid in depreciated legal tender currency, or whether the 
additional value of coined money over the depreciated currency was also “income.”  
After reviewing the taxing act, which required a separate accounting for income received 
in coin and currency, the Court held that additional income was reportable when income 
was received in coin and the tax paid in currency.153 The second question considered by 
the Court was whether the income tax was a direct tax that failed to comply with the rules 
of apportionment.  The Court followed the theory expressed in Hylton that only taxes that 
could be easily and fairly apportioned would be direct.  Applying this theory to the tax on 
an insurance company’s income, the Court said:   
 
The consequences which would follow the apportionment 
of the tax in question . . . must not be overlooked. They are 
very obvious. Where such corporations are numerous and 
rich, it might be light; where none exist, it could not be 
collected; where they are few and poor, it would fall upon 
them with such weight as to involve annihilation. It cannot 
be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended 
that any tax should be apportioned, the collection of which 
 
149See Calvin Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, supra note 
124, at 332 (calling Hylton “heroic” and arguing for a return to its theory); Calvin Johnson, Apportionment 
of Direct Taxes, supra note 124, at 75 (Arguing at length that “Hylton has a special legitimacy on both its 
holding and its functional perspective on constitutional construction, because of who the actors were.”); 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992) (arguing for special weight to be given to the Hylton decisions because of the 
closeness in time to the adoption of the Constitution and the participation of the judges in the constitutional 
process).   
150 See Jensen, Interpreting the 16th Amendment, supra note 114, at 379-380 (noting, among other things, 
that the judges had fewer reference works than we have today, failed to cite primary sources, were all well-
known federalists who had an agenda to expand governmental power); Jensen, The Apportionment of 
Direct Taxes, supra note 114, at 2356-57 (criticizing Alexander Hamilton for advancing positions 
inconsistent with his prior writings regarding the meaning of the direct taxing clause, and criticizing the 
judges for their lack of analysis).   
151 The Civil War income taxes were imposed by the Internal Revenue Act of June 30, 1864, and amended 
by the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, 13 Stat. 105, 120, pp. 276, 283. 
152 74 U.S. 433 (1869). 
153 Id. at 442-43. 
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on that principle would be attended with such results. The 
consequences are fatal to the proposition. . . .  [t]he tax [in 
issue] is not a direct tax, but a duty or excise; that it was 
obligatory on the plaintiff to pay it. 
 
Shortly thereafter, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,154 a 10% tax on the issuance by a 
state or national banking association of bank notes was upheld against constitutional 
challenge.  Justice Chase pointed out that Congress had only previously adopted 
apportioned taxes on real property and slaves, and that “taxes on personal property, 
contracts, occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by Congress as proper 
subjects of direct tax.”155 Justice Chase concluded that “It may be rightly affirmed, 
therefore, that in the practical construction of the Constitution by Congress, direct taxes 
have been limited to taxes on land and appurtenances, and taxes on polls, or capitation 
taxes.”156 After reviewing James Madison’s notes from the constitutional convention, 
Justice Chase concluded “All this . . . indicates, also, an understanding that direct taxes 
were such as may be levied by capitation, and on lands and appurtenances; or, perhaps, 
by valuation and assessment of personal property upon general lists.”157 Finally, after 
reviewing the Court’s early holding in Hylton, and recent holding in Soule, Justice Chase 
concluded that only taxes on land, capitation, polls, and possibly personal property upon 
general lists would be considered direct, and therefore it “follows necessarily that the 
power to tax without apportionment extends to all other objects.”158 
Next, in Scholey v. Rew,159 the Supreme Court upheld a Civil War succession tax, 
which applied to the real estate Mr. Scholey received under the will of his deceased wife.  
The Court held that the tax was an excise on the transfer of property, not a tax on the real 
estate itself.  Interestingly, the Court also compared the succession tax to an income tax:   
 
Taxes on lands, houses, and other permanent real estate 
have always been deemed to be direct taxes, and capitation 
taxes, by the express words of the Constitution, are within 
the same category, but it never has been decided that any 
other legal exactions for the support of the Federal 
government fall within the condition. . . . Whether direct 
taxes in the sense of the Constitution comprehend any other 
tax than a capitation tax and a tax on land is a question not 
absolutely decided, nor is it necessary to determine it in the 
present case, as it is expressly decided that the term does 
not include the tax on income, which cannot be 
distinguished in principle from a succession tax such as 
the one involved in the present controversy.160 
154 75 U.S. 533 (1869). 
155 Id. at 543.  Justice Chase explained that the taxation of slaves was in a special class, and that slaves were 
treated for purposes of taxation as a form of real estate.  Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 544. 
158 Id. at 546-47. 
159 90 U.S. 331 (1875). 
160 Id. at 347 (citations omitted, emphasis added).   
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The Civil War income tax was challenged by an individual many years after its 
enactment and repeal in Springer v. United States,161 and was again upheld.    The 
taxpayer in Springer filed an income tax return, but refused to pay the assessed tax.  The 
tax collector therefore levied on the taxpayer’s real estate, purchased the property at a tax 
lien sale, and sought to eject the taxpayer from the premises.  The taxpayer then 
challenged the tax assessment, levy, sale, and ejectment on due process and 
apportionment grounds.  Once again, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax 
from constitutional challenge, relying on the lack of clarity from the constitutional 
debates,162 the notes left behind by Alexander Hamilton from the Hylton case,163 the 
letters of James Madison disagreeing with the Hylton case but recognizing that the courts 
were unlikely to adopt his views,164 the prior practice of Congress in imposing taxes,165 
and the recent decisions in Veazie, Soule and Scholey.166 The Court concluded:  “that 
direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as 
expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the 
plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty.”167 
The early courts had thus interpreted the direct taxing clause extremely narrowly, 
allowing unapportioned taxes on the ownership of personal property, on inheritances, and 
on the issuance of bank notes, and suggesting that only taxes on real property and 
possibly general lists of personal property would be subject to apportionment.   
 
(3) The Direct Taxing Clause Under Pollock.   
 
Congress enacted the first non-war income tax in 1894.168 Professor Bruce 
Ackerman claims that the 1894 income tax, which was modeled after the civil war 
income taxes that had been upheld in Soule and Springer, was imposed in the midst of a 
class war catalyzed by the financial panic of 1893.169 The string of governmental 
victories came to a screeching halt in the famous 1895 cases of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan 
& Trust,170 in which the Court ultimately struck down the entire 1894 Act.  Charles 
Pollock, a shareholder in Farmers Loan and Trust Company, sued the company to prevent 
it from paying taxes imposed under the 1894 Act on the income generated by the real and 
personal property that the corporation owned.171 Mr. Pollock claimed that Congress 
could not constitutionally tax the corporation’s income from real and personal property 
 
161 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
162 Id. at 596-97. 
163 Alexander Hamilton stated in his papers “direct taxes be held to be only "capitation or poll taxes, and 
taxes on lands and buildings, and general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals or on 
their whole real or personal estate. All else must, of necessity, be considered as indirect taxes.”  Id. at 598.   
164 Id.
165 Id. at 599. 
166 Id. at 601-602. 
167 Id. at 602. 
168 Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349 at 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (1894) (declared unconstitutional in Pollock II, infra 
note 170, in 1895).   It is also worth noting that while business expenses were made deductible from 
income, there was no exclusion in the act for personal injury awards. 
169 See Ackerman, supra note 116, at 28. 
170 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (Pollock I); 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (Pollock II). 
171 See prior history, cited in 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
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without apportionment,172 and could not constitutionally tax interest earned on the 
corporation’s municipal bonds under implied federalism principles.173 Since Congress 
purported to tax income from real and personal property in the 1894 Act, Mr. Pollock 
sought a declaration that the 1894 Act was unconstitutional, and an injunction preventing 
Farmers Loan & Trust from paying any of the income taxes.174 
Chief Justice Fuller began his majority opinion in the first Pollock case by stating 
“in the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and 
indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, 
namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to 
duties, imposts and excises.”175 Chief Justice Fuller stated, essentially, that direct taxes 
in common parlance are those that cannot be avoided by conduct – taxes on mere 
ownership as opposed to taxes imposed on activities.176 However, Justice Fuller 
recognized that the Constitution might apply a different definition.  He therefore 
proceeded to review the ambiguous constitutional debates, concluding initially that the 
drafters understood direct taxes to include taxes on real and personal property and the 
incomes therefrom.177 
Justice Fuller then reviewed the Court’s prior cases.  He distinguished Hylton,
Soule and Vesie as taxes on duties or excises (on the use of carriages, the operation of an 
insurance company, and the circulation of bank notes, respectively).178 Justice Chase 
distinguished Scholey as an excise on the transfer of property at death.179 Finally, the 
Court struggled to distinguish the income tax in Springer by going back to the original 
record to find “that the income . . . was in part professional as attorney-at-law and the rest 
interest on United States bonds,” not from property.180 
After reviewing the cases, the Court equivocated on whether a tax on income 
from personal property would constitute a direct tax, concluding only “that the law in 
question, so far as it levies a tax on the rents or income of real estate, is in violation of the 
Constitution, and is invalid.”181 The Court, unanimously,182 agreed with Mr. Pollock that 
the tax on municipal bond interest was unconstitutional under federalism principles.183 
172 Mr. Pollock also argued that the tax on income from property was not uniform because certain entities 
were excepted from the tax.  Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 555. 
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 557.  Justice Fuller noted that some questioned whether there was a third category 
of indirect taxes that did not constitute a “duty, impost or excise,” but noted that “such a tax for more than 
one hundred years of national existence has as yet remained undiscovered”  Id.
176 Id. at 680 (“Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden upon some one else, 
or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property 
holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and 
the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes.”). 
177 Id. at 574. 
178 Id. at 576-77. 
179 Id. at 577. 
180 Id. at 578-79. 
181 Id. at 583. 
182 Id. at 717.  See also Id. at 653-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 586 (“it is obvious that taxation on the interest [from municipal bonds] would operate on the 
power to borrow before it is exercised, and would have a sensible influence on the contract, and that the tax 
in question is a tax on the power of the States and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and 
consequently repugnant to the Constitution.”).   
31
Justice Field wrote a lengthy concurring opinion arguing that the entire tax act 
should be declared unconstitutional.  Justice Field contended that taxes on income from 
non-property sources such as wages – which even he conceded constituted “duties, 
imposts and excises” and thus required no apportionment – were not uniform because of 
the modest progressive structure of the Act - the first $4,000 of income was exempted.  
Justice Field saw the exemption as an attack on wealth, and as an invitation to class 
warfare.184 To Justice Field, uniformity meant more than geographic uniformity, it 
required all taxpayers to pay ratably.185 No other justice joined Justice Field in these 
views.  Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, wrote a lengthy dissent arguing on the 
basis of precedent that direct taxes should be limited to taxes on real property itself, and 
should not cover taxes on income from real property.186 
In Pollock 2,187 a five-to-four divided Supreme Court revisited the case and 
expanded its ruling.  The Court first held that a tax on income from personal property was 
also a direct tax that had to be apportioned.  The Court’s decision was supported 
primarily by statements made by Alexander Hamilton in his papers regarding the Hylton 
case, which had been published after his death,188 and on decisions of English courts.189 
The Court stated that the tax in income from personal property was direct because the 
taxpayer had no means of escape.190 However, this theory is highly questionable.   
Taxpayers do not need to rent or sell their property – income generally results from 
people engaging in transactions with their property, which is the usual province of an 
excise.  The Court treated the source of the income (from property) as controlling, rather 
than considering whether the income arose out of a transaction.   
After holding that the broad based tax on all income from real and personal 
property was direct and had to be apportioned, the Court considered whether the tax act 
as a whole should be declared unconstitutional, or whether the unconstitutional portions 
(the tax on income from property and municipal bonds) should be severed from the 
constitutional portions (which the Court characterized as a tax on incomes from 
“business, privileges, or employments.”)191 The Court noted that most of the expected 
 
184 Id. at 597 (Field, J., concurring). 
185 Id. at 607-608. 
186 Id. beginning at 829. 
187 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
188 Id. at 625 (quoting Alexander Hamilton as follows:  “The following are presumed to be the only direct 
taxes. Capitation or poll taxes. Taxes on lands and buildings. General assessments, whether on the whole 
property of individuals, or on their whole real or personal estate; all else must of necessity be considered as 
indirect taxes.”).  The Court adopted Hamilton’s statement as a definition of direct taxes.  Id. (“He gives, 
however, it appears to us, a definition which covers the question before us. A tax upon one's whole income 
is a tax upon the annual receipts from his whole property, and as such falls within the same class as a tax 
upon that property, and is a direct tax, in the meaning of the Constitution.”)  It is important to note that 
Hamilton did not discuss a tax on income – his statement covered only a tax on a person’s entire property 
or estate.  The Court on its own extended the analysis to income from property. 
189 Id. at 630-632. 
190 Id. at 627-28 (“can it be properly held that the Constitution . . . authorizes a general un-apportioned tax 
on the products of the farm and the rents of real estate, although imposed merely because of ownership and 
with no possible means of escape from payment, as belonging to a totally different class from that which 
includes the property from whence the income proceeds?”). 
191 Id. at 635 (“We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, 
and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits 
from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, 
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revenue from the 1894 Act was to come from the unconstitutional tax on income from 
real and personal property, and only a small portion was to come from the constitutional 
tax on other income, including wages and professional earnings.192 The Court held that 
Congress would not have intended for the constitutional portions to survive alone, and 
therefore it struck down the entire Act.193 
Four justices joined a famous194 dissent written by Justice Harlan.195 The 
dissenters distinguished between a tax on land and a tax on income from land, the former 
being direct and reasonably subject to apportionment, while the latter should be treated as 
an excise.196 The dissenters also argued that all taxes on personal property or income 
therefrom should be treated as indirect,197 and that the decision as a whole was a threat to 
the security of the country by effectively limiting the subjects of taxation.198 
It is important to note that the Pollock majority recognized Congress’s power to 
tax all types of income without apportionment other than taxes on real and personal 
property or the income therefrom, including income from “business, privileges, or 
employments.”  There was no question raised by any of the judges in Pollock over 
Congress’s power to tax wages and other revenues generated from what we today call 
human capital.  Indeed, Pollock implicitly recognized Congress’s ability to tax without 
apportionment all sources of income not from real or personal property (or municipal 
bonds).   
 
privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such.  Being of 
opinion that so much of the sections of this law as lays a tax on income from real and personal property is 
invalid, we are brought to the question of the effect of that conclusion upon these sections as a whole.”). 
192 Id. at 637 (“[B]y far the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would 
leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations; and in that way 
what was intended as a tax on capital would remain in substance a tax on occupations and labor. We cannot 
believe that such was the intention of Congress.”). 
193 Id. (“[A]ll  those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid.”). 
194 Professor Bruce Ackerman claims that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Pollock was far more famous at the 
turn of the century than was his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which has become a 
law school textbook staple.  See Ackerman, supra note 116, at 29. 
195 Justices White, Brown and Jackson joined Harlan in his dissent.   
196 Id. at 665 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Assuming it to be the settled construction of the Constitution that the 
general government cannot tax lands, eo nomine, except by apportioning the tax among the States 
according to their respective numbers, does it follow that a tax on incomes derived from rents is a direct tax 
on the real estate from which such rents arise?  In my judgment a tax on income derived from real property 
ought not to be, and until now has never been, regarded by any court as a direct tax on such property within 
the meaning of the Constitution.”). 
197 Id. at 670 (“When direct taxes are restricted to capitation taxes and taxes on land, taxation, in either 
form, is limited to subjects always found wherever population is found, and which cannot be consumed or 
destroyed. They are subjects which can always be seen and inspected by the assessor, and have immediate 
connection with the country and its soil throughout its entire limits. Not so with personal property.”). 
198 See Id. at 671-72 (“ No such apportionment can possibly be made without doing gross injustice to the 
many for the benefit of the favored few in particular States. Any attempt upon the part of Congress to 
apportion among the States . . . would tend to arouse such indignation among the freemen of America that 
it would never be repeated. When, therefore, this court adjudges, as it does now adjudge, that Congress 
cannot impose a duty or tax upon personal property, or upon income arising either from rents of real estate 
or from personal property, including invested personal property, bonds, stocks, and investments of all 
kinds, except by apportioning the sum to be so raised among the States according to population, it 
practically decides that, without an amendment of the Constitution . . . such property and incomes can 
never be made to contribute to the support of the national government.”). 
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(4) The Direct Taxing Clause After Pollock and Before the 16th 
Amendment. 
 
The negative political reaction to the split decision in Pollock199 led quickly to 
retreat.  Four years after Pollock, in Knowlton v. Moore,200 the justices unanimously201 
agreed that the War Revenue Act of 1898,202 which imposed an unapportioned tax with 
progressive rates on legatees who receive property from a deceased person’s estate, was 
constitutional.  In an opinion by Justice White, one of the Pollock dissenters, the Court 
first noted that the tax was not on property itself, but on the transfer of property from the 
decedent to the legatees.  The Court stated that inheritance taxes: 
 
[A]re included officially under the general denomination of 
indirect taxes . . . [because they] are considered as levied on the 
“occasion of a particular isolated act.” This view of the inheritance 
and legacy tax conforms to the official definition of indirect taxes, 
among which inheritance and legacy taxes are classed, which 
prevails in France at the present day. The definition is as follows:  
“Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession 
and enjoyments of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the 
happening of an event or an exchange.”203 
This theory is very different from the theory underlying Pollock, which focused on 
whether the source of the item subject to tax was property, rather than whether the item 
subject to tax was generated from an “event or exchange.”   
The Court in Knowlton also noted that a similar succession tax had been upheld in 
Scholey.204 However, the Court had to address the tangle of authority created by the 
interplay of Pollock and Scholey. The tangle was caused because Scholey, in upholding 
the succession tax, had analogized it to an income tax – both of which according to 
Scholey were indirect.205 The taxpayers in Knowlton argued that Scholey must have been 
over-ruled by Pollock’s holding that taxes on income from property were direct and had 
to be apportioned.206 The majority in Knowlton disagreed with the taxpayer’s argument, 
holding that the precise holding in Scholey regarding succession taxes had in fact been 
“reaffirmed” by the Pollock Court when it distinguished Scholey as dealing only with the 
succession taxes that were before it.  In essence, Pollock only rejected the dicta in 
 
199 See Ackerman, supra note 116, at 31. 
200 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
201 Three judges dissented in Knowlton. Justice Brewer dissented from the Court’s holding on the meaning 
of the uniformity requirement, contending that a progressive tax would not be uniform.  Id. at 110.  Justices 
Harlan and McKenna dissented only to the majority’s interpretation of that the tax rate be determined by 
the amount of each distributee’s share rather than to the whole estate.  Justices Harlan & McKenna 
specifically agreed with Constitutional views of the majority.  Id.
202 20 Stat. 448 (1898). 
203 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47. 
204 Id. at 52; see also discussion of Scholey, supra, beginning at note 159. 
205 See supra at note 81. 
206 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 80. 
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Scholey regarding income taxes, and reaffirmed the holding regarding succession 
taxes.207 
The Court in Knowlton next rejected the taxpayer’s argument that since the 
inheritance tax could not be shifted to another taxpayer it was a direct tax requiring 
apportionment.  Knowlton held that the Court in Pollock did not ground its decision on 
the economic theory of shiftability.208 Rather, the Knowlton Court said that Pollock was 
grounded on the theory that the tax on income from property was a tax on the property 
itself.  On the other hand, the inheritance tax in Knowlton was a duty or excise on the 
transfer at death, not a tax on income, and therefore could be analyzed differently.   
It is difficult to reconcile the theory used by the Court in Knowlton with Pollock’s 
source rule, since the source of the inheritance tax in Knowlton, like the source of the 
income tax in Pollock, was property.  Although the Knowlton Court professed to 
distinguish Pollock, its focus on the activity of transfer rather than the source of the item 
being taxed marked a substantial theoretical departure.  The theory used in Knowlton,
which focused on whether there was any activity triggering tax rather than on whether the 
source of the item taxed was property, would have changed the result in Pollock. After 
all, the corporate taxpayer in Pollock was engaged in activities (leasing property and 
managing investments) that gave rise to the income that was subject to tax. 
After concluding that the inheritance tax was an indirect duty or excise triggered 
by the transfer of property at death, the Knowlton Court considered the taxpayer’s 
argument that the tax was not uniform because of the $10,000 exemption and progressive 
rate structure employed by the statute.209 The Court began by recognizing that many 
states had rules requiring equality and uniformity in taxation that would have been 
violated by the statute.210 The Court focused closely, however, on the constitutional 
language requiring uniformity “throughout the United States.” 
 
Considering the text, it is apparent that if the word "uniform" 
means "equal and uniform" in the sense now asserted by the 
opponents of the tax, the words "throughout the United States" are 
deprived of all real significance, and sustaining the contention 
 
207 Id. at 81. 
208 Id. at 82 (“The fallacy is in the premise. It is true that in the income tax cases the theory of certain 
economists by which direct and indirect taxes are classified with reference to the ability to shift the same 
was adverted to. But this disputable theory was not the basis of the conclusion of the court. The 
constitutional meaning of the word direct was the matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of 
apportionment had its origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general 
ownership of property from being levied by any other rule than that of apportionment, two things were 
decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed between a tax levied on a person solely 
because of his general ownership of real property, and the same tax imposed solely because of his general 
ownership of personal property. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or 
personal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said income was derived, and 
hence must be apportioned. These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was 
decided that duties, imposts and excises which are not the essential equivalent of a tax on property 
generally, real or personal, solely because of its ownership, must be converted into direct taxes, because it 
is conceived that it would be demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the 
person upon whom they first fall.”). 
209 Id. at 83-84. 
210 Id. at 84. 
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must hence lead to a disregard of the elementary canon of 
construction which requires that effect be given to each word of 
the Constitution.211 
The Court therefore adopted a geographic definition of uniformity, suggesting that only a 
duty, impost or excise that discriminated on its face depending on the geographic location 
of the taxpayer would lack uniformity. 
 In Thomas v. United States,212 the Court again retreated from Pollock by holding 
that a tax on the transfer of stock certificates was indirect.  Mr. Thomas, a stockbroker, 
who had been criminally indicted and convicted for failing to pay the tax, argued that the 
tax was an unapportioned direct tax and therefore invalid.  In a unanimous opinion by 
Justice Fuller, the author of Pollock, upholding the conviction, the Court said: 
 
There is no occasion to attempt to confine the words duties, 
imposts and excises to the limits of precise definition. We think 
that they were used comprehensively to cover customs and excise 
duties imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture and sale 
of certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, 
vocations, occupations and the like.  Taxes of this sort have been 
repeatedly sustained by this court, and distinguished from direct 
taxes under the Constitution.213 
The tax in Thomas was imposed on an item of personal property, as in Pollock 2,
yet the Court looked not to the source or base of the tax – personal property in the 
form of stock, but to the acts giving rise to the tax – the transfer of personal 
property.  In attempting to explain its ruling in Thomas, the Court fell back on the 
transactional concept it had expressed in Knowlton, and also mentioned a new 
second theory – corporate privilege – that would soon be expanded: 
 
The sale of stocks is a particular business transaction in the 
exercise of the privilege afforded by the laws in respect to 
corporations of disposing of property in the form of 
certificates. The stamp duty is contingent on the happening 
of the event of sale, and the element of absolute and 
unavoidable demand is lacking. As such it falls, as stamp 
taxes ordinarily do, within the second class of the forms of 
taxation.214 
As with Knowlton, the theory used by the Court in Thomas is difficult to reconcile 
with the theory used by the Court in Pollock. Why, for example, would a tax on the 
income generated by a sale of stock be direct under Pollock, while a tax on the gross 
proceeds from the sale of stock would be indirect under Thomas? The only way to 
 
211 Id. at 87. 
212 192 U.S. 363 (1904). 
213 Id. at 370. 
214 Id. at 371. 
36
reconcile these cases is to suggest that a tax on income from property is more direct than 
a tax on the property itself.  The absurdity of the proposition is manifest, and shows that 
the standards used by the Court were changing. 
In the same year as Thomas, the Court in Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. 
McClain215 upheld a tax on the gross proceeds from the sale of sugar.  The Court, in a 
unanimous decision by Justice Harlan, a Pollock dissenter, held that the tax was an excise 
on the business of refining sugar, and not a direct tax on property ownership.216 The 
Court emphasized that Congress in the statute called the tax a “special excise.” Because 
Congress labeled it an excise, said the Court, “it must be assumed, for what it is worth, 
that Congress had no purpose to exceed its powers under the Constitution, but only to 
exercise the authority granted to it of laying and collecting excises.”217 The Spreckels 
Court disposed of Pollock, which it called The Income Tax Cases, in two sentences, 
saying that the Court there said that it was not commenting on “‘gains or profits from 
business, privileges or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on 
business, privileges or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been 
sustained as such.’"218 But of course the question in Pollock was whether income from 
an investment business could constitutionally be taxed.  Once again, the Spreckels 
Court’s underlying theory – focusing on the identity or activities of the taxpayer rather 
than the source of the item taxed – was a marked departure from the Court’s theory in 
Pollock, and would have changed the result there. 
Taking the hint from Spreckels and Thomas that a tax on the privilege of doing 
business in corporate form would be a valid excise, Congress passed a new corporate 
income tax in 1909.219 The 1909 law imposed “a special excise tax with respect to the 
carrying on or doing business by such corporation . . . equivalent to one per centum upon 
the entire net income over and above five thousand dollars received by it from all sources 
during the year.”  Only dividends received by one corporation from another who had 
already paid the tax were excluded.220 
The 1909 Corporate Income Tax was upheld by the Court as a valid excise in 
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,221 a unanimous opinion written by Justice Day.  As in the other 
post-Pollock cases, the Court again emphasized Congress’s stated purpose to impose an 
excise rather than a direct tax.222 In distinguishing Pollock, the Court stated: 
 
215 192 U.S. 397 (1904). 
216 Id. at 411 (“Clearly the tax is not imposed upon gross annual receipts as property, but only in respect of 
the carrying on or doing the business of refining sugar. It cannot be otherwise regarded because of the fact 
that the amount of the tax is measured by the amount of the gross annual receipts. The tax is defined in the 
act as "a special excise tax," and, therefore, it must be assumed, for what it is worth, that Congress had no 
purpose to exceed its powers under the Constitution, but only to exercise the authority granted to it of 
laying and collecting excises.”). 
217 Id.
218 Id. at 413, quoting from Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635. 
219 36 Stat. 11 (1909). 
220 Id. at 144. 
221 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
222 Id. at 145 (‘While the mere declaration contained in a statute that it shall be regarded as a tax of a 
particular character does not make it such if it is apparent that it cannot be so designated consistently with 
the meaning and effect of the act, nevertheless the declaration of the lawmaking power is entitled to much 
weight, and in this statute the intention is expressly declared to impose a special excise tax with respect to 
the carrying on or doing business by such corporation . . .  It is therefore apparent, giving all the words of 
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In the present case the tax is not payable unless there be a carrying 
on or doing of business in the designated capacity, and this is made 
the occasion for the tax, measured by the standard prescribed. The 
difference between the acts is not merely nominal, but rests upon 
substantial differences between the mere ownership of property 
and the actual doing of business in a certain way.223 
Was the income earned by the corporation in Pollock not the result of “actual doing of 
business in a certain way?”  Indeed, the Court in Flint considered the objections of real 
estate companies (including one whose only asset was a hotel), and ruled that such 
entities could be taxed because they were engaged in business activities:   
 
We think it is clear that corporations organized for the purpose of 
doing business, and actually engaged in such activities as leasing 
property, collecting rents, managing office buildings, making 
investments of profits, or leasing ore lands and collecting royalties, 
managing wharves, dividing profits, and in some cases investing 
the surplus, are engaged in business within the meaning of this 
statute, and in the capacity necessary to make such organizations 
subject to the law.224 
One could surmise that the only real basis for the Court in Flint to distinguish Pollock 
was Congress’s statement in the 1909 statute calling the tax an “excise.”  Surely 
Congress’s constitutional power to tax could not depend merely on Congress making a 
self-serving statement in the statute.  Despite the sophistry, by the time of Flint the 
standard had changed from focusing on the source of the income to focusing on whether 
or not the income came from an activity. 
 In Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate,225 a case argued at the same time as Flint but 
decided later,226 the Court held that a corporation, which had leased all of its property to a 
single lessee for 130 years, and had amended its charger to permit it to own only the 
property subject to the lease, was not “doing business” and therefore was not subject to 
the Corporate Tax Law of 1909.  The Court’s decision in Zonne was based on the 
language of the statute, not on any constitutional limitation on Congress’s power to tax.  
Yet, the specter of Pollock hung over the decision, for without sufficient business activity 
the new constitutional theory, under which taxes on income from business activities 
constitute “duties or excises,” would not logically apply.227 
the statute effect, that the tax is imposed not upon the franchises of the corporation irrespective of their use 
in business, nor upon the property of the corporation, but upon the doing of corporate or insurance business 
and with respect to the carrying on thereof.”). 
223 Id. at 150. 
224 Id. at 171. 
225 220 U.S. 187 (1911). 
226 See McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228 U.S. 295, 310 (1913). 
227 The Court in McCouch v. Minehill, 228 U.S. 295 (1913), followed Zonne in holding that a railroad that 
had leased its property, and maintained a staff to invest the rents, was not engaged in business within the 
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Flint was followed in Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert,228 where the court 
distinguished between a broad income tax as in Pollock, and an excise tax on a 
corporation engaged in business that is measured by income.229 The Court in Stratton’s 
made some comments about the distinction between a tax on business activity and a tax 
on property that would later be used by the Court to define the meaning of “income” 
under the 16th Amendment:230 
The sale outright of a mining property might be fairly described as 
a mere conversion of the capital from land into money. But when a 
company is digging pits, sinking shafts, tunneling, drifting, 
stoping, drilling, blasting, and hoisting ores, it is employing capital 
and labor in transmuting a part of the realty into personalty, and 
putting it into marketable form. The very process of mining is, in a 
sense, equivalent in its results to a manufacturing process. And, 
however the operation shall be described, the transaction in 
indubitably "business" within the fair meaning of the act of 1909; 
and the gains derived from it are properly and strictly the income 
from that business; for "income" may be defined as the gain 
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and 
here we have combined operations of capital and labor.231 
Beginning in 1909 there was strong support in Congress for enacting a new 
broad-based income tax with which to challenge Pollock head-on.  However, President 
Taft sought to avoid the dispute by proposing a compromise - a constitutional amendment 
that would permit a broad based income tax without apportionment.232 The compromise 
led to the enactment of the 16th Amendment in 1913. 
The courts never fully developed the distinction between direct and indirect 
taxation because Congress passed and the States adopted the 16th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution in 1913.  However, it is important to recognize that the Court 
had retreated from the theory it had used in Pollock – that Congress could not, without 
apportionment, tax income from property because it would constitute a direct tax on the 
property itself.  Instead, the post-Pollock cases focused on the conduct of the taxpayer 
(and to some extent on the identity of the taxpayer)233 rather than the source of the 
revenue, and specifically upheld the 1909 corporate income tax in situations that would 
not have survived under the theory utilized in Pollock.
meaning of the Corporate Tax Law of 1909.  Three dissenters argued that the continuing investment 
activities were enough to constitute the carrying on of a business. 
228 231 U.S. 399 (1913). 
229 Id. at 416-17 (“Congress in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise  or 
privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although 
derived in part from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable.”). 
230 See discussion of Eisner v. McComber, infra beginning at note 354. 
231 Id. at 414-15 (emphasis added).   
232 The history of the negotiations leading to a constitutional amendment are set forth in Ackerman, 
Taxation and the Constitution, supra note 116, at 34-39. 
233 The Court’s identity theory suggested that Congress would have the power to tax a corporation simply 
because it was permitted to exist and conduct business, that its corporate existence might be enough to 
categorize a tax imposed on a corporation engaged in business as an excise.   
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Moreover, all of the early cases, including Pollock, recognized that Congress 
always possessed the power to tax income from what we call today human capital, such 
as wages, without apportionment.234 Pollock only questioned the Court’s ability to tax 
income from real or personal property without apportionment.  What remained of Pollock 
at the time of the adoption of the 16th Amendment was a prohibition against imposing 
unapportioned taxes on the mere ownership of real or personal property, or on income 
arising solely out of that mere ownership, absent transactional activity triggering the tax.   
It is also important to note that the period following Pollock and before the 
adoption of the 16th Amendment saw the turnover of nearly the entire Court.  Of the nine 
justices serving when Pollock was decided,235 only Justice White, a dissenter,236 was still 
on the Court in 1913.237 And it was an elderly Justice White, writing for a unanimous 
Supreme Court, who would later formally reject Pollock’s source rule.238 
(5) The 16th Amendment and the Judicial Rejection of Pollock’s 
Source Rule 
 
The 16th Amendment eliminated any remaining constitutional requirement that 
taxes on income be apportioned.   It provided: 
 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.239 
The Supreme Court would say many times that the 16th Amendment did not grant 
to Congress any new power of taxation.240 Congress had the power under the original 
 
234 Id. at 415 (“As to the alleged inequality of operation between mining corporations and others, it is of 
course true that the revenues derived from the working of mines result to some extent in the exhaustion of 
the capital. But the same is true of the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital, yet 
such earnings are commonly dealt with in legislation as income.”). 
235 The justices on the Court in 1898 were Justices Fuller, Harlan, Field, Gray, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, 
White and Peckham.  See MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, available at 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0101281.html (2006) 
236 See supra note 195. 
237 The justices in 1913 were McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar, Pitney and 
White.  See MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 235. 
238 See discussion infra beginning at note 247. 
239 U.S. CONST. art XVI (1913). 
240 See e.g. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (“As repeatedly held, this [the 16th 
Amendment] did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which 
otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income.”); Stanton v. Baltic 
Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1916) (“the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new 
power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation 
possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to 
which it inherently belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment 
by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what 
it was -- a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income 
taxed.”); Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1918) (‘It is clear on the face of this text [of the 
16th Amendment] that it does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense – an 
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Constitution to impose all forms of taxes, other than taxes on exports, including any type 
of property or income tax.  The 16th Amendment simply eliminated the requirement from 
Pollock that taxes on income from real and personal property be apportioned – a 
requirement that by 1913 only applied if the income from the real or personal property 
had not resulted from an activity or transaction.  The 16th Amendment thus repudiated 
the Supreme Court’s theory in Pollock by eliminating the one potential impediment to the 
imposition of broad-based income taxes – the requirement of apportionment applicable to 
taxes on income from the mere ownership of real or personal property. 
The 16th Amendment did not, however, eliminate the apportionment requirement 
entirely.  The apportionment requirement remains for direct taxes that are not income 
taxes, as the 16th Amendment applies by its terms only to “taxes on incomes.”241 Thus, 
for example, under the consistent rulings of the Supreme Court, Congress would still not 
be able to impose a traditional ad valorem real property tax without apportionment.242 In 
addition, the constitutional amendment made no change in the geographical uniformity 
requirement for duties, imposts and excises.243 
Following adoption of the 16th Amendment in 1913, Congress quickly imposed a 
broad based income tax.244 In Brushaber v. Union Pacific,245 a case procedurally 
identical to Pollock, a stockholder sought to enjoin a corporation from paying income 
taxes imposed under the Tariff Act of 1913.  The Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
the income tax without apportionment under the 16th Amendment, and rejected the 
 
authority already possessed and never questioned – or to limit and distinguish between one kind of income 
taxes and another, but that the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when 
imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income was derived.”).   
Congress’s plenary power under the Constitution to impose all forms of taxation other than taxes 
on exports was settled long before the enactment of the 16th Amendment.  See e.g. Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895) (“The power to lay direct taxes apportioned 
among the several States in proportion to their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a 
representation based on population as ascertained by the census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct 
taxes without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties, imposts, and excises was subject to 
the qualification that the imposition must be uniform throughout the United States.”); Hylton v. United 
States, 3 U.S. 171, 176 (1796) (Patterson, J.) (“It was, however, obviously the intention of the framers of 
the Constitution, that Congress should possess full power over every species of taxable property, except 
exports.The term taxes, is generical, and was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases 
of taxation.”) 
241 U.S. CONST. art XVI (1913) (“The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration.”). 
242 Every Court from Hylton to Pollock recognized that, at a minimum, a real property tax would have to be 
apportioned.  Since such a tax would be on value and not on income, the 16th Amendment should not have 
changed the Constitutional mandate.  I have heard some academics argue that a property tax should be 
permissible without apportionment if the tax did not exceed the rate of income from property generally, or 
the rate of tax earned on the property.  Aside from the technical problems inherent in justifying a property 
tax as an income tax (some property does not earn income, for example), the Court’s decisions in 
Spreckels, Thomas and Flint put substantial weight on the form of the tax, casting significant doubt on the 
ability of courts to recharacterize an ad valorem property tax as an income tax. 
243 The amendment leaves open the question of whether income taxes have to be geographically uniform.  
To the extent Pollock remains good law, taxes on income from property could be imposed in a non-uniform 
manner because they do not constitute “duties, imposts and excises.”   
244 Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II, Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166 (1913). 
245 240 US 1 (1916) 
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argument that the 16th Amendment conflicted with a limited taxing power contained in 
the Constitution.  The Court held that the 16th Amendment eliminated the apportionment 
requirement for direct income taxes – it did not create a new taxing power, and thus did 
not create a conflict.246 
In Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.247 Justice White finally took his revenge against 
the Pollock majority.  A shareholder in a mining company claimed that the 1913 Act 
effectively imposed a tax not on the mining company’s “income,” but on its property 
without apportionment, because the Act did not allow adequate depletion allowances to 
be deducted from its gross receipts.248 Justice White’s opinion for a unanimous Court 
upheld the tax both because it was within the 16th Amendment, and, even if it had not 
been within the Amendment, because it was as a valid excise on the operation of the mine 
in accordance with the Court’s pre-16th Amendment decision in Stratton’s.249 Baltic 
Mining shows that a court considering the constitutionality of a tax must look not only to 
the 16th Amendment, but also to any other taxing powers given to Congress in Article I 
of the Constitution.  A purported tax on income which is outside of the 16th Amendment 
is not per-say unconstitutional, since it may be within Congress’s general taxing power.  
And, according to the Court in Baltic Mining, that general taxing power allows Congress 
to tax as income, without apportionment, items that may not constitute “income” within 
the meaning of the 16th Amendment.  For example, a tax not on “income” within the 
meaning of the 16th Amendment could still be upheld without apportionment if it 
constituted a “duty or excise” attributable to the taxpayer’s conduct.  Indeed, this was the 
basis upon which the Court had repeatedly upheld the 1909 Corporate Income Tax Act. 
The Court in Baltic Mining also made a direct assault on the “source” theory 
utilized in Pollock, calling it a “mistaken theory:”   
 
[T]he provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new 
power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and 
plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the 
beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect 
taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed in the 
category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a 
consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, 
that is by testing the tax not by what it was – a  tax on income, but 
by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the 
income taxed.250 
Pollock was not over-ruled in Baltic Mining, but only because Pollock’s “erroneous” 
source theory had been mooted by the adoption of the 16th Amendment. 
 
246 Id. at 112-13; See also supra note 240. 
247 240 U.S. 103 (1916). 
248 The statute limited depletion allowances to 5% of gross receipts. Id. at 110. 
249 Id. at 114 (“[I]ndependently of the effect of the operation of the Sixteenth Amendment it was settled in 
Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, that such a tax is not a tax upon property as such 
because of its ownership, but a true excise levied on the results of the business of carrying on mining 
operations.”). 
250 Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
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(6) Congress’s Tax on Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Was Not a 
Direct Tax Requiring Apportionment. 
 
The court of appeals in Murphy held that Ms. Murphy’s emotional distress 
damages award was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment, and 
therefore Congress lacked the power to tax the award.251 The court of appeals erred in 
reaching this conclusion.  As shown above, the correct constitutional question was 
whether Congress had the power under any provision of the Constitution to tax Ms. 
Murphy’s damages award, not whether the award could be taxed under the 16th 
amendment.252 
If, as the court of appeals held, Ms. Murphy’s damages award was not “income” 
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment,253 then the court of appeals should have 
“search[ed] the Constitution to ascertain whether or not the power is conferred.”254 In 
searching the Constitution, the court of appeals should have discovered Article I of the 
Constitution, which authorized Congress to tax anything other than exports, but required 
direct taxes to be apportioned.255 Therefore, after holding that Ms. Murphy’s damages 
award was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment, the court of appeals 
should have proceeded to determine whether the tax imposed on Ms. Murphy’s damages 
award was a direct tax requiring apportionment (in which case Congress’s attempt to tax 
Ms. Murphy’s award without apportionment would be unconstitutional), or whether it 
was an indirect duty or excise which could be lawfully imposed without apportionment.   
There are two alternative reasons for treating the taxation of Ms. Murphy’s 
damages award as an indirect “duty or excise” requiring no apportionment, even if the 
award did not constitute “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.  As 
discussed below, the tax on Ms. Murphy’s award was a valid duty or excise both because 
Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she exchanged her emotional distress 
damages for cash, and because taxes on what we today call human capital were never 
considered by the courts direct taxes on property requiring apportionment.  
 
(a) Congress Could Tax Ms. Murphy’s Exchange of Emotional 
Distress Damages for Cash. 
 
The first reason to treat the tax on Ms. Murphy’s award as a “duty or excise” that 
could be taxed without apportionment is that Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when 
she sold her emotional and reputational damages for cash.   
Congress’s original Article I powers included the unfettered authority to tax 
duties and excises without apportionment.256 The Court specifically recognized, both 
prior to the adoption of the 16th Amendment and afterwards, that Congress had the 
power to tax the gross proceeds from the sale of property.  For example, before Pollock 
questioned Congress’s ability to tax income from real or personal property without 
 
251 Murphy, 160 F.3d at 92 (“Murphy’s compensatory award . . . was not . . . within the meaning of the term 
‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth Amendment.”) 
252 See discussion supra beginning at note 105. 
253 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92. 
254 See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1883), discussed supra at note 105. 
255 See discussion supra beginning at note 110. 
256 See supra beginning at note 110. 
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apportionment, the Supreme Court had upheld taxes on the gross proceeds from the 
issuance of bank notes,257 and on the gross proceeds inherited at death.258 These 
authorities were reaffirmed in Pollock, and distinguished on the grounds that they were 
not taxes on income from property, but rather taxes on activites.  Following Pollock, the 
Court made it clear that Congress had the power to tax transactions, without 
apportionment, because they constitute indirect duties or excises rather than direct taxes 
on the mere ownership of property.259 After Pollock, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
Congress’s power to tax the gross proceeds transferred at death,260 the transfer of stock 
certificates without respect to income,261 and most importantly the gross proceeds from 
the sale of sugar.262 The Court thus recognized Congress’s power to tax without 
apportionment the gross proceeds realized in a transaction involving property both 
before and after Pollock, and without regard to the 16th Amendment.  In essence, what 
was left of Pollock at the time the 16th Amendment was adopted was a restriction on 
imposing broad taxes on unrealized income from property – for the events that trigger 
realization also, generally, constitute activities that could be taxed as duties or excises.  
Under its historical Article I power, as repeatedly recognized both before and after 
Pollock, Congress had the constitutional power to tax without apportionment Ms. 
Murphy’s damages award because it was the result of an activity – a sale of her lost 
human capital interest for cash.   
There are a few Supreme Court cases that are often cited for the general 
proposition that a recovery of capital cannot constitutionally be taxed.  The Supreme 
Court’s famous decision in Eisner v. Macomber,263 discussed in detail below,264 is 
sometimes mis-cited as a decision prohibiting the taxation of capital.  But Macomber 
only dealt with taxing what the Court determined to be unrealized income – a pure stock 
dividend that only resulted in additional pieces of paper to reflect the same ownership as 
before.  Ironically, Macomber, by converting realization into a constitutional imperative, 
may have rendered the 16th Amendment entirely moot, because the Court had repeatedly 
recognized before the 16th Amendment that realized income resulting from an activity, 
such as a sale or exchange, could be taxed without apportionment as a duty or excise.265 
Macomber never questioned Congress’s ability to tax the entire proceeds from a sale or 
exchange transaction, without apportionment, as a “duty or excise” under Article I.  The 
quick retreat from Macomber concerning whether realization was constitutionally 
mandated suggests there should be little concern that the Court will expand Macomber’s 
reach.266 
257 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869), discussed supra beginning at note 154. 
258 Scholey v. Rew, 102 U.S. 586 (1880), discussed supra beginning at note 159. 
259 See discussion supra in Part IV.A(4) beginning on page 33, and Part IV.A(5) beginning on page 39. 
260 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), discussed supra beginning at note 200. 
261 Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904), discussed supra beginning at note 215. 
262 Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904), discussed supra beginning at note 212. 
263 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
264 See infra beginning at note 354. 
265 See discussion supra beginning at note 221 
266 See discussion supra beginning at note 393.  Note also that Congress has imposed a number of taxes on 
unrealized income, most notably on imputed interest earned annually but only paid upon maturity of an 
interest under the so-called original issue discount rules (see IRC § 1272), and the requirement of mark-to-
market accounting for dealers in securities and parties involved in hedging transactiosn (See IRC § 475; 
1256). 
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The other case that is often cited for the proposition that Congress cannot tax 
capital is Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,267 which did not consider the constitutional issue.  
Even reading Doyle broadly to express a definition of income that was incorporated into 
the 16th Amendment does not address the alternative theory for Congress’s constitutional 
authority in Article I for taxing transactions and activities as duties and excises without 
apportionment.   
Finally, there is one troubling Macomber era case that lends support to the notion 
that Congress lacks the power to tax capital.  The case is Edwards v. Cuba Railroad 
Co.,268 in which the Court held that subsidy payments made by the government of Cuba 
to induce development of railroad lines in that country were not income, but rather the 
recovery of capital, and therefore the payments could not be taxed under the 16th 
Amendment.  There was little in the way of reasoning in the case.  The Court did not 
consider the alternative constitutional bases for Congress to tax the transaction that 
generated the subsidy payments under Article I as duties and excises, because Congress 
had not sought to do so.  In fact, the entire constitutional discussion in Cuba Railroad 
was inappropriate because the Court failed to first determine, as a matter of statutory law, 
whether Congress had in fact sought to tax the subsidy payments.  Presumably, if the 
subsidy payments did not, as the Court held, constitute income, then Congress had in fact 
not sought to tax them in the statute. The Court could easily have avoided the 
constitutional question by ruling that the statute did not reach the subsidy payments.  
Despite the opinion’s obvious shortcomings, the Court’s suggestion in Cuba Railroad 
that Congress lacks the constitutional power to tax capital would lend some support, 
however dubious, to the notion that capital cannot constitutionally be taxed. 
Although Cuba Railroad has never been directly overturned, its continuing 
validity is in great doubt.  The opinion was issued at a time in which income was defined 
as a gain from capital, labor or both combined.  By 1943, the Court was already having 
some doubts about the Macomber definition of income.  In Detroit Edison Company v. 
Commissioner,269 the Court considered whether an electric company that received from 
its customers the funds necessary to construct certain power plants could take 
depreciation deductions.  In explaining why the funds received by the electric company 
from its customers for the construction of the plants had not been treated as income, the 
Court stated:  “They [the customer construction funds] have not been taxed as income, 
presumably because it has been thought to be precluded by this Court's decisions in 
Edwards v. Cuba R. Co. holding that under the circumstances of that case a government 
subsidy to induce railroad construction was not income.”270 Because the funds were not 
taxed, and thus the electric company had no basis in the power plant, the Court held that 
depreciation deductions could be denied.  The Court’s language in Detroit Edison 
suggested some question about the continuing validity of Cuba Railroad. One would 
think that the Court’s expanded definition of “income” later adopted in Glenshaw 
Glass271 would have effectively overruled the Cuba Railroad as a constitutional doctrine..   
 
267 247 U.S. 179 (1918), discussed supra beginning at note 292. 
268 268 U.S. 628 (1925). 
269 319 US 98 (1943). 
270 Id. at 103 (citation omitted).   
271 348 U.S. 426 (1955), discussed infra at note 402. 
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With the exception of the weakly reasoned early opinion in Cuba Railroad, the 
existing authorities suggest that Congress could constitutionally tax the entire proceeds 
from the sale or exchange of property without apportionment, even though there would 
be no “gain” or “income” realized in the transaction.272 
As is discussed below, 273 Congress created a basis tracking system to prevent the 
double taxation of already-taxed (or exempted) financial capital.  The basis system 
carries out Congress’s policy of taxing income earned by a particular taxpayer only once 
at the time of realization.  Congress’s decision to tax only the gain from property cannot 
be interpreted to limit Congress’s earlier power under Article I of the Constitution to tax 
entire transactions without regard to the recovery of basis.  Therefore, even if Ms. 
Murphy’s human capital were to be treated in the same way as previously-taxed financial 
capital, Congress would have the power under Article I to tax as a duty or excise, without 
apportionment, the entire proceeds Ms. Murphy received when she sold her emotional 
distress damages for cash.  This would be so even if Ms. Murphy had basis in her human 
capital equal to the amount of the award.  As is discussed below, however, what we today 
call human capital has not been treated by the courts in the same way as financial 
capital,274 and Ms. Murphy did not have any basis in her human capital and therefore her 
entire award was “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.275 Congress had 
the power under Article I of the Constitution to tax Ms. Murphy’s award even 
interpreting the principle of human capital in a way most favorable to Ms. Murphy’s 
position.   
 
(b) Congress Could Tax Ms. Murphy’s Human Capital. 
 
The second reason for treating Ms. Murphy’s award as a “duty or excise” rather 
than a direct tax is that taxes on human capital have never been considered direct taxes.  
Prior to Pollock, the Court had suggested that only taxes on land, slaves, capitation or 
poll taxes, and possibly taxes on entire estates by general list were direct,276 while taxes 
on “personal property, contracts, occupations and the like”277 were regarded as indirect.  
In Pollock, the Court held that taxes on real and personal property were direct, but that 
taxes on “business, privileges, or employments” were not.278 Thus, throughout the long 
history of taxation, the Court has never suggested that a tax on human capital, other than 
 
272 It is worth noting that the constitutional amendment allows the taxation of all income, not just net 
income.  Although the “accession to wealth” notions used by the Supreme Court in defining income 
suggest that only gains, computed after deducting basis, would be taxable (see Glenshaw Glass, infra at 
note 402), the Amendment itself is silent on the point.  Of course, one could argue that the notion of “gain,” 
being an essential element of income from the interpretations made of earlier statutes, was incorporated 
into the 16th Amendment’s meaning.  These debates are irrelevant so long as Congress seeks to tax only 
gain from the sale of property. 
273 See discussion infra Part IV.B(4) beginning on page 66. 
274 See discussion infra Part IV.A(6)(b) beginning on page 45. 
275 See discussion infra Part IV.B(5) beginning on page 71. 
276 See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 172 (1796), discussed supra beginning at note 129; Veazie Bank 
v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 543 (1869), discussed supra beginning at note 154; Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331 
(1875), discussed supra beginning at note 159; and Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880), 
discussed supra beginning at note 161. 
277 Veazie, 75 U.S. at 543. 
278 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust, 158 U.S. 601, 635, discussed supra beginning at note 170. 
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a head or capitation tax which is specifically mentioned in the Constitution (and is not 
imposed on human capital but on human beings regardless of potential),279 is direct.  
Indeed, the Court consistently recognized, even in Pollock, that Congress has the 
unfettered ability to tax wages.  And wages are, after all, simply receipts from the sale of 
human capital.280 If taxes on human capital were treated the same way under the 
Constitution as taxes on financial capital, then the Court’s distinction in Pollock between 
income from real and personal property (held to be direct), and income from 
employments (held to be indirect) would be erroneous, since both would constitute 
income from “capital.”  The Court and Congress have not treated what we today call 
“human capital” in the same way as financial capital,281 and the Court has never 
questioned Congress’s ability to tax without apportionment income from the sale of 
human capital.  Since the tax on Ms. Murphy’s damages award was not a tax on real or 
personal property, but at best a tax on human capital which has never been treated as real 
or personal property,282 there should have been no constitutional limitation on Congress’s 
power to tax it without apportionment.   
 Therefore, both because Congress has the unlimited power to tax transactions 
involving the sale of any form of capital without apportionment, and because human 
capital has never been treated as financial capital or property for the purpose of taxation, 
Congress had the power to tax Ms. Murphy’s damages award even if it did not constitute 
“income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.   
By wrongly focusing on the 16th Amendment as the sole source of Congress’s 
taxing power, the court of appeals in Murphy failed to consider Congress’s original grant 
of power contained in Article I of the Constitution, by which it could tax Ms. Murphy’s 
award irrespective of whether it constitutes “income” within the meaning of the 16th 
Amendment.  Moreover, by treating human capital in the same way as financial capital 
for purposes of the 16th Amendment, the court of appeals in Murphy has opened a 
Pandora’s box, raising questions about the constitutional validity of taxes on such firmly 
established sources as wages.283 That box can be easily closed through proper analysis, 
returning tax policy to the Congress where it belongs.   
 
B. Congress Had the Power to Tax Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Under the 
16th Amendment. 
 
(1) The Court of Appeals’ Holding in Murphy. 
 
279 A capitation or head tax is imposed on each human being regardless of the value of the human being’s 
human capital.  Even if human capital were to be treated as property, a tax on the increase in the value of 
human capital would be a tax on income just as a tax on the increase in the value of property would be a tax 
on income.  The concept of human capital suggests treating the human being as a value store, consisting of 
future potential revenues that the human being is able to generate.  Even if human capital were to be 
equated with financial capital, under both the pre-Pollock and post-Pollock cases Congress could tax as an 
duty or excise, without apportionment, any sale or exchange of human capital for other property.   
280 See discussion infra Part IV.B(5) beginning on page 71. 
281 See discussion infra at Part IV.A(2) beginning at page 24. 
282 See discussion infra at Part IV.B(5) beginning at page 55. 
283 See discussion infra at Part IV.B(5) beginning at page 71 regarding the consequences of constitutionally 
mandating Congress to treat human capital as financial capital. 
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The court of appeals in Murphy concluded that Ms. Murphy’s award of emotional 
and reputational damages was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment 
because it involved a “restoration of capital.”  In support of this statement, the court of 
appeals relied on two 1918 Supreme Court cases, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., Co, and S. Pac. 
Co. v. Lowe, for the proposition that a “return of capital [is] not income under [the] IRC 
or Sixteenth Amendment.”284 In addition, the court of appeals agreed with Ms. 
Murphy’s argument that two 1918 administrative opinions, “strongly suggest that the 
term ‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend to monies received 
solely in compensation for a personal injury unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”285 The 
court of appeals then concluded that both physical and non-physical awards were not 
“income” within the 16th Amendment, and the attempt by Congress to tax non-physical 
awards was therefore unconstitutional.286 
In reaching these conclusions, the court of appeals failed to put these materials in 
their proper historical context or to correctly interpret their holdings.  A proper analysis 
of the cited materials in the light of their historical context will show that none of these 
materials was inferring a constitutional limitation on Congress’s taxing power.  Rather, 
the materials were attempting to apply then-recent Supreme Court interpretations of the 
applicable tax acts, not the Constitution.  These early Supreme Court statutory (and later 
Constitutional) interpretations have long since been rejected or limited.  A proper 
understanding of the historical materials cited by the court of appeals in Murphy requires 
careful chronological review of tax history.  A careful in-context review of these 
materials will show that they do not support the court of appeal’s conclusion that the 
enactors of the 16th Amendment intended human capital recoveries to be beyond the 
reach of Congress’s income taxing power.  Moreover, under modern interpretations of 
Congress’s taxing power under the 16th Amendment, Ms. Murphy’s award would 
constitute “income” because she realized an accession to her financial wealth.  
 
(2) The Historical Meaning of “Income” Under the 16th Amendment 
Before Macomber. 
 
Each of the American taxing statutes have taxed income on an annual basis.  In 
order to do so, it has been necessary to determine how increases in property value 
accruing over a period of time would be taxed.  There are two fundamentally different 
types of income tax systems for determining in what year income from property will be 
taxable:  (1) tax the increase in the value of property accruing on an annual basis, 
regardless of whether the property has been sold or the improvement in value has been 
severed from the property in some way (hereafter, the “annual accrual system”), or (2) do 
not tax the annual increase, but instead tax the entire increase in value at the time of 
realization – either when the gain is severed in some way from the property, such as upon 
 
284 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85.  
285 Id. at 90.   
286 Id. at 92 (“the framers of the Sixteenth Amendment would not have understood compensation for a 
personal injury – including a nonphysical injury – to be income.”). 
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sale, exchange or other disposition of the property, or when some other recognized event 
of realization occurs (hereafter, the “realization system”).287 
The annual accrual system is difficult to administer because any increase in the 
value of property must be estimated, since there is no market-based event that establishes 
the value.  In addition, an accrual system can work financial hardships on the owners of 
property who, prior to sale or other realization event, will have received no money from 
the property with which to pay the tax.  The main drawbacks of the realization system are 
(1) the need to clearly define the realization event, (2) the ability of taxpayers to defer 
paying taxes on income from the time it accrues until the realization event occurs, and (3) 
the problem of bracket creep – taxing income accruing during multiple tax years in the 
single year of realization.   
There is nothing in the text of the 16th amendment that would eliminate the 
apportionment requirement only for one type of income tax system but not the other.  
Moreover, both types of income taxation systems had been utilized in the United States 
prior to the adoption of the 16th Amendment.  The annual accrual system appears to have 
been utilized in the first federal income tax act which was adopted during the Civil War, 
according to the Court in Gray v. Darlington.288 The taxpayer in Darlington bought 
United States Treasury Notes before 1865, exchanged the Notes for United States 
Treasury Bonds in 1865, and sold the Bonds in 1869 for a profit of $20,000 over the 
original cost of the Notes.  The issue was whether that entire profit, accruing over more 
than four years, two of which were prior to the enactment of the taxing act, would be 
taxed in the year of sale.  The Court, interpreting the language of the 1867 Act requiring 
the tax to be “levied, collected, and paid annually,” held that only the increase in value 
attributed to the tax year was taxable under the statute.   
Similarly, in Collector v. Hubbard,289 a shareholder objected to being taxed on the 
corporation’s income that had not been severed or paid as dividends.  The 1864 Act 
required all corporate income, whether distributed or not, to be included in the 
shareholder’s income subject to tax.290 Although the case was decided on procedural 
grounds, the Court stated, apparently in dicta, that the undistributed corporate profits 
should have been included in income.291 The Court in Hubbard made no mention of the 
Constitution, ruling entirely on the basis of the statutory language.  
 
287 There is a third potential system, which would look at final results of investments rather than annual 
receipts, although this system has never been utilized by American courts, except in a particular transaction 
where there is no administrative way to determine the gain to tax.  See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. 
United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (1954) (holding that open transaction doctrine following exchange of 
property should only apply in the “rare and extraordinary cases that the value of the property exchanged 
cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty.”). 
288 82 U.S. 63 (1872). 
289 79 U.S. 1 (1871). 
290 Internal Revenue Act of June 30th, 1864, § 117, 13 Stat. 281 (“And the gains and profits of all 
companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in this section, shall be 
included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether 
divided or otherwise.”) 
291 79 U.S. at 28 (“Suppose, however, that . . . the provision in question is not a bar to the present suit, still 
the court is of the opinion that the addition made to  the list rendered by the plaintiff [for undistributed 
corporate profits] was proper, that the tax was lawfully assessed, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover in this case.”). 
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On the other hand, the Court in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,292 recognized that the 
realization system applied under the 1909 Corporate Income Tax Act.  Doyle was decided 
under the 1909 Act after the enactment of the 16th Amendment, but concerned years 
before the Amendment.  The Court in Doyle assumed without analysis that all of the 
income accruing from the time of enactment of the Act – 1909 – until the date of sale was 
subject to tax at once in the year of sale.  The main issue of contention in Doyle, 
however, was whether the increase in the value of assets accruing prior to the 1909 Act 
but realized after the enactment of the 1909 Act would also be included in income in the 
year of realization.  The Court, noting that part of the proceeds received from the sale of 
property is attributable to the recovery of original cost, and part in the receipt of gain (if 
the sale is for more than cost) or incurrence of loss (if the sale is for less than cost), first 
noted that only the gain from property should be included in the concept of “income” 
under the 1909 Act. The Court stated that this rule – that “income” only constitutes the 
gain realized from the sale of property, and not the entire proceeds of sale – “has been 
recognized from the beginning [of the 1909 Corporate Tax] by the administrative officers 
of the Government.”293 The Court went on to interpret the 1909 Act to impose a tax only 
on income accrued after 1909.  The value of property on the date of the enactment of the 
1909 Act, even if in excess of cost, would be deducted from the sale proceeds in 
determining the gain or income realized in the year of sale.294 Doyle was decided entirely 
on the grounds of statutory construction, and did not consider the meaning of the 16th 
Amendment of the Constitution (which indeed had no application to the case).  There was 
also no suggestion in the opinion that Congress lacked the Constitutional power to tax 
income in the year of sale attributed to periods before enactment of the Act.   
Doyle has been regularly cited by subsequent courts for its quotation from the 
Stratton’s case, defining income as a “gain from capital or labor or from both 
combined.”295 In both cases, the Court was defining income for the purpose of 
determining whether the tax was an excise on business activity, as was required by the 
statute in both cases.  The constitutionality of the 1909 Act had, after all, been upheld by 
distinguishing Pollock on the grounds that the 1909 Act had a business activity 
requirement.  Whether this definition of income should have been applied under the 16th 
Amendment, which allowed the taxation of income without apportionment irrespective of 
business activity, would be an issue of debate until the mid 1950s, when the Supreme 
Court ruled that the old definition was not a touchstone for the meaning of income.296 
The Court in Doyle also noted that the government did not challenge the method utilized 
by the taxpayer for allocating income between the pre-1909 period and the post-1909 
 
292 247 U.S. 179 (1918). 
293 Id. at 185. 
294 Id. at 187.  In describing the gain from sale, the Court noted that the assets had not increased in value on 
their own, but had increased in value through processing during the year.  The Court stated:  There having 
been no change in market values during these years, the deduction did but restore to the capital in money 
that which had been withdrawn in stumpage cut, leaving the aggregate of capital neither increased nor 
decreased, and leaving the residue of the gross receipts to represent the gain realized by the conversion, so 
far as that gain arose while the act was in effect. This was in accordance with the true intent and meaning of 
the act.”  Id. at 188.  The Court thus used the word “realized” to represent the increase in value reduced to 
money at the time of sale. 
295 See supra note 224, quoted in Doyle, 247 U.S. at 185. 
296 See discussion of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), infra note 402.  
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period.297 The court of appeals’ suggestion in Murphy that Doyle had interpreted the 
meaning of the 16th Amendment298 is simply incorrect. 
In Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co.,299 the Court again held that the language 
used by Congress in the 1909 Act, unlike the language used by Congress in the 1869 Act 
that had been interpreted by the Court in Darlington,300 showed an intent to tax all of the 
income from property in the year of sale, rather than on an annual basis when it accrued – 
at least to the extent that it accrued after enactment of the Act in 1909.  The Court stated:   
 
The expression "income received during such year," employed in 
the Act of 1909, looks to the time of realization rather than to 
the period of accruement, except as the taking effect of the act on 
a specified date (January 1, 1909), excludes income that accrued 
before that date.301 
Thus was borne the formal concept of “realization,” which began as a matter of statutory 
construction of the 1909 Corporate Income Tax Act.302 
The broad 1913 income tax, enacted after the adoption of the 16th Amendment, 
used language more similar to the Civil War Income Tax than the 1909 Corporate Tax, 
covering all income “arising or accruing” during the year.303 The 1913 statute did not 
specify whether an accrual system or realization system would apply.304 
However, despite the vague language of the statute, the Court promptly 
interpreted the language to adopt a realization system.  In Towne v. Eisner,305 the Court 
 
297 247 U.S. at 188. 
298 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85. 
299 247 U.S. 189 (1918). 
300 Id. at 191 ("Gains, profits, and income for the year ending the thirty-first day of December next 
preceding" (Act of 1867) conveys a different meaning from "the entire net income . . . Received by it . . . 
during such year" (Act of 1909).”). 
301 Id. at 192 (emphasis added). 
302 The cases were not consistent in the method for computing gain attributed to the post-1909 period.  In 
Doyle, the gain was based on the difference between the sale price of the processed timber and its 
unprocessed value at the time the 1909 act went into effect.  Doyle, 247 U.S. at 188.  In Hays, Court upheld 
that government’s assessment of a pro-rata portion of the gain allocated pro rata on the basis of time.  The 
taxpayer in Hays had purchased stock for $800,000 in 1902, and sold the stock for $1,010,000 in 1911, 
realizing a total profit of $210,000.  The taxpayer had owned the stock for a total of 3,233 days, and the 
sale occurred 1019 days after the enactment of the 1909 Act.  Therefore, the government computed the tax 
proportionally on the basis of time:  (1,019/3,233) X $210,000 = $66,189.30.  Hays, 247 U.S. at 190.  In S. 
Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918), the court used the Doyle approach, by accepting the stipulated 
value for stock at the beginning of 1909 as the basis for determining gain.   
303 Compare supra note 300 with Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 116 (“There shall be levied, 
assessed, collected and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the 
preceding calendar year . . . a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income.”). 
304 For example, the statute said that the additional tax “shall embrace the share to which he [the taxpayer] 
would be entitled of the gains and profits, if divided or distributed, whether divided or distributed or not, of 
all corporations . . . or associations however created or organized, formed or fraudulently availed of for the 
purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains or profits to 
accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.”  Id. It also covered income from “sales or ownership 
or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities”.   Id. at 167. 
305 245 U.S. 418 (1918). 
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held that a stock dividend306 did not create a realization event for the shareholder under 
the 1913 Act.    Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, made two important 
statements in the Towne opinion.  First, the Court stated that the 1913 Act’s definition of 
“income” may not be the same as the definition of “income” in the 16th Amendment.307 
The idea that “income” had the same meaning in the statute and the 16th Amendment 
first occurred in the 1920 decision in Eisner v. Macomber.308 The court of appeals in 
Murphy cited Macomber for the a synonymous reading of “income,” and suggested that 
the Macomber analysis should be respected because it has been “acquiesced in for a long 
term of years.”309 However, as discussed below,310 Macomber did not say that the two 
terms were synonymous, but only that Congress intended to exert its full taxing power. 
Second, the Court in Towne held that the 1913 Act did not reach the taxpayer’s 
stock dividend, because neither the shareholder nor the corporation received any separate 
gain from the distribution of the additional shares.311 The Court did not base its decision 
on an interpretation of the 16th Amendment, but rather relied on an interpretation of the 
 
306 A pure stock dividend is a pro-rata distribution of additional stock to all shareholders.  For accounting 
purposes, a corporation declaring a stock dividend must transfer amounts showing as earnings on its 
balance sheet to paid-in-capital.  On the corporation’s books, the transaction looks the same as a cash 
dividend, followed by a subsequent purchase by the shareholders with their cash dividends of additional 
stock.  From the shareholder’s prospective, the shareholder owns more shares of stock, having less value 
per share, resulting in no change in actual ownership.  For example, assume a corporation with 10,000 
shares of stock outstanding declared a 100% stock dividend.  A shareholder owning 10% of the corporation 
(1,000 shares) before the dividend would continue to own 10% of the corporation (2,000/20,000) after the 
dividend distribution.  While no real gain is realized by a shareholder from the mere receipt of a stock 
dividend, the question considered by the Court is whether this stock dividend was an event that would 
trigger the shareholder’s requirement to realize and recognize the gain inherent in the stock (at least to the 
extent reflected in the pro forma distribution of the corporation’s earnings, and the mandatory reinvestment 
of those earnings in the stock).   
307 Id. at 425 (“The Government in the first place moves to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, on the 
ground that the only question here is the construction of the statute not its constitutionality. It argues that if 
such a stock dividend is not income within the meaning of the Constitution it is not income within the 
intent of the statute, and hence that the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is not an immediate issue, 
and is important only as throwing light on the construction of the act. But it is not necessarily true that 
income means the same thing in the Constitution and the act.”) (emphasis added). 
308 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
309 The court of appeals first quoted Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926), for the proposition 
that “a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . acquiesced in for a long term of 
years, fixes the construction to be given to its provisions.”   Murphy, 460 F.3d at 90.  The Court then quotes 
from Eisner v. Macomber for the proposition that “construction of the [Revenue Act of 1913] is inseparable 
from the interpretation in the Sixteenth Amendment.”  Id.  The Court concludes that it must inquire into 
what “the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment, or the Congress when it implemented the 
Amendment, would have understood compensatory damages for a nonphysical injury to be income.”  Id. 
In light of the deference to early interpretations, one wonders why the Court would adopt Macomber’s 
statement suggesting that income in the Constitution was synonymous with income in the 1913 Act, rather 
than the earlier statement in Towne suggesting that the words may not be synonymous. 
310 See discussion infra at notes 359 and 389. 
311 Id. at 427 (“A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing 
to the interests of the shareholders. Its property is not diminished, and their interests are not increased. . . . 
The proportional interest of each shareholder remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which 
represents that interest, the new shares and the original shares together representing the same proportional 
interest that the original shares represented before the issue of the new ones."  In short, the corporation is 
no poorer and the stockholder is no richer than they were before.”) (citations omitted).  
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1913 Act.  Indeed, the author of the opinion in Towne, Justice Holmes, would later 
dissent in Macomber from the effort to constitutionalize the ruling.312 
In 1918, the Court issued on the same day four tax opinions that would greatly 
confuse tax jurisprudence.  In the main case, Lynch v. Hornby,313 the Court held that the 
1913 Act could reach income accrued by a corporation before the Act but paid as 
dividends after the Act.  “We repeat that under the 1913 Act dividends declared and paid 
in the ordinary course by a corporation to its stockholders after March 1, 1913, whether 
from current earnings or from a surplus accumulated prior to that date, were taxable as 
income to the stockholder.”314 The decision was of limited importance, because by the 
time the Court issued the opinion Congress had already exempted income earned before 
1913 from taxation in the 1916 and 1917 Acts.315 Nevertheless, the decision constituted a 
broad view of Congress’s new taxing power.   
But the broad reading of the 1913 Act in Hornby was confusingly restricted in the 
second companion case, Lynch v. Turrish,316 where a shareholder received in 1914 a 
liquidating distribution in cash from a corporation.  The liquidating distribution 
represented twice the original cost of the shareholder’s stock, and was the result of the 
gradual appreciation in the value of the corporation’s timberland.  The shareholder 
argued that the increase in the value of assets over many years should not be taxable in 
entirety in the year of sale, citing Gray v. Darlington.317 The Court agreed with the 
taxpayer, and stated broadly that the profit accrued in prior years from the increase in the 
market value of assets was not “income” but rather “capital” under the Act.318 The Court 
did not mention Hornby, apparently because it dealt with a dividend rather than a 
liquidating distribution.  The distinction between Hornby and Turrish hinged on the 
language of the taxing statute, not upon any constitutional limitation on the power of 
Congress to impose taxes.  In Hornby, Congress specifically provided in the taxing 
statute that dividends, regardless of source, would be treated as income, while in Turrish 
no such specific language was included with respect to gains from increases in the value 
of property upon liquidation.  Nevertheless, the loose language in Turrish would later 
lead to constitutional challenges to Congress’s ability to tax capital gains.319 
312 See infra at note 368. 
313 247 U.S. 339 (1918). 
314 Id. at 346. 
315 252 U.S. at 346 n. 1 (“In Act of September 8, 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 757, which took the place of 
the Act of 1913 . . . ‘Provided, That the term 'dividends' as used in this title shall be held to mean any 
distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation . . . out of its earnings or profits accrued since 
March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of 
the corporation.”).  The 1917 Act incorporated a similar proviso, but provided that dividends are first 
deemed to come from the most recent income (Id.), a provision that remains in the law today.  See IRC § 
316(a). 
316 247 U.S. 221 (1918). 
317 See discussion supra at note 288. 
318 Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. at 231 (“The mere fact that property has advanced in value between the date 
of its acquisition and sale does not authorize the imposition of a tax on the amount of the advance. Mere 
advance in value in no sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income specified by the statute. It constitutes 
and can be treated merely as increase of capital."). 
319 See discussion of Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), discussed infra 
beginning at note 379. 
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In the third companion case, Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe,320 the Court 
made a fine distinction of Hornby.  Hornby permitted the taxation of dividends paid after 
enactment of the 1913 Act from income earned both before and after the Act, but Hornby 
would not apply to dividends paid after enactment of the 1913 Act from income that had 
been earned entirely before the Act – at least where a single shareholder had total control 
of the corporation.321 The Court ignored the corporate form set up by the taxpayer to 
treat the income, distributed to the taxpayer in the form of dividends after the 1913 Act, 
as if earned by the taxpayer before the 1913 Act was adopted.   
Interestingly, the court of appeals in Murphy cited Lowe (along with Doyle)322 as 
holding that a “return of capital is not income under [the] IRC or Sixteenth 
Amendment.”323 Both citations are erroneous.  The Court in Lowe did not discuss 
whether a return of capital was income under the 16th Amendment.  The only mention in 
the opinion of the 16th Amendment concerned the date of its enactment.  One could 
argue that Lowe implied that Congress might not be able to tax income earned by an 
owner of property before the effective date of the statute, although a careful reading of 
the opinion makes no such suggestion (and the theory would seem inconsistent with the 
Court’s contemporaneous holding in Hornby).324 
In the final companion case, Peabody v. Eisner,325 the Court made clear that 
Towne v. Eisner was limited to stock dividends of the issuing corporation, and would not 
apply to dividends made in the form of cash or corporate assets such as stock in other 
companies.  In Peabody, the Court held that cash or property dividends are always 
taxable as income. 
It was after this series of confusing 1918 judicial opinions, especially the opinion 
in Turrish which caused some to believe that capital gains might not be “income” at all 
under the Act, that the 1918 Attorney General opinion and Treasury Department 
Decision, which were relied on by the court of appeals in Murphy, were issued.  At the 
time, the concept of realization and the method for determining cost basis were in their 
early development.  The Court had repeated a definition of income – “gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined”326 – that had been used in the 1909 Acts to 
 
320 247 U.S. 330 (1918). 
321 Id. at 336-37 (“Our view of the effect of this act upon dividends received by the ordinary stockholder 
after it took effect but paid out of a surplus that accrued to the corporation before that event, is set forth in 
Lynch v. Hornby . . . .  We base our conclusion in the present case upon the view that it was the purpose 
and intent of Congress, while taxing "the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources" during 
each year commencing with the first day of March, 1913, to refrain from taxing that which, in mere from 
only, bore the appearance of income accruing after that date, while in truth and in substance it accrued 
before; and upon the fact that the Central Pacific and the Southern Pacific were in substance identical 
because of the complete ownership and control which the latter possessed over the former, as stockholder 
and in other capacities.”) (citations omitted). 
322 See supra beginning at note 292. 
323 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85. 
324 Lowe, 247 U.S. at 334-35 (“The purpose to refrain from taxing income that accrued prior to March 1, 
1913, and to exclude from consideration  in making the computation any income that accrued in a 
preceding calendar year, is made plain by the provision last referred to [the statutory language]; indeed, the 
Sixteenth Amendment, under which for the first time Congress was authorized to tax income from 
property without apportioning the tax among the States according to population, received the 
approval of the requisite number of States only in February, 1913.”) (emphasis added).   
325 247 U.S. 347 (1918). 
326 See supra notes 231, 295. 
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distinguish between profits from corporate activity that could be taxed as an excise 
without apportionment, and mere unrealized increases in the value of property that, under 
Pollock, could not be taxed without apportionment.327 
Contrary to the suggestion made by the court of appeals in Murphy, none of the 
Supreme Court’s opinions before 1920 had suggested that Congress lacked the power to 
tax capital under the 16th Amendment.  Rather, all of the Court’s opinions had focused 
on the language and intent of the taxing statutes.  In addition, the Court in Towne v. 
Eisner had flatly rejected the contention that the word “income” under the 1913 Act and 
under the 16th Amendment were necessarily synonymous.  While constitutional 
questions had been raised by the parties, the Court had carefully sidestepped the 
constitutional issues.   
The court of appeals in Murphy relied heavily on a 1918 Attorney General 
Opinion328 and a 1918 Treasury Decision329 to support its theory that the enactors of the 
16th Amendment did not intend for damage awards in compensation for losses of human 
capital to be included within the definition of income.330 However, neither of these 
administrative materials support the court of appeals’ theory, as neither purported to 
determine the meaning of income under the 16th Amendment. 
The Attorney General’s 1918 opinion considered whether the proceeds of an 
accident insurance policy would be taxable under the 1916 and 1917 Acts.  The General 
noted that the Court in Stratton and Doyle had defined income under the 1909 Act as 
“gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,” and that the court of 
appeals’ decision in Doyle,331 which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court,332 had 
suggested in dicta that insurance proceeds received in compensation for damages to 
property should not constitute income under the 1909 Act because the insured loss could 
not be deducted under the Act.333 The General then concluded that: 
 
Assuming that this dictum [from Doyle regarding property damage 
insurance proceeds] is a correct construction of the act . . . it 
follows that if the proceeds of such accident insurance are held to 
be "income", they are in a category different from the proceeds of 
any other kind of insurance.  In my opinion the act does not make 
such a distinction, because the proceeds of an accident insurance 
 
327 See discussion supra at note 231. 
328 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304 (1918). 
329 T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918). 
330 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 90 (“We concur in Murphy’s view, however, that the Attorney General’s 1918 
opinion and the Treasury Department’s ruling of the same year strongly suggest that the tem “incomes” as 
used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend to monies received solely in compensation for a personal 
injury and unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”). 
331 Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 235 F. 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1916), aff’d 247 U.S. 179 (1918) (“Fire insurance 
money is clearly a substitute for the assets burned; but we find that in case of a fire loss uninsured the loss 
may be deducted from income, while if it is insured, and if the insurance money is "income," the loss may 
not be deducted, and the insurance money must be added -- an absurdity which can be avoided only by 
saying that such insurance money is not income at all. The proceeds of the sale of a building or other 
permanent assets are as clearly a substitute therefor as is the insurance money paid to indemnify for a 
building burned.”). 
332 See discussion supra beginning at note 292. 
333 Id.
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policy are not "gains or profits and income" as these terms are 
defined by the Supreme Court.334 
The General thus explicitly based his opinion on the judicial interpretations of the 
applicable statutes, and not on the enactors’ understanding of the meaning of “income” 
under the 16th Amendment.335 Contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion in Murphy,
the General’s 1918 opinion, which was issued five years after the 16th Amendment was 
adopted, was based on the General’s statutory interpretations in light of the Court’s recent 
statutory interpretations.  The General did not purport to interpret or give an opinion 
concerning the scope of the 16th Amendment. 
In the course of rendering his opinion, the General speculated about why, as a 
matter of policy, accident insurance proceeds might be excludible, suggesting the 
recovery was on account of capital: 
 
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the 
“capital” invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense 
the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go, 
capital which is the source of future periodical income.  They 
merely take the place of capital in human ability which was 
destroyed by the accident.  They are therefore “capital” as 
distinguished from “income” receipts.336 
It is this statement – a statement which in modern terms would suggest that the recovery 
should be taxable since the payment is a substitute for “future periodical income” which 
would have been taxed337 – that is cited in part and out of context by the court of appeals 
in Murphy for the proposition that compensatory damages were not intended to be 
income within the 16th Amendment.  But this statement had nothing to do with the 16th 
Amendment – it was a theory, however flawed,338 explaining why the General believed 
that Congress had intended in the statute to exclude accident insurance proceeds from 
income.     
 
334 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 7 (emphasis added). 
335 Indeed, the General did not even mention the 16th Amendment in the opinion.  31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304 
(1918).   See quotation from Attorney General, supra note 334.  
336 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). 
337 See discussion of Burke v. U.S., 504 U.S. 229 (1992), supra note 61. 
338 The suggestion that human capital is invested in the insurance policy makes no sense.  An insurance 
policy is purchased with premiums, generally paid in cash.  These premiums are the capital invested in the 
policy.  The potential loss of human capital is the risk that is being insured.  The recovery may result in a 
gain if the recovery exceeds the premiums paid, or a loss if the recovery does not exceed the premiums 
paid.  The court of appeals in Murphy conceded that the recovery of lost wages would be taxable, because 
the lost wages would have been taxable if earned.  Murphy, 460 F.3d at 91 (“[W]e see no meaningful 
distinction between Murphy’s award and the kids of damages recoverable for personal injury when the 
Sixteenth Amendment was adopted.  Because, as we have seen, the term “incomes,” as understood in 1913, 
clearly did not include damages received in compensation for physical personal injury, we infer that it 
likewise did not include damages received for a nonphysical injury and unrelated to lost wages or 
earning capacity.”) (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, the 1918 Treasury Decision cited by the court of appeals in Murphy339 
simply instructed internal revenue collectors to follow the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the statutory enactments.340 Once again, there was no discussion in the 
Decision of the 16th Amendment.  Curiously, the Decision only applied by its terms to an 
“accident” recovery, and therefore may not have even covered an emotional and 
reputational injury recovery like that at issue in Murphy. Therefore, a correct in-context 
review of the 1918 administrative materials in their proper historical context, and the 
wording used in them, belies the court of appeals’ argument in Murphy that these 
materials “strongly suggest that the term ‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth 
Amendment does not extend to money received solely in compensation for a personal 
injury and unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”341 
It is also important to recognize that these administrative materials, issued five 
years after the enactment of the 16th Amendment, were rendered under an early Supreme 
Court definition of income that would later be rejected by the Supreme Court.342 The 
interpretations are simply not evidence of the clear intent of federal and state legislators 
who voted for the 16th Amendment to exempt emotional distress damages from taxation 
as income.  The quotations used by the court of appeals in Murphy were taken out of 
context, possibly to avoid quoting the language contained in the rulings showing their 
statutory, and not constitutional, genesis. 
Following these 1918 opinions, Congress decided in the Revenue Act of 1918343 
to exempt personal injury recoveries from income.344 The court of appeals in Murphy 
conceded that the scant legislative history from the 1918 Act was ambiguous as to the 
reason Congress enacted a specific exclusion.345 The relevant legislative history consists 
only of a short statement from a House committee report suggesting that “under present 
law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or health insurance, or 
under workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or sickness, 
and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included 
 
339 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 90 (“We concur in Murphy’s view, however, that the Attorney General’s 1918 
opinion and the Treasury Department’s ruling of the same year strongly suggest that the term “incomes” as 
used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend to monies received solely in compensation for a personal 
injury and unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”).  
340 T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) (“To collectors of internal revenue and others concerned:  
The Attorney General has advised, upon the basis of recent decisions of the Supreme Court (Doyle . . .
Hornby . . . Turrish . . . and . . . Lowe . . . and it is accordingly held that the proceeds of an accident 
insurance policy . . . are not income taxable under the provisions of . . . act of September 8, 1916 . . . act of 
October 3, 1917.  It is held upon similar principles that an amount received by an individual as a result of a 
suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained by him through accident is not income taxable under the 
provisions of said titles.”). 
341 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 90 (emphasis added).  According to Murphy, the report merely said:  “it is doubtful 
whether . . . compensation for personal injury or sickness . . . [is] required to be included in gross income. “  
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 86, quoting H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918). 
342 See discussion of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955), infra note 402. 
343 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat 1057 (1919).   
344 Id. at 1065, § 213(b) (Gross income does not include the following items which shall be exempt from 
taxation under this title . . . (“[t]he amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on 
account of such [personal] injuries or sickness.”). 
345 Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 90 (“We agree with the Government that the House Report on the 1918 Act is 
ambiguous and therefore unhelpful on the question before us.”). 
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in income.”346 At best, one can surmise that Congress based its decision to exclude 
personal injury awards, at least in part, on the Attorney General’s opinion about the 
current state of the law, which was itself based on statutory interpretations and not on the 
limits of Congressional power under the 16th Amendment.347 While Congress might 
well have sought to avoid a constitutional challenge by enacting an exemption, it might 
also have thought that the exemption was justified as a matter of policy.   
The Court more recently considered these administrative materials in O’Gilvie v. 
United States,348 a case that asked whether Congress intended punitive damages 
recovered in a personal injury action to be excluded under the 1988 version of IRC 
section 104(a)(2), which had its genesis in the 1918 Act.  The Court concluded, in part on 
the basis of these 1918 administrative materials, that Congress only intended to exclude 
compensatory damages and not punitive damages.  In his dissent in O’Gilvie, Justice 
Scalia criticized any attempt to explain Congress’s ultimate adoption of the exclusion for 
personal injury awards on the 1918 Attorney General’s dubious and speculative “human 
capital” analysis.349 
The court of appeals in Murphy takes this speculation one step further, by 
inferring a constitutional limitation from language that was, at best, explaining the 
Attorney General’s rationale for his interpretation of the taxing statute.  The court of 
appeals in Murphy cited no credible authority for the proposition that the enactors of the 
16th Amendment understood that “income” did not include emotional distress recoveries.   
The court of appeals’ most glaring mistake was its failure to point out that the first 
treasury rulings after the adoption of the 16th Amendment treated all personal injury 
damages as includible in income, and taxable.350 After all, if, as the court of appeals in 
 
346 Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 86, quoting H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918).  See also Laura Sager and 
Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages For Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, 
Congress, And The Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 453 n. 44 (Summer, 1998) (hereafter, Sager & 
Cohen); Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain – No Gain?  Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax 
Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 407, 414 (1986-87). 
347 The Court of Appeals in Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 86, quoted the following statement from Dotson v. United 
States, 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996):  “Congress first enacted the personal injury compensation exclusion in 
1918 at a time when such payments were considered the return of human capital, and thus not 
constitutionally taxable “income” under the 16th Amendment.  See H.R. REP. NO. 767, 65th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 9-10 (1918).”  There is nothing in the report that supports the statement from Dotson. The Court of 
Appeals in Dotson also cited in a footnote an article by Robert Ellwood, Supreme Court’s Ruling on 
Taxation of Discrimination Damages Provides Little Resolution, 83 J. TAX’N 148, n. 3 (1995), suggesting 
that the human capital argument is seriously flawed.  Dotson, at 685 n. 1.   
348 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
349 Id. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The statute must exclude punitive damages because the Committee 
Report must have had in mind a 1918 Treasury Decision, whose text no  more supports exclusion of 
punitive damages than does the text of the statute itself, but which must have meant to exclude punitive 
damages since it was based on the "return-of-capital" theory, though, inconsistently with that theory, it did 
not exclude the much more common category of compensation for lost income. Congress supposedly knew 
all of this, and a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure it out by mistrusting the inclusive language of the 
statute, consulting the Committee Report, surmising that the Treasury Decision of 1918 underlay that 
Report, mistrusting the inclusive language of the Treasury Decision, and discerning that Treasury could 
have overlooked lost-income compensatories, but could not have overlooked punitives. I think not.”). 
350 See T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. 39, 42 (1915) (accident insurance policy proceeds and “pain and 
suffering” recoveries are income); T.D. 2570, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 321, 323 (1918)(workers 
compensation payments are income); T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 130 (1918) (“amount received as 
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Murphy seems to argue,351 early administrative rulings establish the understanding of the 
enactors of the 16th Amendment, then the administrative rulings issued closer to 
enactment would be a better guide to the enactor’s understandings than later rulings made 
after the Supreme Court had muddied the waters.   
Moreover, following the 1918 Amendments, the Treasury Department interpreted 
the personal injury exclusion to apply only to physical injuries.352 It was only after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Macomber, discussed below, that the administrators 
changed their opinion and held that the exclusion applied to non-physical injuries as 
well.353 On its face, the court of appeals’ reliance on administrative statutory 
interpretations made between 1917 to 1922 to establish the understanding in 1913 of the 
enactors of the 16th Amendment is dubious.  But when viewed in their proper historical 
context – as changes in position brought about by early Supreme Court rulings and 
Congressional amendments – the court of appeals’ argument becomes absurd.  In sum, 
the court of appeals in Murphy cited no proper authority to support its assertion that the 
enactors of the 16th Amendment intended compensatory human capital recoveries to be 
outside the reach of Congress’s income taxing power. 
 
(3) Constitutionalizing Realization:  The Troubled History of Eisner v. 
Macomber and the Meaning of Income. 
 
The Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the word “income” in the 16th 
Amendment occurred in 1920, with its famous decision in Eisner v. Macomber.354 
Harking back to the Pollock cases,355 Macomber was a 5-4 split decision in which the 
Court ruled unconstitutional Congress’s attempt to tax a pure stock dividend.  The issue 
before the Court in Macomber was very similar to the issue that was decided by the Court 
four years earlier in Towne356 – whether a dividend of stock in the issuing corporation 
was income.  However, there was one big difference between the two cases.  Towne 
concerned inclusion of a stock dividend under the 1913 Act, which said nothing specific 
about stock dividends.  Macomber, on the other hand, concerned the inclusion of stock 
dividends under the 1916 Act, which specifically provided that a “stock dividend shall be 
considered income, to the amount of its cash value.”357 Therefore, the justices in 
Macomber could not avoid the constitutional issue by interpreting the meaning of the 
statute to exclude stock dividends from income, as they had in Towne.
The Court in Macomber made the decision in Towne constitutional, by concluding 
that Ms. Macomber’s stock dividend did not constitute “income” within the meaning of 
the 16th Amendment.  Therefore under the Pollock Court’s definition of direct taxes, 
which included taxes on personal property, Congress could not tax property – in that case 
 
the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury, being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is 
to be accounted for as income.”).   
351 Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 90. 
352 See Sol. Mem. 1384, 1920-2 C.B. 71 (1920) (denying exclusion for recovery of damages for alienation 
of affection stating “the term ‘personal injuries,’ as used therein means physical injuries only.”). 
353 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922). 
354 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
355 See discussion supra beginning at note 170. 
356 See discussion supra at note 305. 
357 Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 757, quoted in Macomber, 252 U.S. at 205.   
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Ms. Macomber’s stock from which there had been no realized income – without 
apportionment.  Justice White, the Pollock dissenter who as Chief Justice wrote the 
majority opinions in Brushaber and Baltic Mining, was now part of the majority holding 
the unapportioned tax on a corporate stock dividend to be unconstitutional.358 
Macomber has no direct application to the Murphy case, because, unlike Ms. 
Macomber, Ms. Murphy did engage in a transaction resulting in realization when she 
exchanged her emotional distress damages for cash.  However, the Court made a number 
of important statements in Macomber that could be relevant to the Murphy case. 
First, the Court suggested that Congress intended in the 1913 Act to “exert its 
power to the extent permitted by the [16th] Amendment.”359 This dicta could be 
interpreted as a reversal of the Court’s prior dicta in Towne, in which the Court concluded 
that the word “incomes” in the 16th Amendment might not be co-extensive with 
“income” in the 1913 Act.  In addition, shortly after Macomber, the Court in Bowers v. 
Kerbaugh-Empire,360 a case that has been the subject of significant academic criticism,361 
358 Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that Justice White’s views had changed from the time of his 
original dissent in Pollock to the time of his majority decisions in Brushaber and Stanton. See Ackerman, 
supra note 116, at 41.  Professor Ackerman argues that Justice White originally sought in his Pollock 
dissent to continue the Court’s historic treatment of direct taxes as applying only to land and capitation.  Id.
However, by the time to his majority decisions in Brushaber and Stanton, Justice White compromised with 
the majority to interpret the 16th Amendment only to over-rule Pollock’s source rule, and to accept 
Pollock’s theory that a non-income tax on personal property was direct.  Id. Professor Ackerman argues 
that Justice White’s later view was incorrect, because the language of the 16th Amendment had been 
clarified during the initial Congressional debates on the Amendment for the purpose of rejecting Pollock 
entirely and reinstating the previous limitation of direct taxes to income and capitation.  Id. However, 
Professor Ackerman’s theory is debatable.  President Taft had proposed a constitutional amendment as a 
compromise to enacting a new income tax law to force the Court to re-evaluate Pollock. Id. at 35.  The 
Conservatives initially proposed language that would, arguably, have had no effect, since the existing 
Constitution permitted direct income taxes with apportionment:  “The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes and inheritances.”  See Ackerman, supra note 116 at 36, quoting S.J. Res. 25, 61st 
Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (1909).  After the liberals pointed out the need to address the apportionment 
requirement, the conservatives proposed “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect direct taxes on 
incomes without apportionment among the several States according to population.”  Ackerman, supra note 
116 at 36, quoting 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (1909).  This proposal would have implicitly adopted the Pollock 
definition of direct taxes (which included personal property), rather than the earlier Court view that direct 
taxes were limited to real estate and capitation taxes.  When the liberals suggested instead eliminating the 
apportionment entirely, for all taxes, the conservatives responded that they were only agreeing to eliminate 
the apportionment requirement for income taxes.  See Ackerman, supra note 116 at 37.  A compromise 
proposed by the Senate Committee on Finance contained the language ultimately adopted.  Ackerman, 
supra note 116 at 38, citing S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 3900 (1909).  Professor Ackerman 
argues that this compromise shows an intent to return to the pre-Pollock definition of direct taxes – real 
property and capitation.  Ackerman, supra note 116 at 38.  However, the language of the final amendment 
simply does not address whether non-income taxes on personal property remain subject to the 
apportionment requirement.  It is true, as Professor Ackerman points out, that the language in the initial 
proposal, which would have validated the Pollock definition, was deleted.  But the alternative that was 
adopted leaves the personal property question open rather than putting it to rest.  Contrary to Professor 
Ackerman’s argument, the final language appears to have been a compromise – it neither adopted the 
Pollock view that taxes on personal property were “direct” nor rejected it.   
359 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 203. 
360 271 U.S. 170 (1926). 
361 See e.g. Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lumber:  The Many Faces of Discharge of Indebtedness 
Income, at 106, REPRINTED IN Tax Stories, supra note 371 (“The whole transaction theory [of Kerbaugh-
Empire] is not only theoretically wrong, it is completely impractical.”).  The Court ruled that a taxpayer’s 
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went further in holding that “‘Income’ has been taken to mean the same thing as used in 
the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment and in the various 
revenue acts subsequently passed.”362 
Second, the Court adopted the definition of income used in the 1909 Corporate 
Tax cases:  “‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or 
from both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or 
conversion of capital assets, to which it applied in the Doyle case.”363 
Third, the Court promoted realization from a matter of statutory convenience to a 
constitutional mandate by focusing on the word “derived” in the 16th Amendment.  
According to the Court, “derived” means that the income must be severed from the 
property in some way.364 This notion of severance gave rise to the early concept of 
realization. 
In reaching its conclusion that realization was a constitutional mandate, the Court 
specifically rejected the government’s argument that it could constitutionally tax a 
shareholder on the income earned by a corporation each year, as it does a partner in a 
partnership, even if none of that income had been distributed.365 The Court, using little in 
the way of analysis or logic, held that the accrual system that had been allowed by the 
Court in Collector v. Hubbard366 had been overruled by Pollock, and had not been 
reinstated by the 16th Amendment.367 
Four judges dissented from Macomber, in two written dissenting opinions.  
Justice Holmes, who had written the Court’s earlier decision in Towne, wrote a terse 
dissent arguing that the purpose of the 16th Amendment “was to get rid of nice questions 
as to what might be a direct tax, and I cannot but doubt that most people not lawyers 
would suppose when they voted for it they put a question like the present to rest.  I am of 
the opinion that the Amendment justifies the tax.”368 Justice Brandeis wrote a lengthy 
Socratic dissent on the merits, arguing both that the 16th Amendment gave Congress the 
power to tax a shareholder on all corporate earnings, and that the declaration of a stock 
 
gain in U.S. dollars from paying back borrowed German marks at a depreciated value was not taxable 
because the taxpayer’s use of the borrowed funds had resulted in an overall loss.  While the Court has never 
explicitly over-ruled the case on its facts, the theory of the case – focusing on overall results rather than 
specific transactions within a taxable year - was rejected by the Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks 
Company, 282 U.S. 359 (1931). 
362 Id. at 174. 
363 Id. at 193. 
364 Id. (“Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of 
value in  the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the 
property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being ”derived,” this is 
received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal; - that is income 
derived from property.  Nothing else answers the description.”) (emphasis in original). 
365 See Id. at 218 (“But this would be a taxation of property because of its ownership, and hence would 
require apportionment under the provisions of the Constitution, is settled beyond peradventure by previous 
decisions of this Court.”). 
366 Id. at 289. 
367 Id. at 219 (“The Government nevertheless insists that the Sixteenth Amendment removed this obstacle, 
so that now the Hubbard Case is authority for the power to Congress to levy a tax on the stockholder’s 
share of the accumulated profits of the corporation even before division by the declaration of a dividend of 
any kind.  Manifestly, this argument must be rejected, since the Amendment applies to income only, and 
what is called the stockholder’s share in the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not income.”). 
368 Id. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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dividend – which is recognized by the corporation as a distribution of earnings and profits 
with a consequent mandatory reinvestment in new stock of the corporation – is a proper 
occasion for recognition of income under a realization system, and had been accepted as 
such by a number of states.369 
Legal historians view Macomber as a decision coming at the tail-end of what has 
become known as the “Lochner Era”370 – a period in which the Court’s understanding of 
judicial review included a power, known as substantive due process, to invalidate what it 
believed to be improvident social legislation that posed a threat to commercial 
interests.371 Shortly after Macomber, the Court in Evans v. Gore372 held that the un-
diminishable salaries provision of Article III of the Constitution prevented the income tax 
from reaching the salary of federal judges.  In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,373 also 
known as the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court held that Congress could not use its taxing 
power for the purpose of regulating an activity that it could not regulate directly under its 
enumerated Constitutional powers.374 These decisions were either directly or implicitly 
repudiated following the flood of new deal social legislation driven by the political winds 
of the great depression.  In O’Malley v. Woodrough,375the Court limited Evans v. Gore to 
judges appointed prior to enactment of a tax on their income, and in United States v. 
Hatter376 finally overruled it.  Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company was never explicitly 
overruled, but its underlying rationale was rejected when the Court recognized that 
Congress held a greatly-expanded power of direct regulation under the commerce 
clause.377 
369 Id. at 226 – 38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
370 So-named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
371 See e.g. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber:  The Continuing Legacy of Realization, at 73, 
in TAX STORIES, AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES (Foundation Press 
2003) (“Macomber is best understood as part of the struggle during the Lochner era to define the nature and 
scope of government.”); Ackerman, supra note 116, at 43 (“To be sure, the year was 1920, and perhaps 
Justice Pitney thought that the "function" of the clause went without saying in an era dominated by the 
laissez-faire presuppositions of Lochner v. New York.”). 
372 253 U.S. 245 (1920). 
373 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922). 
374 The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), had held that Congress could not prohibit the 
use of child labor under its power to regulate interstate Commerce.  In response, in 1919, Congress 
imposed a special tax in the amount of 10% of net profits on anyone using defined child labor.  Title XII of 
the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1138 (1919).  The Court in Bailey held the 1919 tax 
unconstitutional as an improper disguised attempt to regulate intrastate commerce. 
375 307 U.S. 277 (1939). 
376 532 U.S. 557 (2001) (“There is no good reason why a judge should not share the tax burdens borne by 
all citizens. Although Congress cannot directly reduce judicial salaries even as part of an equitable effort to 
reduce all Government salaries, a tax law, unlike a law mandating a salary reduction, affects compensation 
indirectly, not directly.). 
377 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the decision preventing Congress from directly regulating 
child labor, was over-ruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  Thus, the theory underlying the 
Court’s decision in Bailey – that Congress could not regulate child labor by directed taxation since it could 
not regulate child labor directly – was entirely undercut.  In Rockefeller v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 9, 13 
(E.D. Ark. 1982), the district court suggested that the general theory of Bailey – that Congress could not 
regulate with a tax that which it could not regulate directly – was effectively overruled by the Court’s later 
decisions, such as United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950), in which the Court stated:  “It is 
beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or 
definitely deters the activity taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously 
62
However, Macomber has never been overruled.  Professor Ackerman expressed 
some surprise that the split decision in Macomber was met with “a long period of judicial 
silence extending from the 1920s through today” rather than, as one would expect of a 
such a famous divided decision “judicial debate and reappraisal.”378 The long formal 
silence can be explained by the Court’s quick narrow interpretation of the holding, and 
subsequent retreat from the definitions used by the Court in Macomber.
The narrow interpretation began the following year in Merchants’ Loan & Trust 
Co. v. Smietanka.379 Emboldened by Macomber, some loose dicta in Turrish,380 and a 
misunderstanding of the difference between the accrual income tax system utilized during 
the Civil War as interpreted in Gray v. Darlington and the realization system utilized by 
the 20th Century taxing statutes,381 taxpayers challenged the ability of the government to 
tax isolated realized gains from the sale of capital assets.   This was nothing short of an 
attempt to eviscerate the 16th Amendment by limiting Congress’s power to tax income to 
essentially that which had already been recognized under the 1909 Corporate Income Tax 
Act – taxes on business activities but not on isolated property activities.  The challengers 
were emboldened when, shortly after Macomber, a district court in Connecticut held that 
Congress could not constitutionally tax the increase in value of property (bonds, in that 
case) upon sale because the increase was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th 
Amendment.382 A note in the Harvard Law Review criticized the district court’s ruling 
for turning a statutory interpretation issue into a constitutional one, and criticized Eisner 
v. Macomber for ignoring the popular mandate by restricting the power of Congress to 
legislate.383 Nevertheless, a concerned Congress enacted special non-recognition rules to 
defer the taxation of gains realized on like kind exchanges.384 The concern about capital 
gains was short-lived, however.  Only one year after Macomber, the Court in Smietanka 
firmly rejected the notion that realized gains on capital assets could not be taxed.385 
Smietanka was quickly followed by United States v. Phellis,386 a case involving 
the reorganization of the Du Pont company.  Before the reorganization, the taxpayer in 
Phellis held stock in a New Jersey Du Pont Corporation.  The New Jersey Du Pont 
reorganized by transferring its business assets to a new Delaware Du Pont corporation in 
return for the Delaware corporation’s stock.  The New Jersey Du Pont then distributed 
some of its stock in the Delaware Du Pont to the taxpayer.  The New Jersey Du Pont 
 
neglible, or the revenue purpose of tax may be secondary.  Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it 
touches on activities which Congress may not otherwise regulate.”     
378Ackerman, supra note 116, at 46.  
379 255 U.S. 509 (1921). 
380 Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. at 230 (interpreting Gray v. Darlington as holding “that such advance in 
value is not income at all, but merely increase of capital and not subject to a tax as income."). 
381 See discussion supra beginning at note 292. 
382 Brewster v. Walsh, 268 Fed. 207 (Conn 1920), rev’d in part 255 U.S. 536 (1921). 
383 Note, 34 HARV. L. REV. 536 (1921). 
384 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921). 
385 Smietanka, 255 U.S. at 519-20 (“Since the fund here taxed was the amount realized from the sale of the 
stock in 1917, less the capital investment as determined by the trustee as of March 1, 1913, it is palpable 
that it was a ‘gain or profit’ ‘produced by’ or ‘derived from’ that investment, and that it ‘proceeded,’ and 
was ‘severed’ or rendered severable, from it, by the sale for cash, and thereby became that ‘realized gain’ 
which has been repeatedly declared to be taxable income within the meaning of the constitutional 
amendment and the acts of Congress.”). 
386 257 U.S. 156 (1921). 
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stayed in business as a holding company.  After the reorganization, the combined 
Delaware and New Jersey Du Pont’s had the same assets, and were owned and run by the 
same people, as was the New Jersey corporation before the reorganization.  The trial 
court even noted that the market value of the taxpayer’s investment before and after the 
reorganization had not changed.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, noting that 
equivalency in market value is irrelevant, held that the stock dividend was taxable.  The 
proper question was whether the essential nature of the taxpayer’s investment had 
changed in any material respect.  The Court distinguished Macomber, holding that Du 
Pont’s dividend of stock in the new corporation was taxable because the fundamental 
nature of the taxpayer’s investment had been changed in several ways:  the new Delaware 
corporation was incorporated in a different state with different governance rules, was 
authorized to issue a much larger amount of capital stock than the old corporation, and 
was legally separate from the old corporation which continued in existence.387 Phellis, 
and other similar cases that followed,388 thus limited Macomber to a very clean stock 
dividend.   
Furthermore, each of the principles announced in Macomber have gone through 
substantial revision or have been outright rejected by later courts.  The idea that the word 
“income” had in the 16th Amendment the same meaning as it was interpreted to have in 
the first taxing acts has been greatly limited.  Eleven years after Macomber, the Court in 
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Company389 recognized that there are many possible systems 
of income taxation, and that it was Congress in enacting the taxing statutes, and not the 
16th Amendment, that decided which of the permissible systems to adopt.390 While the 
courts have continued to say that Congress intended to exercise its full taxing power in 
IRC section 61,391 the statement is properly tempered by the practical realities of the 
realization system chosen by Congress, the specific statutory exclusions enacted by 
 
387 Id. at 172-73 (“In the light of all this we cannot regard the new company as virtually identical with the 
old, but must treat it as a substantial corporate body with its own separate identity, and its stockholders as 
having property rights and interests materially different from those incident to ownership of stock in the old 
company.”). 
388 Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Weiss v. 
Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 
441 (1936). 
389 282 U.S. 359 (1931). 
390 Id. at 365 (“The computation of income annually as the net result of all transactions within the year was 
a familiar practice, and taxes upon income so arrived at were not unknown, before the Sixteenth 
Amendment.  It is not to be supposed that the amendment did not contemplate that Congress might make 
income so ascertained the basis of a scheme of taxation such as had been in actual operation within the 
United States before its adoption. While, conceivably, a different system might be devised by which the tax 
could be assessed, wholly or in part, on the basis of the finally ascertained results of particular transactions, 
Congress is not required by the amendment to adopt such a system in preference to the more 
familiar method, even if it were practicable.”) (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
391 See e.g. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992) (“As this Court has recognized, Congress 
intended through § 61(a) and its statutory precursors to exert ‘the full measure of its taxing power,’ and to 
bring within the definition of income any ‘accession to wealth.’”) (citations omitted); Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (“This Court has frequently stated that this language was 
used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’”) (citations omitted); 
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940) (“The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose 
of Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable categories.”). 
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Congress,392 and by the historical exclusions that have been recognized by the Treasury 
Department in the administration of the tax laws either for reasons of administrative 
convenience or fundamental fairness.  
Similarly, by 1940, the Court had pulled away from the notion that realization 
was mandated by the 16th Amendment.  The pullback began in Helvering v. Braun.393 
Prior to Braun, the courts had relied on Macomber in holding that a tenant’s 
improvements to the landlord’s property were not income to the landlord at the time the 
improvements were made, nor were ratable portions of the value of the tenant’s 
improvements additional rent that could be taxed over the term of the lease.394 The 
landlord in Braun argued that the improvements could not be taxed until the property was 
sold, and any gain “severed” from the real estate.  The Court rejected the landlord’s 
argument, allowing the value of the improvements to be taxed to the landlord at the time 
the lease terminated.  Braun was decided on the basis of the broad language used in the 
taxing statute, which the Court said “follows closely the Sixteenth Amendment.”395 Later 
that year, in Helvering v. Horst,396 the Court held that a donor would be taxed on the 
interest paid on a bond even though the interest coupon had been given to the donor’s son 
before it matured and was paid.  The Court held that the gift of the income coupon was a 
realization event.  In defining realization, the Court backed far away from the 
constitutional mandate it had found in Macomber:
From the beginning the revenue laws have been interpreted as 
defining "realization" of income as the taxable event, rather than 
the acquisition of the right to receive it. . . .  The rule [that income 
is not taxable until realized], founded on administrative 
convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final 
event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by the 
taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the 
enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's 
personal receipt of money or property.397 
More recently, the Court in Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,398 reaffirmed 
the notion that realization is merely a matter of administrative convenience,399 and that 
Macomber remains of interest only because Congress enacted its statutory rules in that 
“contemporary legal context.”400 
392 See IRC §§ 101-140 (items specifically excluded from Gross Income).   
393 309 U.S. 461 (1940). 
394 Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 880 (2nd Cir. 1935) (improvements not taxable to landlord 
when improvements made); M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267 (1938) (improvements not 
taxable as rent over life of lease). 
395 309 U.S. at 468.  This was a significant change from prior language suggesting that “income” has the 
same meaning under both the statute and the Amendment.  See discussion supra at notes 359 to 362. 
396 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
397 Id. at 115-16 (emphasis added). 
398 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
399 Id. at 559 (“As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is ‘founded on administrative 
convenience.’ Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940).”). 
400 Cottage Savings, 318 U.S. at 562 (“Because these decisions [including Macomber] were part of the 
"contemporary legal context" in which Congress enacted [the statute in issue] . . ., and because Congress 
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Finally, the Court has rejected Macomber’s narrow definition of income, which 
was taken from the 1907 Corporate Tax – “a gain derived from capital, labor or both 
combined.”401 In deciding that windfall recoveries like punitive damages were taxable as 
income, the Court in Commissioner v. Glanshaw Glass402 defined income broadly to 
include all “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion,”403 and held that the definition used in Macomber 
“was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”404 
Although virtually every aspect of the Macomber holding has been undermined, 
the Court has never over-ruled the case, and in fact specifically declined an invitation to 
do so.  The opportunity to reconsider Macomber arose when Congress amended the 
statute to provide for the taxation of all stock dividends unless they do “not constitute 
income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution."405 The statute was first amended in 1936, but the issue did not come 
before the Supreme Court until the 1943 case of Helvering v. Griffiths.406 In Griffiths, the 
government asked the Court to finally over-rule Macomber by holding that the small 
stock dividend in issue would be taxable under the 1939 Code.  While recognizing that 
the “original theoretical bases of the decision in Eisner v. Macomber” had been 
undermined by later decisions of the Court, the Court nevertheless declined to over-rule 
Macomber, finding instead that Congress, in enacting the new statutory language, had 
intended to incorporate rather than challenge the rule of Macomber.407 In his dissent in 
Griffiths, Justice Douglas said that “Eisner v. Macomber dies a slow death.”408 
Indeed it does, for the court of appeals’ decision in Murphy transports us back 
nearly 90 years to a time when courts thought they were empowered to overturn the 
taxing acts of Congress by attributing to the language of the 16th Amendment a meaning 
that they desire – a meaning nowhere expressed in the statute or its history.  The only 
clear purpose of the 16th Amendment was to overturn the Pollock Court’s interpretation 
of the direct taxing clause as a restriction on Congress’s power to impose broad based 
taxes on income from property without apportionment.  Congress may well have thought 
it necessary or advisable in 1918 to exclude personal injury awards after the Supreme 
Court had narrowly interpreted income as a “gain from capital, from labor or from both 
combined,” but it is difficult to see how that ruling should have currency today, under the 
much broader definition of income adopted by the Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass.409 
By attributing constitutional currency to statutory decisions from the Macomber 
era, the court of appeals in Murphy unwittingly returned to a long-ago rejected definition 
of “income.”  Under the standard enunciated by the Court in Glenshaw Glass, the proper 
 
has left undisturbed through subsequent reenactments of the Code the principles of realization established 
in these cases, we may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles in § 1001(a).”). 
401 See discussion supra at note 363. 
402 348 U.S. 426 (1955) 
403 Id. at 431. 
404 Id.
405 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 1, 53 Stat. 1, § 115(f) (1939). 
406 318 U.S. 371 (1943). 
407 Id. at 404 (“We are unable to find that Congress intended to tax the dividends in question, and without 
Congressional authority we are powerless to do so. That being the case, we cannot reach the 
reconsideration of Eisner v. Macomber on the basis of the present legislation and Regulations.”). 
408 Id. at 404 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
409 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 328 U.S. 426 (1955), discussed supra note 402. 
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question in Murphy was whether Ms. Murphy realized an “accession to wealth” when she 
exchanged her emotional distress damages for cash, not whether Ms. Murphy realized a 
gain from her capital or labor.  To determine whether Ms. Murphy realized an “accession 
to wealth,” it is necessary to determine what the Supreme Court means by wealth.  If, as 
the court of appeals in Murphy seemed to suggest, wealth means the fair market value of 
one’s property at the time of sale, than virtually no arms’ length sale would result in an 
accession of wealth.    On the other hand, if wealth consists solely of previously taxed or 
previously exempted income that has been invested in real or personal property, under the 
concept called “basis,” then Ms. Murphy’s entire award would constitute an “accession to 
wealth” and be income. 
 
(4) Ms. Murphy Realized Income Because She Had No Basis in Her 
Human Capital. 
 
The court of appeals in Murphy held that Ms. Murphy’s award of emotional and 
reputational damages was not “income” because it was intended to compensate Ms. 
Murphy for her lost emotional well being, and that emotional well being would not have 
been subject to tax if it had not been lost.410 
There are two conceptual problems with the court of appeals’ holding.  First, it is 
not necessarily true that Ms. Murphy would not have received additional taxable income 
if her emotional well being had not been lost.  In order to recover lost wages, a claimant 
must generally prove precise and specific losses.411 While Ms. Murphy did not receive a 
separate award for lost wages (presumably because she could not prove specific wage 
losses), it is entirely possible that she would have made more income from her labor if 
she had been feeling well than she made in her impaired state.  An inability to prove the 
precise amount of losses does not mean losses did not occur.  Whether Ms. Murphy’s 
emotional well being would have been consumed in leisure or used to generate additional 
income is entirely speculative.  Indeed, the proponents of the amendment to IRC section 
104(a)(2) stated in the House committee report the belief that emotional distress claims 
generally result in receipts that would have generated taxable income if the emotional 
distress had not occurred.412 Certainly it would be difficult for the administrators of the 
tax law and the courts to determine precisely how much of a general compensatory award 
compensated for losses that would have resulted in additional taxable income if the losses 
had not occurred and how much of the award compensated for the loss of one’s own 
 
410 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92 (“Murphy’s compensatory award in particular was not received ‘in lieu of’ 
something normally taxed as income.”). 
411 See e.g. MATTHEW BENDER, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 3.04, 121.20 (2006) (party 
claiming damages for lost earnings or profits, or future damages for loss of earning capacity, must prove 
the fact and amount of damages with “reasonable certainty.”  Fact and amount of damages cannot be based 
on speculation or conjecture); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga. App. 463, 469 S.E.2d 763 (1996) (plaintiff 
established lost earnings with “reasonable certainty” by introducing into evidence prior three years’ tax 
returns); Colezetti v. Pircio, 214 A.D.2d 926, 625 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1995)  (general assertions that injuries 
caused plaintiff to miss time from work, to fail to complete jobs timely and to lose consulting jobs does not 
satisfy requirement of “reasonable certainty”). 
412 See House Committee Report on Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H. REPT. NO. 104-586 at 
143 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481 (“Damages received on a claim not involving physical injury or physical 
sickness are generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits or lost wages that would otherwise be 
included in taxable income.”).   
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consumption of human capital (which would not have been subject to taxation).  The 
court of appeals’ counter-factual conclusion that the lost emotional well being would not 
have resulted in additional taxable income was both speculative and contrary to 
Congress’s purpose in restricting the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2). 
Secondly, in determining that Ms. Murphy realized no gain or accession to wealth 
as a result of the emotional and reputational damages award, the court of appeals 
incorrectly focused on the market value of the property rights (Ms. Murphy’s lost human 
capital as a result of her injury) that were exchanged for cash in the award, rather than 
Ms. Murphy’s tax cost basis in the property exchanged (her lost human capital).   
From the time of the first modern income tax acts, Congress and the courts 
recognized that not all gross proceeds from the sale of property constitute income under 
the taxing acts.413 Some sales proceeds represented merely the recovery of the taxpayer’s 
original investment.  As a general matter, the funds used to make that original investment 
in the property had come either from income that had been previously taxed, from 
income that had been permanently exempted from tax when earned (either because the 
funds had been earned before the income tax law went into effect, or because the funds 
were for some other reason not subject to tax), or from borrowed funds that would have 
to be repaid from previously taxed income.414 For example, when a taxpayer buys 
property for $100, and later sells the property for $300.  We all know that the taxpayer 
has $200 of gain that is realized as income at the time of sale.  The income tax statute 
does not reach the entire $300 in sale proceeds because $100 of the proceeds represents 
merely the recovery of taxpayer’s original cost in purchasing the property.  To tax the 
original taxpayer again at the time of sale on the recovery of the taxpayer’s original 
investment of $100 would either be to impose a double tax on the same original income 
earned by the same taxpayer, or to tax previously exempted income that had been 
invested in property. 
The IRC keeps track of the taxpayer’s investment in property of previously taxed 
or exempt income through a mechanism called “basis.”  The taxpayer receives basis for 
the original purchase cost of the property,415 and gets an increase in basis for any 
 
413 Prior to the adoption of the 16th Amendment, the Supreme Court had defined income from property as 
the increase in value during ownership.  See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. 63 (1872) (gain in value of 
bonds); Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913) (gains from operation of mine).  
While the early Courts did not discuss the notion of cost basis, the principle that the recovery of the 
taxpayer’s previously taxed capital would not be income was well recognized.  The 1913 Act imposed a tax 
on “net income” which included “the gains, profits and income derived from . . . sales or dealings in 
property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal 
property.”  Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, § II, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166,  167.  The 1916 Act used the same 
language, but added an exclusion for the value of the property on March 1, 1913, if acquired before that 
date.  Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.  While these early tax statutes did not more specifically 
define the word “gain,” it was recognized that the mere recoupment of an original investment did not 
represent gain.   
414 Even if the $100 came from borrowed funds rather than income, those funds will either have to be 
repaid with previously taxed or excluded income, or, if the debt is canceled, cancellation of indebtedness 
income will have to be recognized.  See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); IRC 
§108(a).  The tax system gives the taxpayer a basis in borrowed funds because of the taxpayer’s obligation 
to repay the loan. 
415 IRC § 1012. 
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additional non-deductible capital improvement investments made in the property.416 
Likewise, the taxpayer must reduce basis for the benefits received from the property, 
either in the form of tax deductions for depreciation and the like or other non-taxable 
recoveries received from the property.417 The cost basis, as adjusted up for additional 
investments and down for the recovery of benefits, is known as the “adjusted basis.”418 
When the property is sold, the tax cost “adjusted basis,” representing the taxpayers 
investment of already-taxed or exempt income in the property, is subtracted from the 
sales price (known as the “amount realized”) in arriving at the gain that is subject to 
tax.419 The fundamental purpose of these basis rules is to prevent a taxpayer from being 
taxed twice on the same income, or from being taxed on income earned earlier that had 
been exempted.  The untaxed increase in the value of property prior to realization may 
constitute economic capital or wealth, but, because that increase in value was not 
previously subject to tax and was not permanently exempted, it does not result in basis 
that can be used to offset gain.  This concept of basis is necessary for a realization system 
of income taxation to properly reach, at the time of realization, the increase in the value 
of property that accrued in prior periods.   
The distinction between a recovery of economic capital and a recovery of tax-cost 
basis was recognized in by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Raytheon 
Production Corp. v. Commissioner.420 The issue in Raytheon was whether a corporation 
was required to include in income an anti-trust damages recovery.  The court of appeals 
first recognized that anti-trust damages recovered on account of lost profits would be 
taxable because the lost profits would have been taxable.  The development of the “in lieu 
of what” test for allocating recoveries is often credited to the opinion in Raytheon.
Equally important were the Raytheon court’s comments about the distinction 
between basis and economic capital.  After holding that Raytheon’s anti-trust recoveries 
were on account of good will (generally not taxed until the business is sold) and not lost 
profits (generally taxed each year), the court considered whether the recoveries of capital 
might nevertheless be subject to taxation as income.  The court of appeals rejected 
Raytheon’s argument that capital recoveries were inherently non-taxable: 
 
[T]o say that the recovery represents a return of capital in that it 
takes the place of the business good will is not to conclude that it 
may not contain a taxable benefit. Although the injured party may 
not be deriving a profit as a result of the damage suit itself, the 
conversion thereby of his property into cash is a realization of any 
gain made over the cost or other basis of the good will prior to the 
illegal interference. Thus A buys Blackacre for $5,000. It 
appreciates in value to $50,000. B tortiously destroys it by fire. A 
sues and recovers $50,000 tort damages from B. Although no gain 
was derived by A from the suit, his prior gain due to the 
 
416 IRC § 1016(a) (basis increased for “expenditures . . . or other items properly chargeable to capital 
account.”).. 
417 IRC §1016(a)(2). 
418 IRC § 1011(a). 
419 See IRC § 1001. 
420 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944). 
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appreciation in value of Blackacre is realized when it is turned into 
cash by the money damages.  Compensation for the loss of 
Raytheon's good will in excess of its cost is gross income.421 
This distinction between a taxable recovery of capital and a non-taxable recovery of basis 
is fundamental to the realization system of income taxation utilized since the adoption of 
the 16th Amendment.422 
After first focusing on ancient understandings of the word “income” from the 
early 20th Century, the court of appeals in Murphy correctly framed the issue before it in 
the modern terms employed in Glenshaw Glass – whether Ms. Murphy’s compensatory 
damage award resulted in an accession to wealth423 – but then failed to analyze the 
question in a coherent way.  The court of appeals simply concluded that Ms. Murphy’s 
award was “but a restoration of the status quo ante, analogous to a restoration of capital, 
in neither context does the payment result in a ‘gain’ or ‘accession to wealth.’”424 
The court of appeals in Murphy ruled that emotional distress damages awards are 
not taxable because they compensate for something that would not have been taxed if it 
had not been lost – emotional and reputational well-being that would not have resulted in 
additional wages.  The court of appeals suggested that Ms. Murphy received no gain – no 
“accession to wealth” – because the value of her lost emotional and reputational well-
being equaled the amount of the settlement.425 But gain is not measured by the value at 
the time of exchange of the property interests transferred.  As we have seen, gain426 in 
property transactions is measured by deducting from the amount realized in the exchange 
only the seller’s tax-cost basis in the property.427 In computing gain, the seller cannot 
reduce the amount realized by the market value of the property sold.    Under the court of 
appeals’ analysis in Murphy, an arm’s length sale of property would generally result in no 
taxable income, because the amount received from the sale would simply equal the value 
of the property transferred – and thus there would be no gain.  The court of appeals’ 
approach ignores the appreciation in value that is inherent in the property sold.  That 
appreciation is realized as taxable gain at the time of sale. 
The court of appeals rejected the government’s argument that Ms. Murphy did not 
have any basis in her human capital, and therefore the entire amount received from the 
settlement was gain or income.428 The court of appeals simply said “we reject the 
 
421 Id. at 114. 
422 See discussion of Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), supra note 305. 
423 Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 85. 
424 Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 88 n. ___ (citations omitted). 
425 See supra note 424 (contending that Ms. Murphy had no income because the value of the human capital 
she lost and money she received were equal, without considering whether she had any tax cost basis in her 
human capital).   
426 IRC §1001(a). 
427 IRC § 1011. 
428 Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 87 (“[T]he Government challenges the coherence of Murphy’s analogy between a 
return of “human capital or well-being’ and a return of “financial capital,” . . . The Government first 
observes that financial capital, like all property, has a “basis,” . . . The Government then observes that 
‘[b]ecause people do not pay cash or its equivalent to acquire their well-being, they have no basis in it for 
purposes of measuring gain (or loss) upon the realization of compensatory damages.’ . . . At the outset, we 
reject the Government’s breathtakingly expansive claim of congressional power under the Sixteenth 
Amendment.”). 
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Government’s breathtakingly expansive claim of congressional power under the 
Sixteenth Amendment – upon which it founds the more far–reaching arguments advanced 
here.”429 
Yet, the point made by the government is fundamental.  The court of appeals in 
Murphy erred by focusing on whether Ms. Murphy recovered capital, rather than focusing 
on whether Ms. Murphy recovered more than her tax-cost basis.  Any recovery in excess 
of basis causes an increase in realized wealth, and the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that increases in realized wealth are income.430 If human capital recoveries were taxed as 
property, then the court of appeals in Murphy should have taxed the amount of the award 
that exceeded Ms. Murphy’s proven basis in her human capital. 
By focusing solely on whether the recovery constitutes a return of capital, without 
regard to tax-cost basis, the court of appeals in Murphy charts a return to the days before 
Smietakna431 when some thought that capital gains could not be taxed as income because 
there had been no gain – measured by the value of the market value of the property 
transferred at the time of the exchange.  The court of appeals in Murphy failed to consider 
whether Ms. Murphy’s tax-basis wealth was increased when she received a cash payment 
on account of a human capital interest that had not been previously taxed or permanently 
exempted from tax when it accrued.432 
Other courts have recognized that a taxpayer must recognize income upon the sale 
of human capital.  For example, in Roemer v. Commissioner,433 the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit allowed the taxpayer to exclude damages recovered for defamation 
under an earlier version of IRC section 104(a)(2).  In a footnote, however, the court 
noted: 
 
Since there is no tax basis in a person's health and other personal 
interest, money received as compensation for an injury to those 
interests might be considered a realized accession to wealth. 
Nevertheless, Congress in its compassion has retained the 
exclusion.434 
In Polone v. Commissioner,435 the taxpayer settled a defamation claim prior to the 
effective date of the 1996 amendments adding the “physical injury or physical sickness” 
to section 104(a)(2).  However, the settlement provided for structured payments to be 
made in the future, which were held to be subject to the new statute when received.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that the payments were taxable as income because the taxpayer had no 
 
429 Id.
430 See discussion of Smietanka, supra beginning at note 379  
431 See discussion supra beginning at note 379. 
432 Human capital is not permanently exempted from taxation because, when labor is sold, the wages are 
taxable.  It is only human capital that is consumed by the taxpayer in the form of leisure that results in no 
taxable income.  If, rather than being consumed, human capital is sold for money that can be used to satisfy 
other desires, it is subject to tax.  See discussion infra part IV.B(5) beginning on page 71. 
433 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). 
434 Id. at 696 n. 2. 
435 449 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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basis in his human capital.436 Cases involving the sale of one’s blood recognize that the 
proceeds received are income because a taxpayer has no basis in their own body parts.437 
The court of appeals’ holding that Ms. Murphy’s emotional and reputational 
damages award was not income was thus wrong for two reasons.  First, the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the award was not received in lieu of income that would 
have been taxed, because Ms. Murphy’s emotional and reputational losses may well have 
reduced her taxable income from what it would have been if the losses had not occurred.  
Second, even if it were proper to treat human capital as property, an issue discussed 
below,438 the court of appeals failed to recognize that Ms. Murphy’s award resulted in an 
accession to her tax-basis wealth, because she had not previously been taxed on the 
increase in the value of her lost human capital. 
This basis analysis assumes that human capital would be treated like financial 
capital by the income tax system.  As discussed below, the implicit theory underlying the 
court of appeals’ holding in Murphy would work a substantial change in the taxation of 
income from human capital, and would threaten the longstanding treatment of wages as 
taxable income.   
 
(5) Ms. Murphy’s Receipts from Human Capital Were Income. 
 
The court of appeals in Murphy erred by assuming that human capital is wealth, 
and thus that Ms. Murphy realized no accession to wealth, and thus no income, when she 
received the award of emotional and reputational damages.   
The modern concept of human capital was largely developed by economists 
beginning in the 1950s.439 According to economist Gary Becker’s Nobel Prize speech, 
which was cited by the court of appeals in Murphy as support for Ms. Murphy’s argument 
that her damages award was a recovery of capital rather than income,440 the modern 
concept of human capital is based on the theory that “individuals decide on their 
education, training, medical care, and other additions to knowledge and health by 
weighing the benefits and costs. Benefits include cultural and other non-monetary gains 
along with improvement in earnings and occupations, while costs usually depend mainly 
 
436 Id. at 1045 (““Polone's defamation claim has no adjusted basis within the meaning of § 1001. . . . 
[A]djusted basis" would have had to have been calculated pursuant to § 1012.  A § 1012 calculation, 
however, is based on cost, which is antithetical to a defamation claim. . . .  Such a personal injury cannot 
reasonably be said to have a cost in the traditional market sense that § 1012 requires, in that one cannot sell 
one's dignity as a commodity on the open market. . . .  Because Polone's defamation claim had no adjusted 
basis and was not transferable under California law, his settlement with UTA could not have been a "sale or 
other disposition of property" for purposes of § 1001.”). 
437 See Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538,1540-41 (11th Cir. 1986) (because taxpayer has no basis in 
own blood, no charitable deduction allowed for donation); Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229,1233-34 
(1980) (regular sale of blood constitutes business for which expenses attributable to business are 
deductible). 
438 See infra Part IV.B(5) beginning on page 71. 
439 See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life, Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel, p. 
43 (December 9, 1992), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1992/becker-
lecture.html (“Until the 1950s economists generally assumed that labor power was given 
and not augmentable. . . .  Human capital is so uncontroversial nowadays that it may be difficult to 
appreciate the hostility in the 1950s and 1960s toward the approach that went with the term.”). 
440 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85. 
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on the foregone value of the time spent on these investments.”441 The court of appeals 
did not explain why these modern economic theories of human behavior should dictate 
tax policy, or more importantly how these recent theories support the court of appeals’ 
view that the enactors of the 16th Amendment in 1913 thought that human capital 
recoveries were not income.   
Modern economic theories aside, the history of wage taxation shows that human 
capital has never been treated as property.  Wages under every income tax act have been 
taxable as income without reduction for one’s basis in the human capital being sold.  It 
could have been otherwise.  The tax system could have been structured to require 
taxpayers to keep track of their investments in human capital – everything from education 
and non-deductible medical expenditures, to food, shelter and clothing – and to reduce 
the gains realized from the sale of human capital in the form of wages or damages 
settlements by the amount of those investments.  However, the tax system has never 
treated human capital as property.  Unless specifically allowed by statute, investments in 
one’s own human capital do not give rise to basis that can be used to offset amounts 
realized from the sale of human capital for wages or other fees.442 
In fact, all proceeds from the sale of human capital have been taxed as income, 
unless Congress has saw fit to provide an exemption or a deduction.  Congress has 
always taxed the gross proceeds from the sale of labor, and arguments that wages should 
be treated as a non-taxable recovery of capital have been repeatedly rejected as frivolous 
by the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals in every circuit.443 Therefore, the notion 
that payments on account of human capital are not income because they are in lieu of 




442 See IRC §§ 61(a)(1) (taxing all compensation for services); 1012, 1011 (authorizing basis for 
“property”).  See also e.g. IRC § 262 (no deduction for personal family or household expenses); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (disallowing deduction for educational training to enter new profession because costs 
“constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures.”); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 
T.C. 515 (1976), aff’d 591 F.2d 1273 (1978) (“Since the inseparable aggregate includes personal 
expenditures, the preeminence of section 262 over section 167 precludes any amortization deduction [for 
educational expenses].”). 
443 See e.g. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (discussing when long-rejected tax protestor 
arguments, such as erroneous belief that wages are not income, could be valid defense to criminal charge of 
tax evasion); United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding conviction); United States 
v. Melton, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11683, 77 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2361 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); United States 
v. Bonneau, 970 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (upholding criminal conviction of taxpayer asserting wages not 
income because recovery of human capital); United States v. Capps, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10669 (10th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 943-44 (3rd. Cir. 1990), cert. den. 497 U.S. 1029 (1990) 
(“We take this opportunity to reiterate that wages are income within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment.”); Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986) (Taxpayer Coleman argued that 
“personal depreciation offsets the wage, leaving no net income. . . .  These are tired arguments.”); 
Biermann v. Commissioner, 769 F.2d 707, 708 (11th Cir. 1985); Connor v. Commissioner, 770 F.2d 17, 20 
(2d Cir. 1985) (“Wages are income. The argument that they are not has been rejected so frequently that the 
very raising of it justifies the imposition of sanctions.”) (citations omitted); Perkins v. Commissioner, 746 
F.2d 1187, 1188 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (awarding sanctions for arguing that wages are not income 
under 16th Amendment); Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 264 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (rejecting 
argument that labor is recovery of capital and not taxable under 16th Amendment); United States v. 
Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981) (Romero’s proclaimed belief that . . . the wages he earned as 
a carpenter were not ‘income’ is fatuous as well as obviously incorrect.”). 
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One apparent distinction between ordinary wages and Ms. Murphy’s 
compensatory damages award is that wages involve the voluntary sale of human capital, 
while Ms. Murphy’s injury was involuntary.  However, property sold involuntarily, and 
recoveries for damage to property on account of casualty, have long been treated as 
taxable in the same general manner as voluntary property sales.444 The tax system treats 
both voluntary and involuntary sales of property for cash the same way.  If there is no tax 
difference between the voluntary and involuntary sale of property for cash, why would 
there be a constitutional difference between the voluntary and involuntary sale of human 
capital for cash?  After all, according to the court of appeals’ theory, human capital is 
property.  The involuntary nature of the income may, as some academics have argued,445 
constitute policy grounds for Congress to grant an exclusion, as Congress did for many 
years, but the involuntary nature does not constitute constitutional grounds for treating 
the recovery as non-taxable tax-cost basis rather than as income.  Furthermore, the 16th 
Amendment on its face makes no distinction between voluntarily and involuntarily 
received income.  The court of appeals’ theory that Congress cannot tax recoveries of 
human capital under the 16th Amendment was not based on the involuntary nature of the 
recovery.   
The proper question in the Murphy case, under the standard laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass,446 was whether Ms. Murphy’s damages award 
constituted a realized “accession to wealth.”   If the award constituted an accession to Ms. 
Murphy’s wealth, then it would constitute “income” under the 16th Amendment.  The 
historic treatment of wage income shows that human capital was not considered wealth 
when the 16th Amendment was adopted.  Without doubt, Ms. Murphy increased her 
financial wealth when she traded her emotional distress and reputational injuries for cash, 
just as a laborer receives an increase in financial wealth when she trades her non-taxable 
leisure time for wages.  And just like a laborer who sells human capital in the form of 
labor for cash, Ms. Murphy realized income that was subject to tax under the 16th 
Amendment when she sold her human capital in the form of emotional distress damages 
for cash.   
The court of appeals in Murphy tried to distinguish between a monetary recovery 
on account of human capital in the form of wages, which would be taxable, and a 
monetary recovery on account of human capital in the form of damages, which would not 
be taxable, by arguing that non-wage human capital is normally not taxed.447 It is 
certainly true that one’s consumption of one’s own human capital is not taxed, just as 
one’s consumption of one’s own property is not taxed.448 However, Ms. Murphy did not 
 
444 IRC § 1033(a)(2) (“If property (as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft, seizure, or 
requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily or involuntarily converted . . . 
into money or into property not similar or related in service or use to the converted property, the gain (if 
any) shall be recognized except to the extent provided in this paragraph [relating to like-kind replacement 
property purchased within certain time periods thereafter].”).   
445 See e.g. Sager & Cohen, supra note 346, at 477-79 (arguing as a policy matter that compensation for 
personal injuries should not be taxed because the appreciation in human capital would not be taxed, and the 
sale was involuntary). 
446 See discussion of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 328 U.S. 426 (1955), supra beginning at note 402. 
447 See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88 n. ___. 
448 See Morris v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (“Products of a farm consumed by the 
operator thereof and his family do not appear to come within any of the categories of income enumerated in 
the taxing statutes and the administrative regulations of the Commissioner. To include the value of such 
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consume her own human capital – she sold it for cash.  She received cash that she could 
use to satisfy other (and often more material) desires.  Had Ms. Murphy’s recovery been 
in reimbursement of non-deductible medical care expenses to restore her emotional well 
being, Congress would have allowed her an exclusion.449 It was the conversion of her 
emotional distress to cash that gave rise to realized gain, income and taxation.  In sum, 
the court of appeals utterly failed to demonstrate that Ms. Murphy’s recovery of money 
on account of her emotional or reputational injury was not “income” within the original 




The court of appeals in Murphy made many errors in concluding that IRC Section 
104(a)(2) was unconstitutional in allowing the government to tax Ms. Murphy’s 
emotional distress and reputational injury award.  This paper attempts to analyze the 
question correctly by first considering the statutory questions:  whether Ms. Murphy’s 
award could properly be excluded from income, and if not by considering whether the 
statute required the award to be included in income.   
The court of appeals properly considered whether Ms. Murphy’s award was 
statutorily excluded from income under IRC section 104(a)(2).450 However, the court of 
appeals erred in focusing on the language used in the heading of the award rather than the 
intent of the Department of Labor hearing board in setting the amount of the award.451 
The award, in fact, compensated Ms. Murphy for the physical manifestations of her 
emotional distress.452 If Ms. Murphy’s physical manifestations of emotional distress 
constituted a “personal physical injury or physical sickness” under the statute, then Ms. 
Murphy’s award would have been excluded from income under IRC section 104(a)(2), 
notwithstanding the language used by the hearing board in the heading of the award.  The 
court of appeals in Murphy failed to ask the right question. 
Yet, the Court reached the correct result – that Ms. Murphy’s award was not 
statutory excluded from income – because the legislative history of IRC section 104(a)(2) 
shows that Congress did not intend physical manifestations of emotional distress to 
 
products . . . would automatically subject such amounts to normal tax and in effect include in income 
something which Congress did not intend should be so regarded. If products of a farm consumed thereon 
are income to the producer, it would seem to follow that the rental value of the farmer's home, the 
gratuitous services of his wife and children, and the value of the power derived from draft animals owned 
by the farmer and used without cost should also be so considered. It is obvious that such items are 
comparable to the rental value of a private residence, which has never been regarded as income or as a 
factor in the determination of tax liability.”).  See also Rev. Rul. 59-360, 1959-2 C.B. 75; 1959 IRB LEXIS 
35, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 72-619, 1972-2 C.B. 650, 1972 IRB LEXIS 293, Rev. Rul. 72-619 (1972)  
(“The value of the use and occupancy of a dwelling by the owner thereof does not constitute gross income 
to him. However, when transformed into cash, as where an owner rents his property to another, the amounts 
received constitute gross income.”) (citation omitted).   
449 IRC § 104(a)(2) (flush language) (limitation of exclusion for emotional distress “shall not apply to an 
amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care . . . attributable to emotional 
distress.”).   
450 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 83. 
451 See discussion supra Part III.B page 7. 
452 See supra note 30 
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constitute a “physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning of the statute.453 
This legislative history was relied on by all of the other courts that have considered 
similar questions,454 although curiously none of these cases was cited by the court of 
appeals in Murphy.
Having properly concluded, for the wrong reason, that Ms. Murphy’s award was 
not excluded from income by IRC section 104(a)(2), the court of appeals should next 
have considered whether Congress required the award to be included in income by any 
provision of the IRC.  Contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion, the lack of an 
exclusion does not mandate inclusion.455 Congress must affirmatively seek to tax the 
award.  IRC section 61 requires all “income” to be included in “gross income” and thus 
be subject to taxation.456 Because the court of appeals was required to first determine that 
the statute required taxation before considering the constitutionality of the statute,457 the 
court of appeals must implicitly have determined that Ms. Murphy’s award constituted 
“income” within the meaning of IRC section 61.   
The court of appeals’ implicit determination was correct, because Congress 
clearly intended when IRC section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1996 for “income” under 
section 61 to include those personal injury awards that were no longer excluded from 
income.  Congress made its intent clear in the legislative history,458 but its intent was also 
manifest from the statutory amendment itself.  There would be no rational reason for 
Congress to go to the trouble of specifically eliminating the exclusion if it did not intend 
to render non-excluded awards taxable.459 Under the doctrine of statutory evolution, 
Congress’s intent when it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) is effective for prospectively 
interpreting the ambiguous meaning of the word “income” in section 61.460 Therefore, 
Congress did seek to tax Ms. Murphy’s award in IRC section 61, and it was thus proper 
for the court of appeals to consider whether Congress’s statutory enactment was 
constitutional.   
In considering the constitutionality of the statute, the court of appeals concluded 
that the 16th Amendment did not authorize Congress to tax Ms. Murphy’s award because 
it was not “income.”  The court of appeals then held IRC section 104(a)(2) to be 
unconstititional.   
The Court’s holding that section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional was wrong in a 
number of ways.  First, section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion provision.  The elimination of an 
exclusion cannot be unconstitutional because Congress is not required to exclude all 
things that are not “income.”  If anything is unconstitutional, it would be IRC section 61, 
which required Ms. Murphy to include her award in income.461 
Second, the Court was flat wrong to hold that the 16th Amendment is the sole 
source of Congress’s taxing power.  Congress’s taxing power emanates from Article I of 
the Constitution, and includes the power to tax everything except exports.  However, the 
 
453 See discussion supra Part III.C page 10. 
454 See supra note 73. 
455 See discussion supra Part III.D page 14. 
456 See supra note 82. 
457 See supra note 83 
458 See discussion supra beginning at note 84 
459 See discussion supra beginning at note 85. 
460 See discussion supra beginning at note Error! Bookmark not defined..
461 See discussion supra beginning at note 80 
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Constitution requires Congress to apportion direct taxes.  Since the tax on Ms. Murphy’s 
damage award was not apportioned, it would not be valid if it constituted a direct tax and 
was not “income” within the 16th Amendment. Therefore, the court of appeals should 
have considered whether or not the tax was direct.   
The history of the direct taxing clause shows that only capitation taxes, poll taxes 
and taxes on real and personal property, and the income therefrom, were ever considered 
direct, and that human capital in the form of wages was never considered “property” for 
purposes of the direct taxing clause.462 Moreover, the courts have repeatedly treated the 
taxation of transactions as an indirect “duty or excise,” requiring no apportionment.463 
Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she exchanged her emotional and reputational 
injuries for money.  Thus, even if Congress correctly concluded that the award was not 
income, Congress had the power to tax the award under the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding interpretations of Congressional power under Article I of the Constitution. 
Third, court of appeals erred in concluding that the award was not “income” 
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.  The court of appeals cited no credible 
evidence that the enactors of the 16th Amendment intended compensatory damage 
awards not to be treated as income.464 Under the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation 
of income, any realized accession to wealth – which includes any recovery of money 
from property in excess of basis – is taxable as income.465 Individuals generally are not 
given basis for their investments in their own human capital.466 Therefore, any recovery 
on account of human capital is subject to tax, absent a specific statutory exclusion.  This 
is most evident with wages.  The Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals in every 
circuit have rejected as frivolous the argument that wages are not income because they 
represent the recovery of capital.   
The court of appeals in Murphy has accepted, for the first time, the vary argument 
advanced by the most provocative tax protestors,467 although in a slightly different guise.  
The argument is that wages, which are recoveries on account of human capital, are not 
income because there is no gain or accession to wealth, since the market value of the 
human capital sold equaled the value of the wages received.   The courts have repeatedly 
recognized, however, that because one does not have basis in one’s own human capital, 
the recovery of any money on account of human capital is income, since it results in an 
accession to one’s financial wealth. 
Using proper analysis, the Court should have determined that Ms. Murphy’s 
award constituted income under both section 61 and the 16th Amendment, and therefore 
Congress’s tax on the award was valid.  Moreover, the court of appeals should have 
determined that even if the award was not income under the 16th Amendment, the tax on 
Ms. Murphy’s damages award under IRC section 61 was still constitutional because 
Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to tax the award without 
apportionment as a duty or excise. 
 
462 See discussion in Part IV.A beginning at page 20. 
463 See discussion in Part 0IV.A(6) beginning at page 42 
464 See discussion supra beginning at note 328. 
465 See discussion supra beginning at note 402. 
466 See discussion supra beginning at note 442. 
467 See supra note 443. 
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While valid policy arguments can be made for the exclusion of emotional distress 
and reputational injury awards,468 those policy arguments should be addressed to 
Congress, not the courts.  The Constitution delegates to our elected officials in Congress 
the power to decide questions of tax policy within the broad limits established by the 
Constitution.  Congress decided to eliminate the exclusion for emotional distress and 
reputational damages awards because, as explained in the legislative history, Congress 
sought to minimize unnecessary litigation over the difficult factual question of 
determining whether an emotional recovery was in lieu of taxable income or not – an 
inquiry that Congress felt had bogged down the judicial process.469 Even if one were to 
disagree with Congress’s policy decisions, Congress’s decisions were certainly rational.  
The remedy for those who disagree with Congress’s policy decisions is the ballot box, 
not the courts.  The erroneous decision in Murphy should be promptly overturned. 
 
As of November 3, 2006 
 
468 See e.g. Sager & Cohen, supra note 346. 
469 Id.
